

Reassessing Strategy: A Historical Examination

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In *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu says that “[v]ictory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.”¹ Antoine Henri Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu—masters of war strategy—offer timeless views of the face of battle.

Clausewitz argues that perfect prewar planning for contingencies is difficult, if not impossible, because of the fog of war. To anticipate the full array of possibilities of changes and plan a way to adapt to all of them is, at least, futile. Therefore, the strategist and his enamored tactician must be able to properly assess the situation, given wartime realities, and adapt to battlefield changes. Revising the strategic net assessment is a first step on the road to victory.

Clausewitz states, “Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.”² Idealistically, a strategist wants to anticipate and plan contingencies so as to conquer all changes in the character of war. Sun Tzu indicates that good intelligence makes it possible to predict the outcome of a war in battle. However, Clausewitz says, “[T]he very nature of interaction is bound to make [war] unpredictable.”³ History is rich with examples which show that prewar plans do not directly relate to wartime realities. Strategists’ ability or inability to reassess and adapt to volatile changes—the friction and fog of war—played key roles in the American Revolution, the Korean War and in the Algerian insurgency.

The American Revolution

During the American Revolution, the British had a prewar plan of using coercive measures to force colonists to capitulate to British empirical and parliamentary rule. The prewar British plan was seemingly simple—

put down a rebellion and return the colonies to the desired status quo.

Sun Tzu would have criticized the British for not considering in the prewar planning process the colonials’ will to resist and ability to prevail. He would have told the British to anticipate French and Spanish forces’ joining the battle. In short, he would have suggested that the British needed a better scriptwriter.

Shooting British subjects would not win colonial hearts and minds. If they had ascertained that using force would do nothing more than nourish the rebellion and recognized that force was detrimental to their cause, the British could have designed courses of action to counter colonial reaction. They could have determined whether it was more feasible to go for the decisive blow or to accept a colonial independence while maintaining a prominent economic existence. While the British did not believe they would have to resort to force to put down what they viewed as a weak rebellion, shedding blood at the onset should have led them to reconsider their strategy.⁴

Ideally, it would be great if the strategist could foresee all changes that might occur. But, even Sun Tzu would not argue against the fact that it is nearly impossible to flawlessly script an entire campaign. Because of such uncertainty, prewar plans are always marginal, at best.

The Korean War

The character of the war in Korea could have led to US use of nuclear weapons to prevent communist Chinese intervening between the North and South Koreans.⁵ Considering the inability to anticipate changes in the character of war, it is questionable whether Sun Tzu or Clausewitz would have decided to play the nuclear trump card.

Arguably, a preplanned nuclear

reaction to a possible change in battle would have been detrimental to the military situation in Korea and to international diplomacy. Therefore, while it is important to have preplanned, rehearsed contingencies, it is equally important to reassess situations continually and adapt to changes as they occur.

With the US and South Korean armies forced into the Pusan Perimeter and the Chinese threatening to join the war, the possibility of using nuclear weapons was real. However, the US ability to reevaluate the situation and adapt to real-time changes prevented it. US Army General Douglas MacArthur, reevaluating his possible courses of action, chose the bold, impressive Inchon landing, which curtailed the North Korean advance.

The Algerian Insurgency

In 1954, Algeria’s ruling party, the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN), attempted a Maoist-type insurgency in Algeria against French occupation forces.⁶ No doubt the FLN anticipated French reaction to insurgent activities, but it failed to plan for changes caused by the friction and fog of war.

Initially, FLN actions appeared to have failed. No popular uprising followed the November 1954 revolt, and the French military remained in power. However, the FLN had wisely reevaluated the situation and adjusted its focus, converting its tactics to attacking—successfully—French political and social vulnerabilities.

Ironically, the French inability to properly reevaluate the situation helped the FLN succeed. Reassessment was critical, especially when the French continually failed to gain Muslim support. The French continued to believe that if they could defeat the FLN operationally they could end the insurgency. They were

wrong. Had they reassessed the situation, they would have realized that reforms and an offer of independence would have won the Maghrib's support.

CommonSense

Ideally, strategists would be able to foresee all possible contingencies. However, while it is important to anticipate changes, it is also imperative to reassess and adapt strategy continually to meet each situation's demands. Author Michael Handel writes: "[E]very war is rich in unique episodes. Each is an uncharted sea."⁷ Therefore, there is no theorem,

no dictum and no proven solution for success in war. But, reassessment caveats the best prewar plans to match desired wartime realities. Past wars show that leaders who anticipate changes are leaders who lead their forces to victory. 

NOTES

1. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Boston, MA: Shambala Publications, 1988), 125.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 121.
3. *Ibid.*, 117.
4. The Center of Military History, "The American Revolution: First Phase," in *American Military History* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989), 58-67.
5. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), chapters 2 and 3.
6. Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counter-*

insurgency in Algeria (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1972), chapters 2 through 7, 12 and 16.
7. Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 141.

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ULUS-KERT: An Airborne Company's Last Stand

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In four days of desperate fighting, from 29 February to 3 March 2000, a large force of Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian paratroop company in the harsh defiles and ridges of the Argun Gorge in the mountains of southern Chechnya. Although the battle was a catastrophic tactical defeat for the Russian airborne force, the company's stubborn defense to the last man and the concentration of Russian relief forces inflicted a strategic setback on the Chechens. The Russians stumbled into this catastrophe through poor unit leadership, but Russian blood and valor transformed it into victory.

Hatred to the Bone

In Fall 1999, the Second Chechen War began. The Russian Army sought to reimpose the Russian Federation's authority in lawless, breakaway Chechnya. The Russians and Chechens' shared 200-year history had been punctuated by convulsions of blood and cruelty. The First Chechen War, from 1994 to 1996, had ended in the Russian Army's humiliation and left Russia with its highest loss of resources and professionalism since the Soviet Union's demise. The loss of basic combat skills also had been



horrific. This second round was the Russian Army's opportunity to show that it had recovered something of its former ability.

Nothing expressed the depth of Russian-Chechen animosity more than the battle cries hurled back and forth across the firing lines during the siege of Grozny. To the Chechen

shouts of "Allah Akhbar!" the Russians would respond, "Christ is Risen!"

After Grozny fell, Chechen forces regrouped in the rough, mountainous areas of southern Chechnya. By late February, a large Chechen force of from 1,600 and 2,500 fighters had concentrated in the town of Ulus-Kert, where the Abazolgul and Sharoargun rivers join.¹ The area was one in which the Russians had not dared enter during the First Chechen War. This time, they did not hesitate to follow.

A Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) tactical group attacked Chechen forces at Ulus-Kert, forcing them southeast. One of the VDV tactical group's regimental task forces, based on the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment (GPR) of the 76th Guards Airborne Division (GAD), was to block the gorge while the VDV tactical group encircled the Chechens.

Area of Operations

The small town of Ulus-Kert is surrounded by extremely steep, mountainous terrain. Approximately 6 kilometers south of the town and extending far to the southeast are the Dargenduk Mountains. A road leading generally south out of Ulus-Kert

and up the northeastern edge of the Dargenduks crosses over a 1,410-meter hill, referred to as Hill 1410. Approximately 1.5 kilometers directly southeast of Ulus-Kert is Hill 705.6. Just about one-half kilometer south of Hill 705.6 is a narrow opening to a small gorge. Three and one-half kilometers southeast of Ulus-Kert, on the gorge's easternmost side, is Hill 776. Hill 787 is only 1 kilometer farther south.

A road leading southeast from Ulus-Kert over Hill 705.6 turns south into the gorge. Another road intersects the first then leads to the western edge of the saddle between hills 776 and 787 where it divides into mountain paths crossing the saddle. Hill 787 is approximately 4.3 kilometers north of Hill 1410. At the time of the operation, the weather was foggy and cold, with snow on the ground.

The Chechens planned to escape advancing Russian forces by using the advantage of the mountainous terrain southeast of Ulus-Kert. After slipping through the passes, the fighters could seize the strategic population centers of Makhkety, Elistanzhi, Zaduli, Kirov-Yurt and Vedeno, which provided a west-to-east corridor in relatively low, flat terrain through which remaining Chechen forces could withdraw to Dagestan.² From Dagestan, they could renew the struggle on more favorable terms.

The VDV tactical group's mission was to counter the Chechen force's objectives by blocking its escape through the mountains then encircling it so artillery and combat air support could be used. Engaging infantry soldiers in direct combat was to be kept to a minimum. The plan to encircle Chechen forces—a common Russian tactic—reflects the Russians' desire to minimize casualties.

The First Chechen War had not been popular with the Russian populace because of the high death rate. Tension was also rife in the Russian command arrangement. Airborne forces felt they were being used as cannon fodder to reduce casualties among motorized infantry troops. Underlying this tension was the old rivalry between Russian airborne

forces and ground forces. Historically, the VDV had been a separate service. Briefly in the late 1990s, it had been subordinated to ground forces. Newly appointed commander of Russian airborne forces Colonel General Georgiy Shpak had obtained a reversal of this decision and zealously guarded the VDV's independence.

Shpak streamlined the organization and obtained new missions for it, primarily in peacekeeping operations. By the time operations around Ulus-Kert were under way, the grouping of airborne forces had been subordinated to Colonel General Gennadiy N. Troshev, Commander of the Eastern Grouping of Federal Forces, who reported directly to General of the Army Viktor Kazantsev, who commanded the Operations Group, Joint Grouping of Federal Forces, in the North Caucasus. The arrangement was not a happy one; airborne forces felt they were not being properly supported.³

The Battle Begins

The VDV tactical group was a task force based on divisional parachute regiments augmented with VDV command-level assets, such as reconnaissance subunits. The 104th GPR task force was assigned the mission of blocking Chechen escape routes east through the mountains. 104th GPR, like most Soviet/Russian parachute regiments, had three airborne battalions, an artillery battalion equipped with two S9, 120-millimeter, self-propelled guns and various support assets. Each airborne battalion had three airborne companies numbered sequentially one through nine, with the first, second and third companies composing the 1st Airborne Battalion and so on. Each 104th GPR company was augmented with reconnaissance and/or SPETSNAZ subunits from the VDV command to form company tactical groups.⁴

Hills 705.6, 776, 787 and 1410 were the main features of the net 104th GPR used to encircle the Chechen force. The VDV tactical group's main body crossed the Sharoargun and Abazolgul rivers, pushing the Chechen force out of Ulus-Kert to-

ward the southeast. 104th GPR's 1st Company, 1st Airborne Battalion, still had not crossed either the Abazolgul or the Sharoargun. An unidentified 104th GPR company was on or near Hill 705.6. 4th Company and an unidentified 104th GPR airborne company, two VDV SPETSNAZ groups and an elite Federal Security Service (FSB)—successor to the KGB—SPETSNAZ group, known as Vympel, were on Hill 1410. Present at 2d Airborne Battalion Headquarters on Hill 776 were Commander, 2d Airborne Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Nikolayevich Yevtyukhin, and Captain Viktor Romanov, the commander of an artillery battery of the regimental artillery battalion who was heading a forward observer team. 6th Company, commanded by Major Sergey Molodov, was en route to the saddle between Hills 776 and 787. 104th GPR was engaged in positioning companies to block escape routes over the mountains.

The Chechen force, retreating to the southeast of Ulus-Kert along a road leading over Hill 705.6 away from the main advancing body of the VDV tactical group, was looking for the first unguarded or weakly held way over the mountains. The 1,600 to 2,500 fighters wore winter camouflage and were well equipped with various small arms, grenade launchers and mortars. They were supported by a logistics train of hundreds of pack animals.

