

Women in the Emirati Military: Spearhead of Change

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After the dastardly attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001, Americans have had to reexamine their understanding of Islam and the Middle East. Americans generally misunderstand Islam, seeing it as a homogenous culture and religion. However, we are now realizing that there are striking differences in culture, lifestyle, and interpretation of religion, just as there are in other parts of the world.

One particular aspect of this reevaluation has been the role women play in Middle Eastern societies. Not only have the injustices committed against Afghani women been given greater prominence in the press, the contrast of varied lifestyles found among women in other Middle Eastern countries has been highlighted, particularly those in the Persian Gulf region.

Few Choices for Women

Most Americans envision women in Persian Gulf countries as swathed in black, not permitted to drive, and having little choice in marriage, lifestyle, education, or work. While true for many Gulf-area women, particularly those in Saudi Arabia, this stereotype is an anachronism when examining a select group of women in the United Arab Emirates—those serving in the military.

Readers interested in military subjects might be aware that women have served for quite some time in such Middle Eastern countries as Jordan and Syria. In fact, Aisha bint Al-Hussein, the sister of King Abdullah of Jordan, graduated from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and presently holds the rank of colonel in the Jordanian army. However, most people are not aware that Emirati women serve as a near-irreplaceable presence in their country's military. The details that surround

their transformation from a generally sheltered existence to the far more public role of soldiers are fascinating.

Female Emiratis an Exception

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) became an independent nation in December 1971. The UAE constitution guarantees women rights equal to men. Article 14 states, "Equality and social justice, ensuring safety and security and equality of opportunity for all citizens shall be the pillars of the Society."¹ However, local tradition and culture have generally dictated that women should stay at home in a more traditional female setting.

Sheikha Fatima, the wife of Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahayan, the President of the Emirates, has been a great pioneer in changing the traditional roles of women in the UAE. With her husband's support, she has done much for women by eliminating antiquated cultural barriers and expectations. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, Emirati women began asking why they could not participate in defending their country if it ever came under attack.² Sheikha Fatima agreed and helped set up the Khawla bint Al-Azwar Military School, named after a famous woman warrior in Islamic history who fought alongside the prophet Mohammed.

The school was founded in 1991 in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE. In support of the school, the U.S. Army sent a cadre of 10 women, led by Major Janis Karpinski, to the Emirates to establish the training regimen for the school. The U.S. team also trained some of the newly graduated Emirati soldiers to become trainers for future recruits.³ Since then, other female U.S. Army soldiers have rotated through the Khawla School in advisory roles. Foreign instructors were phased out in 1996, however, but according to

current commander Colonel Jumah Rashid Saif Al-Dhaheri, the school continues to produce high-quality female soldiers.⁴

Military Training

Women who wish to join the UAE military must be citizens between the ages of 18 and 28. They must have at least graduated from a middle school and be willing to serve in the military for a minimum of five years.⁵ Recruits must also pass a medical examination as well as an interview by school personnel. Once accepted, the cadets undergo a basic training course that lasts six months.

The course is divided into two parts: basic military training and subsequent administrative training. No passes are granted during the first 40 days of training, but after that trainees are allowed weekend passes during which they may go home to visit their families. The school also provides transportation to all trainees for weekend trips home, even if they live five or six hours away in a remote Emirate.⁶ During the six months of initial training, cadets are subject to dismissal if they become pregnant. A surprising number of trainees are already married, and a female soldier may continue to serve in the military if she becomes pregnant after the basic training period.⁷

During the first phase of training, as they are introduced to military life, cadets are instructed in numerous soldiering skills, including the following:

- Physical training.
- Infantry training, including minor tactics.
- Islamic education.
- Light weapons training, namely qualification with the M-16; a 9-millimeter, semiautomatic pistol; hand grenades; machine guns; and Russian rocket-propelled grenades.