Day 1, 29 February 2000

Early on 29 February, a 104th GPR airborne company encountered a significant Chechen force on the road leading southeast out of Ulus-Kert. Russian paratroopers engaged the Chechen fighters for control of Hill 705.6. The Russian company, significantly stressed during the fight, gained control of the hill and pushed the Chechen force southeast into the small gorge below. The company was most likely heavily supported by artillery and helicopters, as was the usual Russian operation in this war.

The 104th GPR commander ordered 2d Airborne Battalion elements to block the saddle between hills 776

and 787, which was the next possible path over the mountains for the Chechens. The 2d Airborne Battalion headquarters was already in place on Hill 776. The 2d Airborne Battalion element was to be in place by 1400. In the early morning, 6th Company, including the third platoon, 4th Company, and two reconnaissance groups, probably from the regimental reconnaissance platoon, started on foot toward the saddle.⁵

6th Company, with the other elements, minus the company's third platoon, arrived by late morning, ahead of schedule. The company commander established a linear defense in the saddle between the hills, fronted by a minefield facing west toward the gorge. The defense focused on the Chechen forces' expected direction of escape. No access routes through the minefield were prepared nor were platoon positions sited to be mutually supportive.⁶ After establishing company positions, troops began their afternoon meal, leaving their positions and congregating in the open.⁷

The Chechen force clearly had a better grasp of the situation. The fighters had been listening to 104th GPR communications and used this advantage and good ground reconnaissance to locate 104th GPR subunits and to set ambushes. At 1230, a 6th Company reconnaissance patrol encountered approximately 20 fighters just outside company defensive positions. That the Chechens could approach that close without detection shows that the Russians had conducted no deep reconnaissance of the approaches to the saddle.

The Chechens, armed with automatic weapons, grenade launchers and mortars, reacted quickly, seizing the initiative. The small force was probably followed by a combat element, which would have been consistent with Soviet-style reconnaissance doctrine that places great value on immediately seizing the initiative in any engagement by having a strong combat element close behind the advance reconnaissance element.⁸ Chechen reconnaissance elements also worked their way around the Russian position in the

saddle and attacked from the rear where there were no defenses.⁹ With Chechens in the rear and no escape routes through their own minefield, 6th Company pulled back and dug in on Hill 776. Their retreat was so precipitous that they abandoned mess kits still full of food.¹⁰

Chechen fighters, laying down constant fire on 6th Company, received reinforcements as the main body arrived. The force encircled 6th Company and sent waves of fighters into the attack.¹¹ By the end of the first day, 6th Company had suffered 31 dead—a 33 percent killed in action (KIA) rate.¹² 6th Company had barely survived three basic errors: failure to establish an all-around defense; failure to aggressively conduct reconnaissance of the enemy's expected approach route, especially given the Chechen reputation for tactical skill, reconnaissance and working around the flanks; and failure to heed warnings about the Chechen force's approach.¹³

For some reason, 6th Company did not anticipate with sufficient seriousness and energy the danger it had been assigned to forestall. It seems likely that weak command at the company level was compounded by a lack of timely supervision by the adjacent battalion headquarters.

Day 2, 1 March 2000

Early in the morning on Hill 1410, a reinforcement group of two VDV SPETSNAZ platoons, one Vympel SPETSNAZ group and two airborne companies departed on foot for the saddle. The group encountered several ambushes while traversing terrain as steep as 70 degrees. At approximately 0330, one VDV SPETSNAZ platoon broke through to Hill 787 but was forced to dig in because of stiff Chechen opposition.

The 1st Company was also sent to reinforce 6th Company. While attempting to cross the Abazolgul River northeast of Ulus-Kert, the unit encountered a Chechen ambush force of up to 60 men. Despite repeated attempts to fight through the Chechen ambush, the 1st Company was forced to dig in on the river's bank. At 0300, during a brief lull, 2d Airborne Battalion deputy com-

mander Major Aleksandr Dostovalov, with 4th Company's third platoon, broke through to the encircled company. While relief forces were being held back by ambushes, waves of Chechen fighters continued to assault 6th Company on Hill 776.¹⁴ When Romanov's legs were blown off by a mortar round, the battalion commander took over.

While some reports question the lack of artillery and combat air support, others indicate that both were present throughout the four-day engagement. In his report to defense minister Igor Sergeyev, Shpak states that 2d Airborne Battalion "was supported by a self-propelled artillery battalion of the 104th Parachute Regiment and by army aviation."¹⁵ The presence of an artillery forward team with 6th Company, which included a battery commander, indicates that artillery support was at least adequate. While Shpak's statement and other reports make it certain that VDV artillery was employed throughout the engagement, it is unclear how effective it was at reducing Chechen numbers. Also unanswered is whether additional artillery assets were employed to support 6th Company.

Press reports also cite use of "Grads"—122-millimeter BM-21 multiple-rocket launchers that VDV units do not have.¹⁶ Accounts of other engagements in the southern mountains show that the Russians employed available artillery from a number of units in coordination with army aviation helicopters. These accounts stress that artillery continued to fire when helicopters disappeared with daylight. Only one Russian helicopter in the Chechen theater had night capability. This supports Shpak's statement that 6th Company received no aviation support at night. Helicopter support was further limited by foggy conditions during the fighting.¹⁷

The Chechens continued heavy attacks on Hill 776 from all directions throughout the early morning. Paratrooper officers showed an unhesitating willingness to sacrifice themselves, a trait the Germans had frequently noted in the grandfathers of the men on the hill. Dostovalov,

already wounded, attacked a group of Chechens trying to carry off a wounded soldier and dispatched them with a grenade. Junior soldiers were equally valiant. After Private Aleksandr Lebedev ran out of ammunition, he threw himself and his last live grenade into a group of Chechens who had wanted him to surrender.

At approximately 0500, the Chechens breached 6th Company defenses. Cumulative casualties and odds of at least 10 to one were too much for the dwindling Russian force. As Chechens overran Hill 776, fighting became hand-to-hand, and Chechens began shooting wounded Russians. The already wounded battalion commander took over the radio from the wounded Romanov and called in artillery fire on his own position, shouting into the radio, "I call artillery on myself!"¹⁸ The Chechens suffered grievously from the artillery, and at 0610, communications with the battalion commander were lost.

As the second day of fighting closed, 6th Company counted another 26 paratroopers killed and many wounded. Counting the 31 men who had fallen the day before, 6th Company had suffered a KIA rate of almost two-thirds—57 out of 90 men.¹⁹ Chechen casualties also continued to mount. Repeated human-wave attacks are costly, especially when the defenders are supported by artillery and aviation.

The Chechens had been throwing themselves at Hill 776 to keep open a path for the rest of their force. This movement was interrupted by the arrival of the relief force from Hill 1410. Major Andrey Lobanov, commanding a 45th VDV Reconnaissance Regiment SPETSNAZ group, was with this force. He noted that hundreds of pack animals had already passed by. The Russians moved into the saddle and found 6th Company's abandoned positions and soon encountered a large Chechen group. The Russians retreated to Hill 787 from which they could cover the saddle.

The Russians intercepted the Chechen commander's desperate orders: "Do not engage in battle.

Force your way forward."²⁰ With the remnants of 6th Company still holding out on Hill 776 and new Russian forces on neighboring Hill 787, the Chechen escape route was dangerously constricted. The Russians sent a reconnaissance platoon into the saddle to find a better position. Instead, it found an ambush by Arab volunteers, covering an attempt by the main Chechen convoy to escape. Having suffered five wounded, the Russians committed another company, hoping to stop the Chechen escape attempt.²¹

Day 3, 2 March 2000

Late in the morning, the 1st Company broke through Chechen forces and reached the battle area. However, it could not relieve 6th Company, which was still under close attack. One officer and 32 men were still alive. Deputy company commander Captain Roman Sokolov had arrived in Chechnya barely 13 days before. Wounded in the hand, he organized the survivors' final defense. He placed the six most junior soldiers in the care of Sergeant Andrey Proshev and ordered them to escape. Then, as the Chechens pressed the attack, Sokolov called artillery fire down on his position as a desperate attempt to fend off the enemy. Another 16 paratroopers on Hill 776 were killed in the continuing fighting.²²

Day 4, 3 March 2000

The struggle for control of Hills 776 and 787 ended on the fourth day of the fighting. The last 11 paratroopers on Hill 776 were killed.²³ The relief force found Proshev's small band of survivors.²⁴ The surviving Chechens, who had not been able to escape over the saddle before the relief's arrival, slipped back down into the gorge pursued by paratroopers and hunted by helicopters. The Russian pursuit took them about 5 kilometers east to the village of Selmentausen where a number of escaping Chechens had concentrated.

Mopping Up

The Chechens won a Pyrrhic victory. Tarrying to bludgeon through

6th Company allowed VDV forces to fight through difficult terrain and Chechen ambushes to close off the main body's escape. Most surviving Chechens were ultimately forced back into the gorge, where troops from 104th GPR took a number of prisoners.

While no 6th Company personnel surrendered or were taken prisoner, the four-day struggle resulted in the death of at least 84 VDV soldiers, including 13 officers. Even after losing its senior officers, 6th Company held its final positions against a much larger force.

Chechen casualties included approximately 400 dead. According to *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the official newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), this figure was based on radio-intercept data, intelligence reports, eyewitnesses, local residents and captured Chechens.²⁵

The Arab volunteers fighting with the Chechens appeared, in particular, to have suffered severely. Heavy Arab casualties would not be unusual among particularly fanatical units, nor would it be unusual for the Chechens to have pushed the Arabs first into harm's way. Lobanov counted 200 enemy dead on Hill 776 alone, along with 75 Russian paratroopers. Survivor Viktor Sokirko stated, "I took a notebook from the pocket of one of the gunmen with a roster of 100 people; the bullet had hit him right in his heart; it had gone through his *Koran*."²⁶

The bodies of the 84 fallen VDV troops were evacuated on foot, with combat aviation providing support. It was shaping up to be a bloody month for the Russian Army; it had a total of 156 dead—a higher KIA rate than during the grimmest comparable period in the storming of Grozny.²⁷

6th Company accomplished its mission. The Chechen force was blocked from escaping the encirclement. More important, Chechen commanders realized that they could not seize strategic population centers in the low terrain and would be forced to stay in the mountains. In the next few days, a number of Chechen fighters surrendered to the Russians. The day after the battle

ended, a Chechen field commander surrendered with 73 men, including 30 wounded—the largest surrender to that date. Made up largely of Chechen teenagers, this band had actually escaped over the saddle before the relief arrived on 2 March. It surrendered on the outskirts of Selmentausen. The young men had had enough of war.²⁸

Recriminations

The loss of 6th Company provoked an interservice exchange of recriminations. At a news conference, Shpak bluntly blamed the disaster on the Eastern Grouping of Forces' commander, to whom the airborne troops had been subordinated. Shpak's subordinates added their fire: "It all began back in Dagestan, when Kazantsev sent the airborne troops to their death and protected his own infantry."²⁹ They claimed airborne forces had been stretched too thin and "in isolation from the main forces. . . . [T]he grouping command treats the airborne troops as cannon fodder."³⁰

By the middle of March, cumulative airborne casualties gave ammunition for their charges. Shpak reported that 181 airborne soldiers had been killed and 395 wounded in Chechnya out of a force of about 5,100 men. The total Russian force in Chechnya had averaged about 100,000 and had lost 1,291 Defense Ministry troops and 617 Interior Ministry troops for a total of 1,908, suffering 3,190 and 2,107 wounded. Airborne forces had numbered five percent of the force and suffered 10 percent of the deaths.³¹

Shpak had a point. While the operational concept of blocking and trapping the Chechens was sound, the net was too weak. 104th GPR was forced to commit individual companies, which could not be easily reinforced, to oppose the breakthrough attempt of a lethal brigade-size unit. The airborne net should have been backed up with larger motorized rifle formations. Shpak's complaints carried enough weight to have the Grouping of Airborne Forces transferred from Troshev's command to the Joint Grouping of Federal Forces—the overall headquarters for operations in Chechnya.