- First aid.
- Field engineering.
- Urban warfare.
- Signals.
- Fieldcraft and battlecraft.
- Military security.
- Chemical warfare.
- Map reading and compass work.
- Military discipline and administration.
- Military symbols.
- Field training.⁸

The training day at the Khawla School is from 0530 to 2100. Cadets take a physical training (PT) test every three months, which closely resembles the U.S. Army's PT test. Cadets also must successfully complete an obstacle course and participate in a coordinated plan of attack in an urban warfare setting. In a film produced by the school, female cadets are shown, in a training session, successfully assaulting an enemy headquarters located in an urban building using hand grenades and M-16 assault rifles.

During training, cadets wear desert camouflage BDUs, which have been slightly modified in accordance with Islamic rules of dress for women. Tunics are cut longer and looser than those worn in the U.S. military. Women soldiers also wear a tight-fitting, black, cotton scarf around their hair underneath their BDU hats or berets. Women are also issued dress uniforms that consist of a khaki tunic and slacks, for use when marching or drilling, or an ankle-length khaki skirt.

The second phase of training consists of learning general staff duties, including skills such as typing, computer use, and military writing. Physical training is continued during this phase of training. After students graduate from basic training, they may enroll for additional training, according to the needs of their respective military units. Subsequent courses include the following:

- Military training.
- Special training that concerns the security of VIPs.
- Computers and secretarial duties.
- Chief clerk duties.
- Advanced military training in various specialties.
- Computer programming.⁹

In addition to the above courses, trainees can choose one of four levels of English-language courses, which are taught using the material created by the Defense Language Institute English Language Center, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas.¹⁰

Once cadets graduate from training, they are assigned to vacant posts throughout the Emirati armed forces. Female Emirati soldiers currently serve in communications and communication engineering, secretarial, computer, and training positions for future recruits. Two graduates of the school, both captains, serve as part of the elite personal protection service to Sheikha Fatima.¹¹ Female Emirati soldiers and their male counterparts also have been assigned peacekeeping duties in Kosovo.

On graduating from the school, military rank is awarded according to the level of education graduates had completed before enlisting. Middle school graduates receive the rank of private. Those who completed their first year in high school become lance corporals. Those with two or more years of high school, or have completed high school, become corporals. Those with one to three years of college-level studies receive the rank of corporal first class. University graduates become warrant officers.¹²

Military salaries are competitive with those in the private sector. A private earns 5,300 Dirhams a month (approximately \$1,450), whereas on reaching first lieutenant, her income increases to 11,000 Dirhams a month (approximately \$3,000). Female Emirati soldiers also receive standard military benefits that include housing, medical care, and rations.¹³ The highest ranking female in the Emirati armed forces is a colonel, who currently heads the dental section in the medical corps.

As time and the cadets march on, the cultures and countries of the Middle East will continue to change. The United Arab Emirates will be no exception. In fact, many believe that this small but strategically significant country has developed and changed more rapidly than any other country in the Persian Gulf area since becoming an independent nation. Women serving alongside men in the Emirati

armed forces have certainly contributed to these admirable changes and will continue to do so as their service becomes more and more acceptable to and valued by Emirati society. It is important for Western societies, particularly the United States, to be aware of these changes, and to continue to reexamine beliefs about women and their roles in the Middle East. **MR**

NOTES

1. *A Valued Role in Society*, Legal Status paragraph, <www.dubaiart.com/uae/women.html>, accessed 23 November 2001.

2. Unnamed Khawla Military School trainees, interview by author, 11 April 2001. Also found in G. Brooks, "The Metamorphosis: Women Warriors Join an Arab Army—Pioneers, Sheltered and Shy, are Molded into Soldiers, U.S. Trainers Learn, Too," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 August 1991.

3. See G. Brooks for an excellent description of the initial establishment of the Khawla School and viewpoints of female U.S. Army soldiers sent as part of the initial training team.

4. COL Jumah Rashid Saif Al-Dhaheeri, United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, interview by author, 11 April 2001.

5. Khawla bint Al-Azwar Military School pamphlet, *Khawla Bint Al Azwar Military School (sic) in Lines*, no date, 4.

6. Al-Dhaheeri, 2001.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Khawla . . . Military School in Lines*, 9; Al-Dhaheeri, 2001.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Personal observation during an ongoing English-language class at the Khawla Military School, 11 April 2001.

11. Al-Dhaheeri, 2001.

12. *Khawla . . . Military School in Lines*, 5.