Reconnaissance and Security

Kazantsev, former commander of the Grouping of Airborne Troops in Chechnya, accurately described the situation: "Such heavy losses could have been avoided. Reconnaissance must be carried out more carefully."³² After walking over the battlefield, Lobanov, who fought forward with the relief, also said pointedly, "There is a continual question in my head: Why was there no information that such a horde of gunmen was breaking through?"³³ Compounding this failure was the lackadaisical attitude toward the company's security. 6th Company had blinded itself, allowing Chechens the priceless element of surprise. Had 6th Company been properly alerted and ready in proper defenses, it might have been able to hold off the Chechens successfully until relief arrived. One elemental failure cascaded into another, which might explain why the battalion commander suddenly emerged as the defense's motivating force once the disaster unfolded.

However much the Russian official line emphasizes the heroism of 6th Company paratroopers, the results of the official inquiry ordered by President Vladimir Putin was professionally blunt. The force was accused of "slovenliness, laxity and unprofessionalism."³⁴ The force showed a glaring loss of basic tactical skills at the company level during the encounters. Such basic tactical considerations should have been uppermost in the company officers' minds. Whether this was a local aberration or indicates pervasive problems throughout Russian Army elite forces, the VDV's failure poses important questions about Russian capabilities. While the VDV performed credibly and often with distinction in the Second Chechen War, there have been enough blatant exceptions to conclude that even the VDV's skills are no longer of a uniform high standard, despite Shpak's reforms.

Pride of Corps

On the positive side, 6th Company recovered and fought well against enormous odds once it moved to Hill 776 under the effective leadership of the battalion com-

mander and his deputy. Other Russian airborne and SPETSNAZ forces in the area, responding to reinforce 6th Company, fought their way into the area and eventually stopped the Chechen breakout. All this occurred in enormously difficult terrain and weather conditions and against tenacious Chechen resistance. Because the Chechens are notoriously atrocity-prone, especially toward members of the more elite Russian military organizations, fighting to the death makes a necessity.

Media reports consistently indicate that no 6th Company soldiers were taken prisoner. They refused to give up their position, even while knowing they would be overrun and killed. The VDV is known as an elite force composed of soldiers with high morale, discipline and a sense of purpose. Their actions make it clear that this characterization held true. Despite glaring tactical mistakes in security and reconnaissance, the Russian airborne spirit successfully imbued its men with the morale and courage that come with pride of corps.

Despite the bad publicity surrounding the casualty figures in this battle, the Russian Army achieved an important victory. By holding Hill 776 long enough for additional VDV troops to fill the area, 6th Company defeated the Chechen strategy to break out of the mountains and regain the initiative. Chechen fighters, seeing they could not break through Russian lines, were forced to scale back their objectives. Instead of employing relatively large groups against vulnerable population centers, Chechen leaders realized they had to break up into smaller formations to wage war at a much lower level.

But, this was an expensive Russian victory. Russian blood and valor had to make up for the deficit in basic combat skills, an issue larger than one small-unit leadership failure. The entire Russian force has suffered too many similar catastrophes for the fate of 6th Company to be just a tragic exception. Still, there was significant improvement in battlefield performance between the First and Second Chechen Wars, although performance levels still remained low,

which reflected how bad things had become. The failure of an elite force such as the Russian airborne shows how fragile and perishable such skills are.

The Aftermath

The battle of Ulus-Kert was quickly enshrined in heroic myth, its theme loudly echoed by Russian media, the Ministry of Defense and the airborne forces themselves. This reflects popular support for the war and the military and a renewal of Russian nationalism. It also served to distract public attention from manifest failures the catastrophe revealed. Certainly the results of the official inquiry commissioned by Putin will never be made public. Nonetheless, he issued a decree decorating all of the fallen paratroopers, with all 13 officers and nine enlisted men receiving Russia's highest medal—Hero of the Russian Federation.³⁵

A memorial service was held on 14 March at the Novopasskiy Monastery in Moscow. The service was conducted by Russian Orthodox Patriarch Alekisy II of Moscow and all Russia, and was attended by Putin, Chief of the Russian General Staff General Anatoliy Kvashnin and national and military leaders. It was an enormous statement of resolve. Likewise, the funeral of most of the Russian dead at their home garrison in Pskov was a heartfelt demonstration of this sentiment. Most of the dead were buried in Pskov where the funeral service was held in the ancient Trinity Cathedral.

Speaking at the funeral, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev stated, "This battle for a nameless height was the turning point of the entire Chechen campaign. It was a do-or-die crisis for the fallen, and they chose to follow the paths of their ancestors in similar desperate straits. Just such decisions were made by Russian servicemen on Kulikovo Field, on Lake Chud, at Borodino and at Sevastopol. In the winter of 1941 Panfilov's legendary heroes defended the last line with their lives on the approaches of Moscow. Nowadays the Argun Gorge has been just such a line for the Guards' paratroopers."³⁶

NOTES

1. *Interfax* (10 March 2000), Moscow; Oleg Odnokolenko and Tatyana Shchipanova, "Such an Untimely Death: Authorities Cover Up Death of 86 Airborne Troops," *Segodnya* (10 March 2000), Moscow.
2. Sergey Prokopenko, "To the Death," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (11 March 2000), Moscow; Viktor Sokirko, "Airborne Troops Commander Georgiy Shpak: 'These Guys Performed a Feat,'" *Moskovskiy Komsomolets* (14 March 2000), Moscow; Sergey Dyupin and Valeriy Tsygankov, "Airborne Troops Called Fire Upon Themselves," *Komsersant* (7 May 2000), Moscow.
3. Ilya Bulavinov, "Cannon Fodder Consists of People as Well: Paratrooper Shpak Attacks General Troshcheyev," *Komsersant* (17 March 2000), Moscow.
4. Airborne company designations refer to company tactical groups.
5. *Interfax* (0940 GMT, 10 March 2000) Moscow.
6. *Moskovskiy Komsomolets* (14 March 2000), Moscow.
7. Yuliya Kalinina, "Terrible Losses," [Unknown] (10 March 2000).
8. The Chechens have shown a remarkable ability to maintain and employ the basic military skills they acquired while in service with the former Soviet Army. Ironically, they maintained these skills better than did the Russian Army.
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10. Sokirko, "A Toast to Russian Soldiers," *Moskovskiy Komsomolets* (14 March 2000), Moscow.
11. Prokopenko, "To the Death."
12. Odnokolenko and Shchipanova; *Interfax* (9 March 2000), Moscow, is an interview with General Nikolai Staskov, deputy commander of the Russian Airborne Forces. Initial comments of Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) personnel indicated that only 31 members of 6th Company had been killed in the entire battle. Although Russian media speculate that MOD was intentionally trying to cover up casualties, they likely received more accurate casualty figures sooner than did the MOD public affairs office. This figure accurately represents the first day of fighting. Also, Russian casualty accounting poli-

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The Promise of e-Commerce to Defense: The Road to Savings

J. Michael Brower

As the Department of Defense (DOD) struggles to keep up with e-business, e-tailing, e-everything, it does so not to be in vogue but to achieve a definite national-security goal. That goal remains consistent from one major defense review to the next—reduce the costs of nonwarfighting tasks, and apply the savings to the acquisition of new weapons systems.¹

While military missions everywhere increased during the resource-constrained 1990s, leveraging the cost savings that the information technology (IT) revolution promised became a necessity. Enter e-commerce and the concomitant reductions in the labor expenses that the private sector has enjoyed.

Traditionally, e-commerce helps suppliers sell directly to consumers and develops ongoing trade relationships at the speed of cyberspace, cutting costs to middlemen. As the online marketplace has become commonplace, military leaders have capitalized on the lessons of industry and have purposefully charted an e-economic e-commerce course.

Electronic commerce holds many rewards.² Fortunately for DOD, access to the sharpest minds in e-commerce is aided by the fact that e-commerce remains largely a US-based phenomenon. However, the balance is shifting. Internet Dynamics Corporation predicts that by 2003, Western Europe and Japan will have combined to lower the US e-commerce share to 44 percent.³

US industry sees DOD as a test bed for developing the best e-commerce solutions because of DOD's history of technological innovation and cost-saving acquisition goods. DOD's interest in e-commerce should

help counter Amazon.com CEO Jeff Bezos' prophecy: "It will turn out in the long term that the US is the worst country for e-commerce."⁴ Often, DOD support for technology and government support for technological innovation made the difference in profitability.

Cyber Clickskrieg@DOD

DOD's commitment to e-commerce principles began in earnest with the May 1998 *Defense Reform Initiative Directives*. The Joint Electronic Commerce Program Office (JECPO) was to navigate DOD's transition to e-commerce.⁵ The DOD e-mall, a linchpin in DOD's overarching e-vision, began with expanding the Defense Logistics Agency's online catalogue and now provides one-stop shopping to all DOD electronic and commercial catalogs.

In fiscal year (FY) 2000, the e-mall contained nearly 5 million items and processed \$78.8 million of transactions. JECPO's goal for FY 2001 is to have 12 million items in the e-mall to generate as much as \$143 million.⁶

Industry powerhouses catering to DOD see e-commerce as a force multiplier. For military managers who must do more with less, "force multiplier" is more than just a catch phrase *du-jour*; it is a requirement to keep the US military performing amid stagnant budgets.

In countenancing future logistic operations, DOD must cut administrative costs and improve efficiency in the acquisition arena. Sadly, neither acquisition policy nor legislation can match the speed of change associated with the technology they would regulate. Consequently, acquisition reform—the DOD watch phrase during the 1990s—has not resulted in predicted savings (approximately \$60

billion) to apply toward acquiring new weapons systems.⁷

Reverse Auctioning and Smart Cards

To help make up the shortfall, e-commerce shepherded procurement purchase using reverse auctioning and smart cards. With reverse auctioning, all potential vendors can see the price for goods and services, thereby driving the price down. The reverse-auction process produces the best price when all merchants can see DOD's bottom-line costs.

Smaller companies join the process by using the Internet to conduct business and by adopting e-standards like Extensible Markup Language (XML) and Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI). Potential suppliers can register quickly, and technology they already have is leveraged to help cut their bottom lines, which allows them to compete against larger firms.

Competition helps DOD find the best deals. For instance, the Navy is busily reengineering its procurement precepts, including the cultural change of delegating to the lowest level. The Navy's Fleet Martial Supply Office, with the mission of providing IT for Naval Supply Systems Command, has partnered with Razorfish Incorporated to put buying decisions at the lowest tier.⁸

Software developed for the project allows Navy personnel to make purchase decisions with a greater awareness of inventory and available funding. Reporting transactions to the comptroller via a client-server environment has allowed the retirement of more-expensive mainframes.