13. Madam Mariam (no last name given), English translator and guide at the Khawla Military School, interview by author, 11 April 2001.

Adrienne A.R. Brooks teaches English as a Second Language at the University of the Incarnate Word, San Antonio, Texas. She received a B.A. from the University of South Florida and an M.S. Ed. from Florida State University. She served as a noncommissioned officer in the U.S. Army in military intelligence. She spent four years teaching at universities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in the United Arab Emirates.

Correction:

On page 49 of Colonel Teddy Bitner's article "Integrating Space Into Training Simulations" (November-December 2001), the model identified as "Descriptive Intermediate Attributed Notation for ADA" should have been listed as DIANA. DIANA is a model specifically developed by the Space and Missile Defense Battle Lab for the Future Command and Control experiment; it is simply a name, not an acronym. Also, the biographical summary on page 50 incorrectly lists Bitner as having a Ph.D. from Trinity Seminary; it should read Doctor of Ministry from Trinity Seminary.

Soviet Special Forces (Spetsnaz): Experience in Afghanistan

Timothy Gusinov

When I read in the newspapers that U.S. Special Forces units had deployed to Afghanistan in the full-scale antiterrorist operation after the Attack on America on 11 September 2001, I could not help but experience *déjà vu*; I had “been there, done that.”

“They are ready to go,” I said to myself. “Maybe at this exact moment they are jumping into a chopper to take them on their mission. Or possibly, they are already on the ground in Afghanistan.”

I had lived through the dark nights in the mountains of Afghanistan. I had heard the angry roar of helicopter engines in thin air. And, I had experienced the deafening bursts of automatic gunfire and the blasts of hand grenades as they exploded in narrow canyons or among packed mud walls of Afghan villages. I lived again the exhausting dash back toward the pick-up area. I saw the faces of my comrades, dead and alive.

Soviet Spetsnaz

The involvement of the Soviet special forces—the Spetsnaz—in Afghanistan began in 1980. The Soviet command soon realized that mechanized infantry units were not effective against Mujahideen guerrilla tactics. The Spetsnaz were called in as the only forces capable of fighting the enemy on his own terms. Even these crack units initially lacked mountain-warfare training. Their mission in the event of a full-scale European theater of war was to hunt and destroy headquarters, command and communications centers, and mobile missile launchers. In Afghanistan they had to learn a lot fast to meet new and unique challenges.

In the paragraphs below, I list some of the challenges and solutions

Soviet Spetsnaz teams faced and what they learned.

Deployment Lessons Learned

Helicopter assault tactics. When deploying a Spetsnaz team into enemy territory, helicopters should make several landings, leaving the team at one location only and under cover of darkness. Doing so complicates the enemy’s search and pursuit because they will have to conduct searches in several places, thus dispersing their forces.

The helicopter drop should be from two to three miles behind the target, so that instead of going deeper into enemy territory for the attack, the group would be moving back toward its own base. If the enemy launches a search operation, chances are fewer that they will be searching in the back direction.

Helicopters should use different routes for returning to base after dropping the team. To conceal the team’s deployment, there should be other air force activity in the area, including limited air strikes near but not too close to the team’s objective.

Destroying enemy supply convoys. During the Soviet-Afghan war, the Mujahideen developed sophisticated and effective tactics of bringing weapons and ammunitions supply convoys into Afghanistan. The tactics the Spetsnaz most often used to destroy such convoys were helicopter assaults and ambushes en route.

The general rule for intercepting and destroying weapons and ammunition convoys is that the closer to the enemy’s base or main camp the convoy is intercepted, the higher the chances the convoy will be in one piece and its security will not be on full alert. After a large convoy arrives at a distribution base or area, representatives of different field com-

manders and tribes meet it and divide it into smaller groups, which are much harder to detect.

When a long line of camels loaded with weapons and ammunition is attacked, the most depressing thing is the maddening shriek of wounded animals. The wounded from the convoy security detachment scream too, but they are the enemy; the animals are victims. The most unpleasant thing is when a camel loaded with mines or TNT explodes into bloody pieces, killing everyone nearby.