The DOD Purchase Card Program has also produced savings. By

FY 2000, DOD had met its goal to have 90 percent of all DOD purchases under \$2,500 made with government purchase cards. JECPO provides the infrastructure to support information exchange among credit card companies and DOD financial systems.

Before the advent of purchase cards, buying supplies and services was labor-, paper- and bureaucracy-intensive. As of September 2000, more than 10 million purchase card transactions had been made—\$5.5 billion worth.

E-commerce capitalizes on buying power that DOD already has and is an excellent counterweight to effects of personnel and resource austerity that characterized much of DOD during the 1990s. E-commerce has proved its viability and pays for itself in savings.

As though by design, but generally because market mechanisms are functioning in the new economy much as they did in the old, DOD is using e-commerce to offset the pain of 1990s budget stagnation. With potential savings so immediate and

immense, e-commerce will continue to grow, to the benefit of private economy and national security.

Into the Cybersea

When are contracting personnel, public and private alike, ready to adopt an e-commerce strategy? Generally, the following factors must be determined before bottling and tossing the e-procurement message into the cybersea:

- Are costs for technology and associated hardware and software low, particularly for access to e-commerce design kits?
- Are usable applications and hardware for end-users and procurement personnel available?
- Are standards promulgated and consistent, particularly in terms of the application of cross-communication?
- Do e-commerce transactions have measurable utility, convenience and value-added?
- Will transactions be secure?
- Will e-commerce transaction have minimal legal and policy constraints? 

NOTES

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4. Tichakorn Hill, *Defense News* (23 October 2000), 62; Jeff Bezos, *The Industrial Standard* (2 October 2000), 41; <www.thestandard.com>. See also <www.activmediaresearch.com> and <www.idc.research.com>
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6. Miles Holtzman, "Electronic Commerce" (20 November 2000), Provided by Maria Lloyd, Defense Logistics Agency, Public Affairs Division, 21 November 2000. See also <www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/May 1997/a19970516qdr2.html> and <www.acq.osd.mil/jecpo>
7. The \$60 billion figure was the approximate target for savings projected by the 1997 QDR, which had hoped to replace military teeth where tail had thrived.
8. Jennifer Moselli, "Navy Finds a Better Way to Buy," *Information Week* (2 October 2000), 111. For more information on Razorfish, see <razorfish@www.informationweek.com/806/razorfish.htm>

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Short-Range Air Defense in Army Divisions: Do We Really Need It?

Colonel Charles A. Anderson, US Army

Soon after General Eric K. Shinseki became the Chief of Staff, US Army, in June 1999, he stated that his goal was "to provide strategic leadership that [would] keep the Army the pre-eminent land warfighting force in the world."¹ To accomplish this goal, Shinseki cited six key objectives:

- To increase strategic responsiveness.
- To develop a clear, long-term strategy to improve operational joint readiness and implement Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) goals.
- To develop joint warfighting leaders.
- To fully integrate Active and Reserve Components.
- To fully man warfighting units.
- To provide for the well-being of soldiers, civilians and family members.²

Shinseki set the azimuth for a more deployable, lethal force that when properly manned and equipped could accomplish National Military Strategy tasks. Given the continuous, growing gap between funding and military requirements, Shinseki must look critically at competing programs and capabilities to make difficult decisions about the Army's traditional roles and enduring capabilities.

The Army's business is to fight and win wars. However, it is involved in many other activities. In 1997, Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. White, addressing the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Board, stated, "We are at a pivotal point in history where the Cold War recedes . . . and a new century rushes toward us."³ The QDR's challenge is to develop new strategies

and capabilities in an era having fewer resources. White sees this effort as involving "hellish choices."⁴

In *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?* Ralph Peters suggests there is a fundamental asymmetry between the kind of military force the United States has and the kind it needs.⁵ Peters' theme is that the United States is "preparing for the war we want to fight . . . not the conflicts we cannot avoid."⁶ To avoid this trap, Shinseki is striving to bring strategic relevance and balance to the Army. Changes in force structure and traditional roles are inevitable.

Since 1994 the Commission on Service Roles and Missions has continually targeted US Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA) for budget and personnel cuts. The dogmatic

objectives of reducing the size of Army divisions and enhancing strategic mobility while maintaining lethality and survivability attracts the force-structure scalpel Army senior leaders wave toward mission areas such as short-range air defense (SHORAD) forces. The question is, should SHORAD be in an Army division? Do the threat and existing joint capabilities suggest the need to keep the air defense battalion in division warfighting formations?

The Argument

Why do we have air defense artillery in Army divisions? The last hostile aircraft shot down by US ground-based air-defense forces was in 1950 when the 507th Automatic Weapons Battalion shot down two of four hostile North Korean planes. Antiaircraft guns and US Air Force (USAF) fighters quickly neutralized the Korean air threat.⁷

Today, the US Air Force is the most technologically advanced air force in the world, second only to China in numbers of air frames.⁸ US Marine and Navy air power constitutes the world's third largest air force. More important, US pilots are among the world's most proficient. US Air Force and Navy pilot training averages 220 hours a year compared to a NATO average of 170 hours and about 50 hours in potential enemy air forces.⁹

It might be presumptive to suggest that air power can protect US land forces throughout a campaign or to presume that high costs associated with training and maintaining a sophisticated air force would prevent potential enemies from acquiring a competitive air force. In 1999 Director of Central Intelligence George J. Trent presented the 20th-century threat assessment to the US Senate Arms Services Committee. He said, "Future challenges to US interests will flow from new factors such as the increasing availability of sophisticated technology and the ease and speed with which it can be applied by those hostile to the United States."¹⁰

The 1998 Joint Strategy Review supports this notion and maintains that other nations and nonstate actors will be able to leverage niche

positions, acquiring more capability than their size, economy and capability would suggest.¹¹ In essence, the past and future are colliding. The United States must deal with rogue nations, declining states, terrorists and insurgents whose causes have been smoldering. Today these factions are armed with more-sophisticated weapons than their predecessors could ever have imagined.¹²

Lessons Learned

As well as preparing for two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, the Army faces significant increases in other activities, ranging from humanitarian and relief operations to major deployments. The US military has deterred aggression in the Arabian Gulf, restored democracy in Haiti and stopped war in Bosnia. The armistice is stable on the Korean peninsula, and the Yugoslavian army has withdrawn from Kosovo.¹³ The world is safer, but current and future enemies are taking notes. Perhaps the next adversary will not allow the United States to build a robust lodgment for generating combat power and logistic support. The challenge will be to sustain the political will to fight in remote places where the threat to national interests is not clear.

During Operation *Desert Storm*, 97 soldiers were killed in action. The US public has come to expect such low casualty rates, but leaders of rogue nations, failing states and terrorist gangs are not overly concerned with casualties. They watched US forces pull out of Somalia and Beirut because of unexpected casualties and realized that the most direct way to deter the US military force was to increase the probable casualty rate.

In 1992 the National Research Council identified advanced technologies that most likely would be used against the United States in the 21st century. Adversaries would:

- Use improved methods for delivering chemical and biological warfare agents.
- Use low-flying cruise missiles.
- Use advanced tactical ballistic missiles capable of surmounting US defenses.
- Attack initially deploying US

forces before US heavy forces can support them.¹⁴

The National Research Council also suggested that the air threat would become increasingly diverse and lethal beyond 2010. It would no longer be possible to rely on the air superiority demonstrated during the Gulf War and subsequent conflicts.

The US military's ability to anticipate the threat and react accordingly with the appropriate technology is not always first rate. Since 1980, ballistic missiles have been used in six regional conflicts.¹⁵ Strategic analyst Dennis M. Gormley maintains that if "planners respond to the threat of land-attack cruise missiles as slowly as they did to ballistic missile threats, Washington and its allies may be on a dangerous path."¹⁶ At the time of Iraq's attack on Kuwait in August 1990, the US Army had only three experimental Patriot Advanced Capability Version 2 (PAC-2) interceptors. Fortunately, Saddam Hussein's six-month delay allowed the United States to rapidly improve and produce more PAC-2 missiles.

The Defense Science Board's 1994 study on cruise missile defense paralleled that of the National Research Council. Defense Science Board findings heightened the Department of Defense's (DOD's) awareness of the evolving cruise missile threat against US forward-deployed forces and lodgment areas. Wishing away cruise missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threats is not prudent. The US almost made that mistake with ballistic missiles.

Authors Stefan T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle cite two common fallacies about technology—that the march of technology can be halted by agreement and that small advantages are not decisive and probably not important.¹⁷ The first fallacy suggests that arms control measures and policies can prevent developing nations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to transport them to military and civilian targets. History alone disproves the second fallacy; Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons, and Korea is testing a ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States.

Currently the USAF can support

only one major theater of war. During the Kosovo crisis, it scrambled to mass pilots, fuelers and precision munitions required to interdict Kosovo and Serbian targets. During Operation *Desert Storm*, it had 20 fighter wing equivalents. When the F-22 replaces the aging F-16 and F-15 fleet, the USAF will be half the size.

Action in Kosovo also demonstrated the importance of having safe havens in which to assemble and launch air operations. Safe havens could become more difficult to obtain if adversaries threaten neighbors with WMD. Furthermore, commercial satellite imagery and longer-range, more-accurate delivery capabilities could expose safe havens. A flash point anywhere in the world coupled with a Kosovo-type crisis could place decisionmakers in a resource-constrained dilemma.

If hostile states and nonstate actors learn from the past, they will never permit US forces to freely establish a lodgment in the area of operations or a safe haven in a nearby country. Their objective will likely be to strike quickly with an array of air and missile threats aimed at forward-deployed US forces. If that fails to sway US public opinion, they will consider WMD use. The best time to execute such actions would be when the United States is already entangled in Kosovo- or Bosnian-type commitments.

Future Aerial Threats

Predicting what capability a potential enemy might employ is always controversial. Such an endeavor's difficulty is revealed by the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency seldom present a consensus, given a global weapons market, parallel technology and decreasing costs associated with high-tech digital systems. A common fallacy is to interpret "no peer threat" as "no threat."¹⁸ In a Strategic Studies Institute Special Report, Earl H. Tilford Jr. says, "Rather than facing a single, symmetrical threat from a known enemy, as was the case from 1946 until the end of the Cold War, the nation faces a range of multidimensional and asymmetrical threats."¹⁹ The array of

threats includes those that attack ground targets from the air.

The National Air Intelligence Center maintains that ballistic and cruise missiles are a significant threat to deployed US and allied forces. Cruise missiles have great standoff as "unmanned, armed aircraft that can be launched from another aircraft, ship, submarine, or ground-based launcher to attack ships . . . or ground-based targets."²⁰

LACM. Land attack cruise missiles (LACM) are an attractive option for potential threats because they can effectively evade US air defense systems. LACMs are powered by jet engines or rockets and are equipped with an internal computer or remote control for guidance and navigation. Although they look like aircraft with stubby wings, they move slower than high-performance fighter aircraft and reach targets in a matter of hours rather than minutes. Over 25 countries now have ballistic missiles systems. By 2015 the land attack cruise missile market will include from 6,000 to 7,000 missiles. Most land attack cruise missiles have effective ranges from 90 to 190 miles and can hit within a few feet of their targets.

Because LACMs are difficult to detect, track and intercept, air defense systems will be stressed. Cruise missiles are smaller than aircraft and, depending on terrain, can fly below radar coverage. For example, ground-based radar can detect an aircraft flying at 10,000 feet over 150 miles away. Because of the earth's curvature, the same ground-based radar cannot detect a low-flying cruise missile outside 20 miles.²¹

UAV. Until recently, many armed forces regarded the UAV as a sensor platform for conducting reconnaissance and surveillance. UAVs are now weapon carriers. Armed UAVs are smaller than manned counterparts and cheaper to operate. They also function as multirole aerial platforms and can deliver weapons, provide real-time intelligence, designate targets, collect signal intelligence and perform decoy, jamming and information-warfare functions. UAVs can be used at high altitudes for long periods or at low altitudes for short periods.²² During World War II,

unmanned bombers packed with explosives, piloted remotely via a radio link, attacked hardened targets such as submarine pens. Current UAVs will be able to destroy WMD production and storage facilities buried beneath mountains.

One can easily debate how the array of theater missiles and manned fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft can be used in a given contingency. With the growing costs required to maintain aircraft and train pilots, UAVs and LACMs are attractive yet effective aerial platforms. This does not suggest that manned aircraft will be cut from a potential threat's arsenal. Manned aircraft might not increase in numbers, but they will improve in sophistication.

The credibility of US ground-to-air and air-to-air defensive capabilities will be challenged. Applying attack or strike operations against short-dwell and fixed-launch platforms, supply points and command and control (C²) facilities could reduce or modify the use of theater missiles and other aerial platforms. However, since Operation *Desert Storm*, US efforts have improved attack operations only slightly.

With UAVs and cruise missiles requiring smaller operational and logistic footprints than ballistic missiles, the possibility of interdicting such targets is remote. The future threat will economically gain operational and strategic advantages by using an array of theater missiles.

SHORAD and Full-Spectrum Dominance

In July 1996, JV2010 was issued to provide a conceptual framework within which the US Armed Forces can view and prepare for the future. It also provides a blueprint with which to leverage military forces and achieve effectiveness in joint operations. Its intent is to provide direction to achieve joint, full-spectrum dominance through four operational concepts: full-dimensional protection, dominant maneuver, focused logistics and precision engagement.²³

Full-spectrum dominance entails overpowering any adversary and controlling a situation regardless of

the operation.²⁴ The *Concept for Future Joint Operations* states that future military trends will most likely include WMD.²⁵ WMD delivery platforms might well be ballistic and cruise missiles, which implies challenges to all JV2010 operational concepts.

To achieve dominant maneuver and precision engagement, commanders must have freedom of action. Freedom of action suggests full-dimensional protection, including protection from asymmetric threats, across all phases of an operation. A multilayered defense against a range of threats requires offensive and defensive actions such as theater-missile defense and defensive counter-air operations.

Stretching military resources over numerous missions throughout the world creates situations in which the US might not be able to maintain air superiority. Fighters must be in the area of concern to intercept low-flying cruise missiles—after receiving ample early warning and positive identification. The smaller the radar cross-sections of cruise missiles and UAVs, the more challenging acquisition and combat identification are for the pilot. This problem is further exacerbated by issues such as the availability of sufficient airframes for offensive and defensive missions, tankers for refueling operations, C² platforms and safe havens from ground and aerial threats.

The capabilities of all services' systems vary according to each aerial target's abilities. However, given a rapid-response requirement, initial-entry forces will rely on SHORAD to achieve full-dimensional protection. Also, as operations become more nonlinear, forces will be isolated and subjected to a host of aerial threats. These threats have lower radar cross-sections, are extremely maneuverable, require less logistics than manned airframes and are extremely difficult to destroy on the ground. SHORAD is easier to introduce into the theater, costs less and can be maneuvered with ground forces.

Current SHORAD force structure includes a ground-based sensor, a C² architecture and three platforms that fire surface-to-air Stingers. This

system of systems engages the air battle with a 24-hour, all-weather radar that can detect low-radar cross-section aerial targets and near-real time automated C² architecture that provides situational awareness to joint and combined forces. The C² system integrates horizontal and vertical air defense weapons, thereby enhancing situational awareness and reducing fratricide. Stingers fired by individual soldiers or from wheeled or track vehicles can provide 24-hour, shoot-on-the-move, mobile protection for maneuver forces.²⁶

SHORAD has limitations. The forward area air defense (FAAD) command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) system and the ground-based sensor (GBS) represent a colossal step from the days of depending on binoculars for early warning and voice for tracking and updating the air battle. FAAD C3I and GBS provide air surveillance, target acquisition and targeting information. GBS information receives information from joint sensors then integrates the information so commanders can make timely battle-management decisions.

SHORAD relies on identification, friend or foe (IFF) or visual identification and does not include an uncooperative target-recognition capability. In 1995, the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation maintained that FAAD C3I and GBS were operationally suitable. However, without enhanced combat identification, FAAD C3I might be useful only in a self-defense role.²⁷ Although positive regarding many operational tasks, the evaluation did not address the ability to positively identify a manned or unmanned threat as hostile or friendly at a desirable range in difficult terrain.

In 1996, DOD created the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) to improve joint air and missile defense and to coordinate all DOD theater air and missile defense activities.²⁸ JTAMDO is the warfighter's focal point for developing and validating joint air and missile defense architectures and operational concepts. Its initial assessment sought to uncover shortfalls in air and missile defense since

Operation *Desert Storm*. Subsequently, it exposed joint air defense capability as being segmented by service and restricted by procedures and limited interoperability.

JTAMDO also revealed a joint air and missile defense system of systems that lacked a timely air picture and a universal combat identification capability.²⁹ Most alarming, findings revealed joint weapons with ranges and rules of engagement that could not satisfactorily meet threats beyond 2010.

The JTAMDO master plan included a single integrated air picture (SIAP) that would allow participating units to observe the same digital air battle. Engagement coordination drastically improves when all services see only one track for every airborne object. A complete, common and accurate air picture enables a distributed fire control that can use remote data to engage a target.³⁰ Continuous, correctly correlated tracks improve combat identification. JTAMDO also seeks to improve early identification and destruction of aircraft and missile threats. Soon, waiting until the target is visible might be too late to engage. The SIAP will keep identification on a track with a single joint force identification.

The next major hurdle is to develop an integrated fire-control capability to allow weapons to fire using data another service sensor provides. This fire-control net would reduce the effects of terrain on ground- and sea-based sensors and allow engagements against low-flying, low-radar-cross-section targets. Cruise missile and UAV defense lacks a common air picture, a reliable combat identification (CID) system and adequate airborne platforms to be able to see low-flying threats. By 2010, SIAP benefits, CID and integrated fire control will provide early, long-range detection, continuous tracking, long-range engagements, 360-degree capability and tactical flexibility supported by less-restrictive rules of engagement.

Of all the joint air and missile defense systems, SHORAD has the most advanced C² and reliability regarding a common air picture. SHORAD will significantly benefit

from improvements in CID and SIAP because SHORAD already fuses joint sensors within the internal ground-based-sensor net. SHORAD's shortfall will remain missile range and the inability to engage short-range ballistic missiles.

Future threats will include ballistic and cruise missiles and UAVs. Equipped with WMD, these threats will need to be engaged at ranges beyond the existing Stinger capabilities. Currently, force developers are examining ways to engage beyond 20 kilometers. Additional experiments are being conducted on a suitable, reliable and survivable airborne sensor for both acquisition and fire control.

JV2010 goals and the operational concepts leading to full-spectrum dominance are at risk. The Air Force cannot be all things for the joint force commander. Its decreasing force structure will challenge its ability to perform defensive and offensive air missions. Full-dimension protection and dominant maneuver is a difficult task when the enemy can leverage cruise and ballistic missiles and UAVs against forward-deployed formations, C² facilities, safe havens and logistics bases.

Shinseki's vision to be on the ground quickly with a relevant combat force requires deploying air and missile defense protection. The Patriot force is heavy and requires an investment of strategic lift. As ground forces move to forward operating bases, air and missile protection should move forward also. SHORAD can provide this protection. Its force structure is suitable for use against cruise missiles, UAVs and fixed- and rotary-wing threats. However, as unmanned threats be-

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come more lethal, a longer-range system is necessary.

The Stinger is a reliable missile for manned aircraft, but it lacks the range and lethality to counter more sophisticated airborne threats. A mobile, ground-based system with 360-degree coverage against all aerial threats would be an appropriate follow-on system, which could be linked to an elevated sensor to gain over-the-horizon engagements. Also, the system should be able to engage short-range ballistic missiles and rocket artillery.

Continued research and development on laser technology will eventually produce a lightweight, lethal, ground-based laser capable of providing multiple inexpensive engagements against all aerial threats. When the SHORAD force brings antirocket capability to the maneuver formation, its relevance will never again be questioned.

Full-spectrum dominance requires force protection against all aerial threats. Responsive, mobile, lethal formations projected on hostile terrain will need air and missile defense to guarantee freedom of maneuver. Maintaining the air defense battalion in Army divisions must be a priority when assessing the Army's force structure for the 21st century.

The Future War

All US intelligence projections suggest that the future threat to forward-deployed forces will not come from an armored vehicle's main gun, but from the air. For over 50 years the United States has not been truly tested from the air, and assessments of current capability point out weaknesses in the US Armed Forces' ability to perform joint air and missile defense.

The proliferation of unmanned platforms, commercial satellite imagery and precision navigation will change the nature of future wars, which are as likely to be waged in cities as on open plains and deserts. In future wars, enemy C² facilities might collocate with hospitals and schools.

Aerial platforms such as cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, rockets and unmanned aerial platforms will be projected into the sky from mobile

launchers cloaked from aerial detection. UAVs, sending real-time information to enemy forces equipped with rocket artillery and short-range, precision ballistic missiles will target soldiers and equipment. Ports and air bases abroad will be untenable because of attacks or threats of attack, and the US Navy will be forced away from brown water by mines and low-tech submarines denying deployed forces the Navy's theater ballistic-missile protection and fighter support.

Patriot forces will be overtasked protecting ports and coalition population centers, and the enemy will use dummy aerial threats to deplete Patriot and theater high-altitude air defense missile inventories. Last, the threatened use of WMD on allied nations might deny US entry and use of ports, air bases and safe havens.

Cutting air defense out of the Army division and relinquishing aerial protection of forward-deployed forces to the Air Force would generate casualties in future wars that would far exceed US tolerance. The argument that air defense has not shot down an aircraft since the Korean War and that US air forces are the best in the world would not comfort the families of US casualties.

Change on the horizon requires tough decisions about force structure and traditional roles and missions. As the relevance of air defense in the division is debated, Army leaders must consider aerial threats and the protection of forward-deployed soldiers. 

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MR Review Essay

Six Presidents and China

Lewis Bernstein

In 1950, because they feared an invasion of Manchuria, the Chinese Communists fought in the Korean War and suffered many thousands of casualties. In 1962 the People's Republic of China fought with India to safeguard a route to Chinese nuclear test sites free from potential Russian interference. In 1979 China fought a short, violent border war with Vietnam that again resulted in thousands of Chinese casualties. This time China fought to express its displeasure over Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. In 1996 this scenario was partially reenacted in the Taiwan Straits. No one can doubt China's willingness to go to war to defend what it considers its vital interests.

Patrick Tyler, a former Beijing bureau chief for *The New York Times*, has written a contemporary investigative history of the United States' China policy titled *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China* (New York: Public Affairs Press, 1999, \$27.50). The book is based on memoirs and archival research, declassified US government documents and extensive interviews with policy makers.