Local conditions. Even if soldiers speak the local language and dress like the locals, they should not count too much on their ability to pass as locals. The way they walk is different, and there are many tribal dialects. Dress-specific features, even in the way of wearing a headdress, carrying weapons, and so on, can betray someone as not being a native. Depending on the mission, however, it makes sense to dress as much like locals as possible for the particular area of the country in which the mission is to occur. Doing so could fool the enemy for some time and give soldiers a small advantage. Also, soldiers should collect and hide used toilet paper. Most Afghans in rural areas use small stones and pieces of dry clay for this purpose.

Tactics Lessons Learned

Air-fuel munitions. The Soviet air force used air-fuel bombs and unguided rockets with air-fuel warheads for the first time in Afghanistan. When used in populated areas, such munitions completely destroy buildings within a distance of 25 to 30 meters from the center of the explosion and partly destroying and damaging structures at a distance of up to 80 meters. The smashing and throwing effect of an air-fuel bomb’s hot explosion wave is effective at a

distance of up to 200 meters, especially in canyons and narrow valleys. However, thin air in the mountains and wind at ground level can quickly disperse the concentration of aerosol needed for explosion, thereby decreasing the power of such munitions.

These munitions should be used during cold season, at night, or during the early morning, when the air is still cool and thick. If dropped in thin air or during windy conditions, it is best to use a cocktail combination of aerosol munitions and smoke bombs dropped together. The smoke will keep the aerosol from dispersing too quickly.

The number of landing zones in Afghanistan near fortified enemy bases are limited and usually mined. During air-assault missions, air-fuel munitions are effective for cleaning mines from helicopter landing zones before troops land.

Soviet attack aircraft used the following tactics:

- Attacking the target from the sun.
- Performing “star” air strikes, which consist of aircraft attacking a target continuously from different directions, thus preventing the enemy from accurate firing in one direction.
- Using two aircraft or two pair of aircraft on parallel courses coming from opposite directions to attack the target.
- Finishing the attack by steady climbing, then performing a sharp hook turn to either left or right.

Often a flight of aircraft would launch a distracting attack by flying on afterburners to create noise, while the main striking force attacked a strongly fortified enemy base from another direction during a large-scale operation.

Air-strike diplomacy. If a particular tribe, field commander, or village was known to have taken prisoners of war (POWs) or possessed the remains of those killed in action, from two to four aircraft would deliver an impressive air strike as close as possible to the location using heavy bombs and incineration munitions. At the same time, leaflet bombs would be dropped that declared that unless there was immediate negotiation for POWs’ release or

for the return of bodies to a specified location, the next air strike would target the area itself.

Air Defenses Lessons Learned

During my service in Afghanistan, the enemy used a variety of portable, shoulder-launched missiles. They included the old (usually Egyptian-made) Strela-1, Strela-2, and Strela-2M (modernized) missiles; American Red Eye and Stinger missiles; and British Blowpipe missiles.

According to information gathered from POWs, Blowpipe performance was disappointing because of its low accuracy, heavy weight, and complicated guidance system. Blowpipes were used en masse during the 1986 assault on Javara south of Khost. I personally witnessed from two to three simultaneously launched Blowpipe missiles missing a single aircraft and exploding in the air.

Twelve 7-millimeter DShK (1, 2, or 4 barrels, mostly of Chinese or Egyptian manufacture) and fourteen, 5-millimeter Zenitnaya Gornaya Ustanovka (ZGU) antiaircraft mountain units, using Krupnokaliberniy Pulemet Vlavimirova Tankoviy tank-mounted, large-caliber machine guns of Vladimirov design (originally designed for tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs)), had effective ranges of fire up to 1,500 to 1,800 meters. Even after the introduction of SA missiles, the DshKs and ZGUs caused from 50 to 70 percent of helicopter losses and damage and from 40 to 50 percent of aircraft losses and damage. Also in limited use were Swedish 20-millimeter Eurlicon antiaircraft guns and the Soviet-made mobile 4-barrel automatic gun system known as Shilka, which was used by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.