With so much known about the policy-making process, it would seem impossible to add anything new to the already existing record. Tyler's material is fuller on the US side, but he tells as much as he can about Chinese actions, detailing the complex and complicated story of recent Sino-American relations with clarity and dispatch.

Tracing the shifts of US-China

policy through Democratic and Republican administrations, Tyler observes that every US president since Richard M. Nixon—whatever his ideological stripe or predilection—has ultimately engaged China simply because no other reasonable choice was available. Tyler's study defends pragmatism in foreign policy.

Nixon's achievement in opening China was more operational than conceptual because using China as a strategic counterbalance against the Soviet Union had long tantalized US President Lyndon B. Johnson. Nixon longed for an opening to China, but international political conditions were not right. The United States was embroiled in Vietnam, and China was in the throes of the Cultural Revolution. Tyler's detailed examination of the ways Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger managed to open China leaves out none of their faults and gives them the credit they deserve.

Kissinger approached China with a unique mixture of fawning and arrogance. James Lilley, a CIA career officer and later an ambassador to China, describes Kissinger's method: "You embrace them, you make all the right statements about building strong and genuine relations and all the while you run espionage operations" against them. The soundness of Kissinger's secret understandings with the Chinese emerged in a review conducted by Michel Oksenberg, President Jimmie Carter's national se-

curity adviser for China. Oksenberg called Kissinger's actions "perfectly defensible" and recommended that Carter maintain them.

The book plunges into a narrative of bureaucratic warfare inherent in the policy process. In every administration ambitious men battled with and sought to undermine each other for control of US China policy. Of necessity, the book plunges into a narration of bureaucratic warfare. One learns that Kissinger regarded the US Department of State as a greater adversary than the Chinese. He flattered Zhou Enlai, fawned over Mao Zedong and curried favor with Nixon. During Carter's administration, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski regarded Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as dangerous to Carter's interests and policy conceptions as the Soviets were. He devoted much time and energy trying to defeat Vance. President Ronald Reagan's administration fared no better. The duel between Alexander Haig and his adversaries was as hard fought as the negotiations with the Chinese.

If this account is to be believed, and there is no reason to doubt it, US foreign policy was determined more by timing and the ebb and flow of events than by planning. Policies succeeded or failed because of external events neither side controlled. The Carter administration succeeded in normalizing relations with China—but not because its officials were any smarter than their predecessors

were but because Carter's tenure coincided with Deng Xiaoping's rise to power. Brzezinski is presented as a fierce bureaucratic warrior and dissembler eager to negotiate an agreement that put a premium on deception and ambiguity. These diplomatic attributes allowed Chinese and US negotiators to disagree while publicly insisting they agreed.

One is left to wonder at the bureaucratic maneuvering in the several presidential administrations, but to recoil in horror or total disbelief would be a sterile, self-defeating reaction. Instead, one should remember that the power struggle in Washington was minor-league when compared to the power struggle occurring in Beijing, where the personal stakes were much higher.

If US policy makers did not display the naked self-interest they did and were not the ruthless bureaucratic warriors they were, how could they have hoped to deal with the Chinese? In the end, success went to those with the most developed, focused, aggressive self-interest. Tyler emphasizes that distinctions in US China policy are not between Republicans and Democrats or liberals and conservatives; they are between those who had the rigorous self-discipline to look at Sino-American relations the way they were evolving and those deluded by preconceptions.

Tyler presents President Bill Clinton as an unfocused president who ignored his foreign policy, national security and intelligence advisers. He created a China policy that con-

centrated on human rights. While trendy and fashionable, it was not sensible. Abandoned as unworkable, its epitaph was uttered in 1993 by US Ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy: "If you look at the last 150 years since the Opium Wars, then you can't avoid the conclusion that the last 15 years have been the best 15 years in China's modern history, and of those 15 years the last 2 years are the best in terms of prosperity, individual choice, access to outside sources of information, freedom of movement within the country and stable domestic conditions." When reporters asked Roy whether China could satisfy Clinton's demands for improved human rights, he said he did not know because the administration had never defined what it meant by significant progress.

In Clinton's defense, it must be added that he eventually moved back toward a more realistic China policy. But, according to Tyler, Clinton remained inattentive toward Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji's overtures for a compromise on outstanding issues that were preventing China from entering the World Trade Organization. This inattention, plus foreign policy initiatives created solely to satisfy internal political constituencies, was the primary characteristic of the Clinton administration's China policy.

The Taiwan issue has long been an irritant. China and the United States have consistently underestimated Taiwan's strategic importance to the other. Tyler reveals that each thought the other would compromise

over this "secondary issue." However, neither has fundamentally changed its position. In fact, the United States and China now find themselves in a position where Taiwan controls both countries' policies.

It would be tempting to attribute the US position solely to the Republican right and the Taiwan lobby—as the Chinese Communists do—and China's position on Taiwan to emotional nationalism—as some Americans do. The reality is more and less complicated. China believes its national security depends on possessing the island. The United States believes its position in Asia depends on brokering a peaceful resolution to the problem. Events since 1972 have aggravated and combined these strategic dilemmas. As Tyler shows, inattention combined with *realpolitik* could lead to a war born out of miscalculation. ♣

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Post-Cold War Priorities

Major John A. Nagl, US Army

Although the post-Cold War world has changed the nature of conflict, many argue that the US military cannot adapt quickly enough. The military is one-third smaller than it was in 1990, and its budget is about 30 percent lower. It now faces a shortfall significant enough to be described as a coming train wreck.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Department of Defense (DOD) requires an additional \$30 to \$50 billion a year to maintain current force structure without any additional spending on National Missile Defense, which is President George W. Bush's top defense priority. Yet, there is little sup-

port for a larger defense budget. "Train wreck" might be too gentle a description of the crisis the military now faces.

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) does the Central Intelligence Agency's deep, broad thinking. It "speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the [Intelligence]

Community as a whole.²¹ In December 2000, the NIC released *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernmental Experts*.² The report is an unclassified estimate of the most likely threats the United States will confront over the mid-term. It identifies demographics, natural resources and environmental concerns, science and technology, globalization, national and international governance, future conflicts and the US role as major drivers and trends that will shape the world of 2015. The results are of great importance to military planners.

The NIC suggests that for at least the next 15 years “the risk of war among developed countries will be low.”³ However, the developing world will see substantial conflict, ranging from “relatively frequent small-scale internal upheavals to less frequent regional interstate wars. . . . Internal conflicts stemming from religious, ethnic, economic or political disputes will remain at current levels or even increase.”⁴ These conflicts will not present a substantial US national security threat. Because of the overwhelming US military superiority over the developing world, most future adversaries “will try to circumvent or minimize US strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses. . . . Such asymmetric approaches—whether undertaken by states or nonstate actors—will become the dominant characteristic of most threats to the US homeland.”⁵

The NIC hedges its bet that the United States will not face a more serious threat than “states of concern” like North Korea or Iraq. But, it admits, “[E]stimates of China beyond five years are fraught with unknowables.”⁶ The report’s clear conclusion is that asymmetric conflict and US intervention in failed or failing states are far more likely than conventional armed conflicts for which US Armed Forces are primarily organized, trained and equipped.

The report’s conclusions provide a starting point for the authors of *Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century*.⁷

Certain to be popular in the Washington policy community, this book will not make most military readers happy. But, that does not mean it should not be read. In fact, no one who cares about the US military’s future can avoid engaging with the arguments presented.

The book’s thesis is that “stuck in the Cold War pattern of force structure, organization, equipment and infrastructure, the US military has frittered away a decade of opportunity to reshape itself for the future.”⁸ The chapter authors propose changes they feel DOD could adapt to its vision of the post-Cold War world while avoiding the coming budget impasse.

Cindy Williams, who until recently led the National Security Division of the Congressional Budget Office, is the book’s editor. She is not afraid to take on the defense establishment’s sacred cows. Her January 2000 *Washington Post* opinion piece, “Our GI’s Earn Enough,” caused a firestorm.⁹ But, this is not a book written by liberals or crackpots. The authors are highly respected security professionals who do not believe that the US Armed Forces have adapted to the sort of challenges they will likely face.

The authors are not decision-makers but advise congressmen on defense budget decisions. They argue that “it makes no sense to revert to Cold War levels of defense spending [when] threats to national security are as low as they are today,” particularly when “the United States is marching into the new century with forces designed for the old one.”¹⁰ They adhere to this point tenaciously.

Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Ronald Reagan, suggests that the FY2000 budget of \$300 billion “should be more than adequate to safeguard US interests in the world.”¹¹ He also feels that “throwing more money at the Pentagon would legitimize the failure of its leaders to come to grips with the post-Cold War world.”¹² After that cheery beginning, Williams suggests

ways for DOD to save money on infrastructure:

- Close commissaries and DODDS schools.
- Privatize military housing in the Continental United States.
- Consolidate basic training among all uniformed services.

According to Williams, these recommendations would result in \$10 billion in annual savings—“enough to pay the Army’s entire procurement bill for FY2000.”¹³ While Williams sees the political roadblocks in store for her proposals, she argues that if DOD “has to choose between giving up infrastructure and reducing its force structure and modernization goals, then \$10 billion in infrastructure savings might be worth fighting for.”¹⁴

After chapters analyzing the limited savings that might be gained by reducing US spending on nuclear weapons—brilliantly titled “The Hunt for Small Potatoes”—and asking European allies to improve their capabilities, comes the most interesting part of the book for military readers. The authors suggest force-structure changes that would shift the balance of power among the armed services.

The current allocation of resources among the services has remained amazingly steady for the past 35 years—25 percent for the Army, 31 percent for the Navy and 25 percent for the Air Force. This allocation might no longer be appropriate in the post-Cold War world. Owen Cote, Karl Mueller and James Quinlivan suggest strategies and force structures that place more emphasis on Navy, Air Force and Army contributions to future US security needs. Their recommendations demand attention.

In “Buying ‘From the Sea . . . ,” Cote suggests that the major theater wars of the future are likely to occur along the world’s littorals and that future US access to ports and airfields is likely to diminish. This would require more emphasis on the Navy’s ability to operate without fixed bases overseas. He argues that

the Navy does not need more ships to accomplish its missions but should use existing nuclear missile submarines to carry conventional guided missiles. Cote would free up defense dollars for the conversion by canceling the F-22, Comanche and Crusader and by eliminating the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st Air Assault Division, 18th Airborne Corps Headquarters, all eight Army National Guard divisions, and one National Guard and two Active Component (AC) F-16 wings. He would also convert the 10th Mountain and 25th Infantry into interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs). He says that "light Army divisions, and the airborne and air assault divisions in particular, make no sense in either the near or the longer term security environment."¹⁵

Mueller's "Flexible Power Projection for a Dynamic World: Exploiting the Potential of Air Power" continues the assault on Army force structure. Mueller argues that "technological changes of the late twentieth century, together with the strategic conditions of the early twenty-first, provide the opportunity to use the increased potential of land-based air power to provide some of the capabilities for which the United States has traditionally relied on land and naval forces."¹⁶ He would eliminate two AC heavy divisions and reduce each of the National Guard's eight divisions to one independent brigade. He would eliminate two 82d Airborne brigades and one 101st Air Assault brigade. The two remaining light divisions would become IBCTs. Mueller's underlying philosophy is that "for the scenarios that are plausible in the coming decade, the total combat capability of the US Army is less important than is the amount of capability that can be deployed reasonably quickly."¹⁷

Quinlivan defends the Army's honor in the face of this onslaught. But, according to several authors I have talked with recently, his is the hardest argument to support. In "Flexible Ground Forces," Quinlivan would stand down one AC heavy

division and six National Guard divisions. He would create seven IBCTs from four AC brigades and from three National Guard enhanced separate brigades (ESB). He would retain the Army's four light divisions but convert three heavy National Guard ESB's to armored carrier units built from mechanized infantry battalions. Doing so would provide more survivability, lethality and firepower to light forces.