For better protection of their fortified bases and strongholds, enemy forces established a local early warning system that consisted of a net of observation posts. Small radio stations were located as far as from 5 to 15 kilometers from each post. This distance does not seem like much when flying in a jet, but it is enough to give advanced warning of approaching helicopters. Also, such posts kept air force bases under observation, reporting every group take

off. To counter such a net, striking teams should take a deceptive course, then change it to the correct one once out of the observation area.

Enemy air defense of fortified bases began from distant approaches of from four to six kilometers out from the main base area. Air defenses included heavy antiaircraft machine guns and occasional SA missiles located on high mountain ridges. The concentration of air defenses gradually increased toward the center of main bases and fortified areas. The number of heavy machine guns defending a base varied depending on its size and importance but could range from 60 to 80 pieces in a particular area. Crews are tough. Often, when a gunner was killed or wounded, another trained crewmember immediately replaced him.

Soviet pilots nicknamed antiaircraft machine guns “welding machines,” because from the air the flashes that occurred when they were fired reminded the pilots of welding works in progress. Fortified areas with large numbers of antiaircraft machine guns were called welding workshops.

Special “free-hunting” missile teams usually consisted of from 10 to 20 soldiers; one to two trained missile men; and two to three soldiers to carry additional tubes. Other team members carried infantry weapons for protection and cover. Hunting teams, operating near air bases, and missile teams defending enemy bases, included 4- to 10-member groups whose mission was to kill or capture downed pilots. Pilots’ messes at airbases, such as at Bagram and Kabul, were specific targets for mortar or rocket barrages. Sometimes such teams would climb to incredible heights to attack or engage transportation aircraft that the Soviets thought were flying at safe altitudes.

In 1987, after recovering from being wounded for the second time, I returned to Afghanistan where I worked at the Military Intelligence Department in Kabul. I received information that a Spetsnaz team in the Panjshir area had intercepted and destroyed an enemy convoy carrying, in addition to the usual variety of weapons and munitions,

small portable oxygen bottles and masks.

To counter such measures, humanitarian packages should be dropped from higher altitudes. Transportation aircraft should alternate approach directions as often as possible, and they should avoid permanent flight routes.

Mine Warfare Lessons Learned

On many occasions, enemy forces would lay mines in a way that they could be easily detected and disarmed. Other mines in the same area would be much better concealed and laid with much more resourcefulness. For example, a mine having an easily detectable metal casing might be surrounded by mines that had plastic casings, which are much harder to detect. Enemy forces would also combine pressure-detonated mines with remote radio or wire-detonated mines and charges whose power was often increased by putting

pieces of cut thick metal around them or laying stones over them.

Despite the fact that many modern weapons, including modern land mines, are used in Afghanistan, many homemade devices are also used. A pile of empty artillery and tank shell cases, as well as cases from unexploded air bombs and other munitions, clearly indicates that the place is used for manufacturing explosive devices. Also, the enemy will collect empty artillery and tank shell cases, refill them with explosives, and use them as anti-vehicle mines. Such refuse should be collected and rendered unusable by running over it with a tank or other heavy-armor vehicle.

Finding large amounts of cheap soap and empty glass bottles indicates the production site of Molotov cocktails. Soap is grated, placed in a bottle, mixed with gasoline, and thrown on a vehicle. When the bottle

breaks the burning mixture of soap and gasoline sticks to the surface and burns. **MR**

Editor's note: U.S. Armed Forces on the ground in Afghanistan have most likely already encountered all or most of the tactics discussed here. However, it is wise to listen to the voice of experience. The War on Terrorism could last much longer than anyone can predict.

Timothy Gusinov served two tours of duty, totaling from 4 to 5 years, in Afghanistan. Because he speaks Farsi and Dari, his duties included facilitating coordination and liaison between Afghani governmental and Soviet troops as well as negotiations with local authorities, tribe leaders, and field commanders. Wounded twice, he received a number of orders and medals including the Order of Red Star. After the Persian Gulf war, he was the U.N. military observer during the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission. He also served as an adviser to the former Yugoslavia. He now lives in the United States.

MR Review Essay

The Two World Wars that Shaped the 20th Century

Lewis Bernstein

The 20th century was shaped by two world wars. The result of World War I was the collapse of the German, Austrian, Turkish, and Russian empires that gave rise to fascism and communism. World War II hastened the end of European colonial empires in Africa and the Far East and brought about the emergence of two super powers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

In *The Great World War, 1914-1945: Volume 1, Lightning Strikes Twice* (HarperCollins Publishers, London, 2001) and *The Great World War, 1914-1945: Volume 2, Who Won? Who Lost? The Peoples' Experience* (HarperCollins Publishers, London, 2001), editors Peter Liddle, John Bourne, and Ian Whitehead compare the experiences of the various nations in the two conflicts and question the received wisdom com-

monly associated with them. Volume 1 concentrates on military affairs. Volume 2 deals with each war's effect on the societies within the countries involved in the conflict.

The editors remind readers of the wars' similarities despite a tendency of most analysts to emphasize the differences between them. World War I is usually seen as "bad"; it was an avoidable conflict, directed by incompetents, which resulted in mass slaughter in the trenches on the Western Front. Historians see World War II as being a "good" war; it was an unavoidable conflict against monstrous tyrannies directed by relatively competent generals who used high-tech methods to move across battlefields at relatively small cost. As these volumes remind us, such views are not completely true. Massive atrocities in World War I foreshad-

owed those in World War II. The 1914-1918 commanders were about as competent as their 1939-1945 successors.

The British Experience

In the 33 comparative essays in Volume 1, *Lightning Strikes Twice*, the mostly British scholars write about experiences on the frontlines, in leadership, and of occupation. The topics of individual chapters include the following:

- Relations between major coalition warfare partners, such as Britain and France; Britain and the United States; and Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary.
- Comparisons in military and political leadership, in particular that of the principal British generals and England's prime ministers Lloyd George and Winston Churchill as well as German strategist Erich

Ludendorff, Japanese General Hideki Tojo, French marshal Ferdinand Foch, U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Russian commanders Aleksey Brusilov and Georgi Zhukov.

- The effects of occupation in Belgium, France, and Poland and of genocide in Armenia in 1915 and Romania in 1942.

The Peoples' Experience

Volume 2, *Who Won? Who Lost? The Peoples' Experience*, has a broader scope than Volume 1. The first part explores the far-ranging implications of total war and how they affected the societies of Canada, South Africa, the United States, India, New Zealand, Russia, Italy, China, Australia, the Balkans, Japan, India, the Arab world, and the African empires of Britain and France. These chapters also detail how the Netherlands and Sweden fared as neutrals. Many of the chapters are sketchy, attempt to cover too much ground, or are drawn too narrowly. However, each chapter contains useful bibliographical references, casts light on unknown aspects of the wars, or indicates areas for future research.

The second part of this volume concentrates on cultural experiences and is narrowly drawn, limning the ways in which British artists, writers, and the entertainment industry responded to the wars. The reader longs for a similar presentation about the cultural experiences of French, German, Japanese, American, Chinese, and Italian societies, but they are not covered.

The section on moral experiences continues in the Anglo-American volume, but the chapter on ethics and weaponry tries to broaden the scope of inquiry. It does not succeed. The authors never explain how ethical dilemmas or questioning prevented or curtailed the use of aerial bombardments, submarine attacks, or chemical warfare against the general civilian populace.

The essayists never grapple with the implications of total war in the 20th century. One would have expected some attempt to place this warfare in a larger world context or even a larger Western context, but that attempt was not made.

Old Rules of War Overthrown

The essayists in both volumes amply demonstrate that the old rules of civilized warfare, invented after the horrors of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, were overthrown by 20th-century mass industrial warfare. As entire societies mobilized to support national aims, warfare reverted to what it has always been—nasty, cruel, and sordid.

After 1945, soldiers and statesmen began to reformulate rules of warfare to include human-rights issues. Dutch pioneer of natural rights and other legal causes, Hugo Grotius, did the same thing after the religious wars of the 17th century, when he began drafting his work on international law. Since the end of the Cold War, politicians wanting to avoid war's totality have sought to disengage their societies from the war-making apparatus.