Quinlivan would keep the Comanche but eliminate the Crusader—something on which all the authors agree. He feels that DOD could save more money by eliminating two aircraft carriers. Quinlivan's argument is based largely on the assumption that the United States will continue to engage in smaller-scale contingencies with "boots on the ground." These missions, which the Army accepts unenthusiastically, are the only hope the Army's advocate can find for preserving Army force structure in the 21st century.

The book concludes with a summary of each author's conclusions. Noting that the current two-major-theater-wars (MTW) strategy "is not producing the capabilities needed for the challenges that the military faces [and will continue to face] in the future," Williams argues that such a strategy no longer makes sense.¹⁸ The US should:

- Increase readiness for smaller-scale contingencies while assigning a lower priority to preparing for the second MTW.
- Hold defense spending constant in real dollars for the next decade.
- Cut infrastructure.
- Reduce and reshape conventional force structure by cutting a number of National Guard and AC Army divisions.
- Eliminate at least one aircraft carrier and remove at least two Air Force wings.
- Severely reduce or cut entirely purchases of the Crusader, Comanche, F-22, the Joint Strike Fighter and the F/A-18E.

Christmas this most decidedly is

not. But, readers who believe that President George W. Bush's administration is unlikely to heed these recommendations have not studied budget realities or the lessons of history. Traditionally, Republican presidents have been fiscal conservatives unwilling to spend large sums on defense. In fact, during the early 1950s, Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway resigned in protest at President and former General Dwight D. Eisenhower's cuts in the Army's force structure under the "New Look" defense policy.¹⁹

The authors of *Global Trends 2015* justify the argument that a new look at defense policy is warranted. The authors of *Holding the Line* outline a new defense policy. Both sources should be read by defense leaders responsible for structuring the US military for the demands of the post-Cold War world. 🇺🇸

NOTES

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MR Book Reviews

THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE SACRED: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, R. Scott Appleby, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2000, 429 pages, \$65.00.

Violence that ends without reconciliation will not lead to permanent peace. Religious organizations, rooted in local traditions and culture, offer the greatest hope for reconciliation between warring factions. The pivotal roles for external organizations are identifying the credible religious organizations and training them as national mediators in conflict transformation and reconciliation.

Reconciliation is the end point of a process of finding facts, identifying perpetrators, paying reparations, healing memories and offering and accepting forgiveness. Religious activists are committed to peace and reconciliation with enemies. Religious extremists are committed to reconciliation's defeat by any means.

In *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*, B. Scott Appleby expands the definitions associated with religious organizations and clarifies the roles they play in national politics, conflict and peace. Because they are already part of the community, religious organizations have great credibility and legitimacy in conflict transformation. Their roles in reconciliation include conflict resolution, conflict management and structural reformation. But, they also must translate the religious language of reconciliation into a human-rights discourse and a broad picture of hope and peace that appeal to all sides. Appleby thoroughly supports his thesis. He establishes clear definitions, argues powerfully for reconciliation and clearly delineates the legitimacy that religious activists who pursue it already enjoy.

Military professionals work with crises around the globe, including those that involve centuries of conflict. Interposing armed forces between factions will not solve the

conflict. Military professionals must address root causes and move toward a vision of the future. While military professionals will never have the credibility to foster reconciliation that community-based religious organizations have, they can facilitate the process. Therefore, they should understand how vital reconciliation is, how it occurs and which actors might best bring it about.

**MAJ Andrea Crunkhorn, USA,
*Monument, Colorado***

FOR LA PATRIA: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, Brian Loveman, Scholarly Resources Inc., Wilmington, DE, 1999, 331 pages, \$23.95.

In Latin America *La Patria* means more than one's country. It encompasses a community, a culture, a territory and, most of all, a spiritual principle. For Latin American militaries, service to *La Patria* is more than defending the nation against all external and internal threats. They view their roles to be above changing threats and enemies. They are the ultimate defenders—the essence of *La Patria*—willing to take whatever action is needed to protect their land.

In *For La Patria*, Brian Loveman builds a strong case for this interpretation of Latin American armed forces. His systematic use of history is far more rigorous than any anecdotal evidence. From his discussion of Iberian colonial influence, through European and North American influences in the 19th and 20th centuries, he tells the logical story of this developing mindset. Loveman's follow-on discussion applying this idea to the 21st-century world environment is noteworthy. There is no reason to think that this driving reason for being will change among Latin American armed forces. It will, however, continue to develop in new ways as new missions appear. And, in whatever actions arise, Latin American armed forces will assuredly go for-

ward for *La Patria*.

The book is worthwhile for research value alone. It has a comprehensive bibliography of more than 500 works, yet it remains enjoyable and easy to read. It is a must for anyone having dealings with Latin American militaries.

**LCDRAI Musgrove, USN,
*Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

STONEWALL JACKSON: A Life Portrait, K.M. Kostyal, Taylor Publishing Company, Dallas, TX, 1999, 214 pages, \$29.95.

On the night of 1 May 1863, Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson was mortally wounded by friendly fire. The statement, "Jackson is dead," caused a collective shudder across the Confederate States of America.


The Confederacy's top two generals—Robert E. Lee and Jackson—were trained at West Point and served in the Mexican War. During the first two years of the Civil War, Lee—the master planner—and Jackson—his able executor—became an invincible fighting team. Jackson's untimely death was a heavy blow to the Confederate cause. Months later Lee lamented, "If I [would have] had Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg, I would have won that fight."

In *Stonewall Jackson: A Life Portrait*, K.M. Kostyal takes a fresh look at the legendary Confederate lieutenant general. Drawing from archival and period photographs and illustrations, and supporting them with an easy-to-read, understandable text, Kostyal assembles Jackson's life portrait. Jackson was careless in appearance, eccentric in habits, devout in religion and cause and heroic in battle. Jackson—the man and legend—looms large through the magnifying glass of history.

Although Civil War scholars will find little that is new, this deeply moving collection of Jackson imagery honors the memory of a great military mind. No one with an interest in Jackson or the Civil War can

afford to ignore this book. It provides valuable insight into how Jackson learned the art of war.

LTC Glenn E. Gutting, USAR,
Fayetteville, Arkansas



DRUG POLITICS: Dirty Money and Democracies, David C. Jordan, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1999, 288 pages, \$24.95.

David C. Jordan's *Drug Politics* comprehensively treats the troubling connections between the global narcotics industry and power centers in national and international politics. Jordan asserts that narcotraffickers' core strength is the ability to subvert legitimate organs of state power within target societies. That ability, coupled with the globalization of capital markets and organized crime, makes narcotrafficking the world's most influential and pervasive criminal enterprise.

Jordan sees current counternarcotics policy as predestined to fail. Policymakers ignore the fundamental character of the illegal narcotics industry, preferring to apply a simplistic, liberal, economic template to what is a more comprehensive sociopolitical problem. Conventional counternarcotics strategy relies narrowly on limiting the supply and demand of illicit narcotics. In doing so, policymakers ignore the roots that narcotraffickers weave into the social, political and financial structures of producer and client societies.

Jordan points out the fallacies in prevailing assumptions, which range

from the centrality of supply and demand to the perceived certainty that official and unofficial forces within societies are committed antidrug activists. Competing and winning against these assumptions are four principle advantages narcotraffickers leverage to their benefit: the development of anarchy, the globalization and politicization of organized crime, the globalization of international finance, and the potential of narcotics trafficking as an instrument of state power.

While essential and relevant, this book is difficult to read. Many of the most important facts are hidden within wider political theory. But, Jordan's message is essential in the current operational environment. He underscores the critical and comprehensive security threat that narcotrafficking poses. He also outlines a way allied and US policymakers could move forward.

MAJ Nathan P. Freier, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CHINA'S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION: Implications for the United States, Mark A. Stokes, Strategic Studies Institute, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1999, 229 pages, out of print.

Credit Mark A. Stokes for providing an alternative view to the conventional portrayal of the People's Republic of China People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a backward continental force. Stokes posits that the PLA is poised to make significant progress in its long-range precision strike capabilities and aerospace defense, primarily backed by the quest for information dominance. The United States must not underestimate China's ability to make revolutionary breakthroughs in areas key to achieving its goals.

Stokes supports his thesis with substantive evidence and sound reasoning. His extensive investigation traces China's technological developments in indigenous defense industries that point toward an aggressive quest for information dominance, credible long-range precision strike capabilities and aerospace defense.

Stokes argues that China's quest for strategic modernization is driven by its emerging doctrine, which emphasizes strategic attack against the most critical enemy targets. Much of this has been influenced by China's "Gulf War Syndrome" caused by the enormous US success, at least at operational and tactical levels, which has awakened Chinese leaders to the preeminence of air power, long-range precision strike and information-based warfare.

Stokes extensively cites Chinese sources that cover PLA military space and directed-energy weapon development. He also supports claims with his experience as the assistant air attaché in Beijing from 1992 to 1995. He provides a balanced analysis and refrains from painting too rosy a picture of China's modernization effort. He points out the obstacles that could complicate China's ability to modernize the PLA, including budgetary constraints, technological overloads and the difficulties of integrating systems acquired from different sources.


Perhaps Stokes's greatest contribution is his illumination of a possible blind spot in conventional analysis of the PLA. By highlighting the PLA's strategic modernization, which is often overlooked, Stokes warns that the PLA is a significant force. Still, he cautions against overreaction.

While providing evidence of PLA's strategic modernization, Stokes falls short of qualitatively assessing how well the US military can counter such capability, particularly if both sides square off over Taiwan. Overall, Stokes's well-supported, extensively documented and balanced study contributes a significant new facet to the analysis of the PLA's capabilities.

MAJ Terry M.M. Siow,
Singapore

LEGACY OF HONOR: The Life of Rafael Chacon, A Nineteenth-Century New Mexican, Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa, Yucca Tree Press, Las Cruces, NM, 2000, 456 pages, \$19.00.

Almost all memoirs written by soldiers and officers of the frontier US



Army in the 19th century are worthy for their literary merit and descriptions of Army service. *Legacy of Honor* continues that tradition, with a twist. Major Rafael Chacón wrote his memoirs in Spanish and tells the little-known story of the Spanish-speaking units and soldiers who served on the Union side during the Civil War. Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa translates Chacón's prose and adds significant commentary, notes, maps and pictures.

Chacón witnessed the downfall of Mexican sovereignty in New Mexico and the coming of the Americans. In true 19th-century fashion, he lived a varied life, working as a rancher, farmer, trader, scout, miner, clerk, lawyer and holder of many political offices both before and after the Civil War. Born in 1833, his life extended long into the 20th-century.

Of greatest interest to the military reader is Chacón's account of his time as a company commander in the 1st Infantry Regiment, New Mexico Volunteers, during the Civil War. Among other duties, he led his company in the Battle of Valverde—the biggest battle of the war fought in New Mexico Territory. The regiment escorted Arizona's first territorial governor into the region and participated in numerous engagements with hostile Indians.