Comparisons

Volume 1's engaging collection of essays, which combine novel approaches to old questions about the business of warfare in the two world wars, is thought provoking. Although some of its comparisons are far-fetched, such as comparisons between Ludendorff and Tojo and others, such as Churchill and Lloyd

George, Brusilov and Zhukov, Foch and Eisenhower, and brief comparisons of genocide give the reader much food for thought. The comparisons between Anglo-French and Anglo-American relations in coalitions are also insightful even though their predominant concern is the British experience. A careless reader would be hard pressed to discover the extent of U.S., French, or Russian involvement in the wars. Nevertheless, the chapters are informative.

In Volume 2, the authors successfully sketch the wars' societal affect. Yet, it fails to deliver on its promise of far-ranging scholarship, especially in the later sections of the book. They were disappointing. However, both volumes are well worth reading. Their varied contents should interest all intellectually curious browsers.

Lewis Bernstein is Senior Historian, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Huntsville, Alabama. He received a B.A. from Brooklyn College of the City of New York, an M.A. from Pennsylvania State University and an M.B.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of Kansas. He has been a Fulbright fellow and taught East and Southeast Asian history at The Kansas City Art Institute, Brigham Young University, and Boise State University. His reviews appear frequently in Military Review, Journal of Urban History, American Neptune, the Journal of Military History and Pacific Historical Review.

ANECDOTE OF ANTIQUITY

afghanistare first

above in a londrawn chariot,

Or witness plowshares melting to flashpoints.

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Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona

MR Book Reviews

LEGACY OF THE PROPHET: Despots, Democrats and the New Politics of Islam, Anthony Shadid, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 2001, 340 pages, \$26.00.

Even before the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, most Westerners thought of Islam as being characterized by strong ideals, religious fervor, and an almost fanatical approach to ideas and cultural issues. After the attacks, most Americans added terrorism and violent conflict to that list. In *Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats and the New Politics of Islam*, Anthony Shadid argues that the West misunderstands Islam and those who practice the religion.

Shadid sets out on what begins as a self-inspired journey, taking his U.S. roots to the Middle East in an attempt to understand his paradoxical feelings of “being an Arab in the United States and an American in the Middle East.” Through a series of interviews with personalities as diverse as Mujihadeen freedom fighters to Cairo entrepreneurs, Shadid examines the emotions that make up the people of Islam.

Shadid begins by providing an introduction to Islam and the Islamic, or Muslim, faith. He sets a course for the book based on the hypothesis that the lack of clarity and direction left as the legacy to the prophet Mohammed’s followers meant that the very nature of the religion would be one of constant change as it sought a direction to follow. This fact affords Shadid the freedom to explain the changes and shifts within Islam as being fundamental to the Muslim religion.

The evolutionary rather than geographical journey that unfolds in the book ushers the reader through the various changes that have occurred within Islam since its inception. What the West should come to realize is that there are many sects and divisions within Islam, just as there are in the Christian faith. As West-

erners, we can gain a better understanding of and toleration of Muslims through a study of this book.

MAJ Simon J. Hulme,
RE, British Army

IN HARM’S WAY: The Sinking of the USS Indianapolis and the Extraordinary Story of the Survivors, Douglas Stanton, Henry Holt and Co., NY, 2001, 333 pages, \$25.00.

Two weeks before the end of World War II, a Japanese submarine in the Philippine Sea, about 350 miles East of Leyte, torpedoed the heavy cruiser U.S.S. *Indianapolis*. The ship sank in 12 minutes. A brief SOS was improvised by an ingenious radioman despite the wreckage of the equipment. Tragically, those who heard it did not properly record or respond to the message.

Approximately 900 crewmembers survived the immediate explosion and were able to abandon ship. Of those, only 317—35 percent—survived to be found by chance four days later. The others died of dehydration, hypernatremia (from drinking seawater), hypothermia, and shark attacks.

Public outcry at the Navy’s reporting inefficiencies that contributed to the enormous loss of life was muted by the euphoria of the ending of the war and the drama of the dropping of nuclear weapons. The Navy quickly carried out courts-martial proceedings, doled out minimal punishments to those involved ashore, and hoped the entire episode would be forgotten.