Although Chacón certainly suffered prejudicial behavior from Anglo subordinates and superiors, *Legacy of Honor* demonstrates that he received much praise for his service, especially from his immediate superior, the famous explorer Colonel Christopher "Kit" Carson. Although

never fully fluent in English, Chacón contributed more to his adopted country than most born with far greater advantages.

**MAJ Peter Molin, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE EMERGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, Williamson Murray, ed., Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1999, 320 pages, \$59.95.

The Emerging Strategic Environment: Challenges of the Twenty-First Century contains relevant, timely essays about the strategic directions of Europe and the Middle East as well as how the US military is dealing with what many people believe is a revolution in military affairs. Editor Williamson Murray believes strategic thinkers should really be focusing on Europe, which in this case extends to Russia, and the Middle East—not Asia—as the strategic fulcrum for the world's strategic balance.

The essays' regional and country-specific writers showcase changes in European foreign-policy attitudes since the end of the Cold War. Although many of the essayists point to economics as key to the emerging strategic environment, their unwillingness to see economic globalization by way of China, Japan and the rest of Asia is mystifying considering the current economic power and potential of those countries. Still, by focusing on countries linked by history and land mass, the writers offer provocative, useful alternatives to some of the world's most vexing problems.

The book also gives military professionals the opportunity to peer into the soul of a true strategic thinker—Murray himself. His 23-page introduction weaves history and philosophy into a conclusion that is both interesting and important. He closes with a too-short afterword that attempts to answer the questions of why we do what we do in the military and how the 21st century might change this.

A historian of the highest order, Murray clearly believes the art of looking back is key to looking forward. He uses industrialist Henry Ford's "history is bunk" quote then

smashes it with intellectual prose, which convinces me that Ford might have known cars but not history.

**MAJ John K. Tien, USA,
Cypress, California**

THE SECRET WAR AGAINST HANOI, Richard H. Shultz Jr., HarperCollins Publishers, NY, 1999, 394 pages, \$27.50.

In *The Secret War Against Hanoi*—a superb history of US operations against North Vietnam—Richard H. Shultz Jr. provides the first comprehensive look at this extensive adjunct to the Vietnam War. The actions and activities chronicled constitute the largest, most complex US covert operation since World War II. Shultz's research is supported by recently declassified top-secret documents. He also interviewed senior government policymakers and those actually involved in the operations.

The organization was established in Saigon to plan and conduct secret operations under its cover name—the "Studies and Observations Group" (SOG). Its membership included representatives from all the services and the CIA. SOG evolved from President John F. Kennedy's dissatisfaction with the CIA's guerrilla operations against North Vietnam. He gave the responsibility to the Department of Defense, where SOG operated under the direction of the Pentagon's Special Operations Group.

SOG had four core missions: training and inserting agent teams and deception programs; conducting psychological warfare; maintaining maritime operations against the North Vietnamese coast; and disrupting activities along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. How these core missions were planned, supported and carried out constitutes the heart of the book.

The secondary story—lessons for the future—involves the politics of how SOG was directed and used; the restrictions under which it operated; its manning; and military attitudes toward these types of operations, particularly the Army's. These lessons provide valuable guidelines for how *not* to do things in the future.

This book publicly acknowledges

the sacrifice of the thousands of people involved and contributes tremendously to Vietnam War literature. All military and civilians in covert-operations roles should read this book.

**LTC John Hardaway, USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**

VICKSBURG: Fall of the Confederate Gibraltar, Terrence J. Winschel, McWhiney Foundation Press, Abilene, TX, 1999, 168 pages, \$12.95.

For a conflict that lasted only four years and occurred 135 years ago, the American Civil War has spawned a publication industry. Terry J. Winschel's *Vicksburg: Fall of the Confederate Gibraltar*, is another welcomed addition, although I rate his book as a good text for a beginner or novice.

Winschel does an excellent job of covering a major campaign with just enough detail to make sense, but several points will raise military readers' antennae. Winschel identifies only two of three levels of war—the tactical and strategic. The intermediate, operational level is post-Vietnam US military vocabulary taxonomy. In this book it would have been useful to differentiate it from the strategic level to provide an understanding of how Union General Ulysses S. Grant developed his plan in complementary stages.

One glaring inaccuracy is Winschel's discussion of the 13th Infantry shoulder patch. The designation "First at Vicksburg" is an honor, although I consider this dubious because the unit was repulsed! It is not worn on any US Army patch. The 13th Infantry has not been a separate regimental organization for well over 50 years and even then it was not worn as a regimental shoulder patch. The slogan is located on the regimental colors, as is the custom of regimental mottoes, and it is also located on the distinctive unit insignia.


Another oddity is that Winschel cites Grant's turning movement from Port Gibson to Vicksburg as having "often" been referred to as the "blitzkrieg of the Vicksburg campaign." I am relatively well versed on the campaign and have only seen the phrase used once—in this book. I do not

disagree that the term is a good descriptor, but I believe Winschel is the first to use it.

Also, the description of locating the *USS Cairo* fails to credit the major contributor to the effort—Warren Graubau. Graubau, a retired US Army Corps of Engineer civilian employee in the Vicksburg district, has been long overlooked and neglected for his substantial contributions to the discovery of the *Cairo*.

On the plus side, the book's maps are fully sufficient for a general understanding of events, and for those who are beginning a study of the Vicksburg Campaign, this is a great primer. I also highly recommend it to students who are planning to visit Vicksburg.

**LTC Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**



DEADLY DREAMS: Opium, Imperialism and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China, J.Y. Wong, Cambridge University Press, New York, 542 pages, \$69.95.

The Arrow War is an important event in 19th century Anglo-Chinese relations, but scholars have never placed it in a satisfactory historical framework. Most view it as a part of the attempt to force China to accept Western norms in foreign relations. Marxists interpret the war according to the evil nature and innate rapacity of Western imperialism. This interpretation fits nicely into Chinese preconceptions and emphasizes the differences between a culture steeped in the rule of law and one steeped in the rule of virtue.


If a historian should read documents until he can hear the people speak, J.Y. Wong has been reading and listening. In this lengthy, well-written, revisionist work he explores some of the reasons nations go to war and describes imperialism in a specific context from multiple viewpoints. Long used as an epithet, few have attempted to depict imperialism as a historical phenomenon in specific contexts. Drawing on years of research, Wong places this small war in its British, Indian and Chinese context, highlighting mutual misunderstanding, arrogance and xenophobia.

Wong chronologically narrates events then analyzes issues. He places primary responsibility for the war's outbreak directly on British consul Harry Parkes and Sir John Bowring, the plenipotentiary in Hong Kong. Chinese obduracy on diplomatic representation in Beijing maddened the British government. Yet, this was only one issue connected with upholding British imperial prosperity and expansion. The war connected domestic politics to the politics of opium, cotton and tea—the pillars of British prosperity.

Wong shows how the British prepared an alliance against China before the *Arrow* incident and how the need to safeguard diplomatic, strategic and economic power led to a series of wars against the Chinese, Sikhs, Russians and army mutineers in India. He restores the war's role as an equilibrium mechanism, believing that while economic and political questions are important, Great Power political conflicts are fundamentally about power.

In the mid-19th century, British imperial power rested on Indian revenues, which depended on revenue from the opium monopoly. Part of Britain's economic problems, which many scholars trace solely to domestic causes, might have come from the post-1885 growth of Chinese opium production and its deleterious effect on Indian revenue. Everyone who wants to understand the connections between internal politics, diplomacy, strategy and economics should read this book.

**Lewis Bernstein, Assistant
Command Historian, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas**



EISENHOWER, Geoffrey Perret, Random House, New York, 1999, 685 pages, \$35.00.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower has long been a favorite of biographers. He is perceived as a hero and a good president. Geoffrey Perret does Eisenhower justice without succumbing entirely to the legend.

Eisenhower certainly achieved legendary status in his own lifetime, but not without critics. Some men who are perceived as great during

their lifetimes fade in reputation once they pass from the scene. Others grow in stature. Eisenhower's fame has passed through these stages. He was a respected general, beloved president and a leader in crisis. He was esteemed as a military hero but reviled by scholars. Not surprisingly, there are few objective views of Eisenhower.

Perret's Eisenhower emerges as a real man with all of a real man's foibles. Perret makes no claim that Eisenhower was a brilliant general or a brilliant president. Instead, he portrays Eisenhower as a good theater commander and a good and active president.

Eisenhower was self-effacing but possessed an enormous ego, which is not surprising to those of us who have served with senior officers. He had a sense of who he was and the import of his position, yet he tried to remain "Ike" of Abilene, Kansas. Perret ably navigates the rocks and shoals of this complex yet uncomplicated man's life.

Perret also brings new scholarship to the story. Previously closed

personal diaries, opened in 1998, give insight into what Eisenhower really thought as opposed to what he revealed publicly. For example, he made claims that neither known facts nor his diaries support, such as his claim that he was a great proponent of armor and willing to take risks. In reality, at the moment risks appeared, he backed off. When confronted with difficult situations, he often compromised his beliefs to advance his career.

The chapters on Eisenhower's political career are the most useful for readers intensely interested in military history. Eisenhower led the way to Soviet containment during NSC 68. Such massive retaliation was pure Eisenhower. Massive retaliation in practice means first strike, which explains a great deal about Eisenhower's less-than-enthusiastic support of Army positions during his tenure. Eisenhower's diminution of the Army in the 1950s infuriated his old friends and subordinates. He made decisions without regard to old loyalties but also without malice or romance.

Some readers will find Perret insufficiently critical of Eisenhower. However, the book is a well-balanced account of a man who is deservedly among the pantheon of great Americans.

**COL Gregory Fontenot, USA,
Retired, Lansing, Kansas**

MR Letters

Accessing Past MR Issues

Q. I really enjoyed James B. Patrick's review essay, "A War To Be Won" in the May-June 2001 issue of *Military Review*. One footnote referred to Colonel Dan Bolger's *Military Review* article, "Zero Defects," from the May 1991 issue. Is there a way to access Bolger's article electronically?

**Colonel Jim Danley, USA,
US Central Command, MacDill
Air Force Base, Tampa, FL**

A. To access past issues, go to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) site at <<http://leav-err.army.mil/call.html>>. Choose "CALL Database (Public Access)." You might have to click through two warnings before getting to the next page. Choose "*Military Review English Edition*." You can also access MR's Portuguese and Spanish editions at this site.

MR's archives go back to 1922.

Choose the year in which the article you wish to see appears. When you find the article you wish to read or download, click on the .pdf icon at the left of the underlined title. **NOTE:** You will need to download the Adobe Acrobat Reader to access the articles available for free download.

Editor's Note

In "GPS Vulnerabilities" by LTC Thomas K. Adams (*Military Review*, March-April 2001), the last sentence on page 11 should read: "Since the FAA also intends to broadcast GPS correction via geostationary satellites, worldwide airlines will likely take advantage of this highly accurate system for normal en route navigation, collision avoidance and airport ground navigation." Also, the USAF does not invest \$600 million annually for commercial tracking purposes; it maintains the GPS that private firms use. MR regrets any confusion.

DISTORTING DEFENSE: Network and National Security, Stephen P. Aubin, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1999, 262 pages, \$62.95.

The ability of major US networks to report significant events fairly, accurately and objectively is a topic of great debate. This is especially true for reports pertaining to national defense and security. Given the role of evening newscasts as principle conveyors of information, watchdogs and interpreters of government policies, how accurately do they present defense and security issues to the public they serve? Do they present these issues in the proper context without distorting or omitting facts? Stephen D. Aubin says, "No."