The ship’s skipper was reprimanded, retired from the Navy, and ultimately committed suicide. The survivors met periodically, and in 1999 the meeting was brought to the attention of author Douglas Stanton. Stanton interviewed 14 of the attendees and used in-depth interviews with the ship’s doctor, a lieutenant commander at the time, and a Marine private for most of the new ma-

terial included in the book. Most of the material used as the basis for this well-told story came from numerous newspaper and magazine articles written in 1945 and 1946.

Stanton’s account is meant to remind the public of a dramatic story. He is not a sailor or Navy man. The first 63 pages, which provide background to the events leading up to the sinking, are filled with Navy and nautical gaucheries, which could have been avoided if the publishers had bothered to ask any old seagoing Navy man to help with proofreading. Although such errors irritate the professional, they do not detract from the story.

The book’s ending could have been more satisfying if Stanton had included in the epilogue something of lessons learned from this and other stories of survivors of torpedoing during wartime. Navy and Coast Guard physicians have studied such histories and by applying what they have learned they have influenced the redesign of lifeboats, life rafts, life vests, techniques for converting seawater to potability, and methods for identifying a man afloat in a life vest in the open ocean. Most important, after its frightful performance in 1945, the Navy redesigned its system for ship reporting so that, hopefully, such a tragic overlooking of a sinking ship will never recur.

RADM Ben Eiseman,
USNR, Retired, Denver, Colorado

SO OBSTINATELY LOYAL: James Moody, 1744-1809, Susan B. Shenstone, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2000, 354 pages, \$39.95.

James Moody of Sussex County, New Jersey, was one of the most active Loyalists during the Revolutionary War. He was a spy, a recruiter of Loyalist troops, and a staunch supporter of the king.

Susan B. Shenstone’s book, *So ObstinateLY Loyal*, follows Moody’s life after he leaves the American

Colonies and resettles in Nova Scotia. There is little information extant about Moody, although much has been attributed to him. Therefore, Shenstone paints his portrait by skillfully filling in the outline with the story of the people and events of the time, which surely formed Moody into the person he became. In Canada, Moody is largely unknown; in New Jersey, he is still looked on as being a rascal. His story is interesting and refreshing.

Lynn Sims, *University of Richmond, Virginia*

LOVE AND VALOR: Intimate Civil War Letters Between Captain Jacob and Emeline Ritner, Charles F. Larimer, ed., Sigourney Press, Western Springs, IL, 2000, 472 pages, \$19.95.

Collections of letters from Civil War soldiers are not uncommon. What sets this collection apart is that it also contains letters from the soldier's wife and family. One can only imagine the difficulties a soldier would encounter attempting to save letters while on campaign. Retention of letters would have been extremely difficult given such conditions as adverse weather, limited space in his knapsack, and loss or theft of personal items. Nevertheless, Captain Jacob Ritner was able to save 44 letters from his wife Emeline—letters that provide insight into the trials of the women who had to manage the farms, take care of the children, and pay the bills while their husbands were away.

Jacob's letters provide ample details of soldier life. He describes food or the lack thereof, marches, equipment shortages, and disgust with paymasters. He gives accounts of winter quarters and the soldiers' attempts to make their rude dwellings comfortable. He inquires about his children, his wife's health, the condition of their cows, the weather in Iowa, and he expresses concern about not being able to provide her with his pay.

At times Jacob declares his dissatisfaction with Army leaders, especially his dislike for Northern democrats whom he believes are undermining President Abraham Lincoln's attempt to win the war. Rarely does he provide his views of Confed-

erates or the Confederacy, although, in his letters beginning the middle of 1864, he takes a more strident tone toward the enemy, referring to them as "liars and drunkards and slave holders and traitors."

Emeline tells of the children, the cost of items at home, local news, and also expresses her desires for a Union victory. In this regard, her passion for the cause exceeds that stated by Jacob.

Often in 19th-century letters there are few expressions of love. Jacob's letters do not follow the norm. He writes of his loneliness, his love for Emeline, his desire to return to her and his children, and of his dreams of her. She, on the other hand, tells of her desires for his safety, but in two letters writes plaintively of what life would be like were he not to return.

Although Jacob's descriptions of the battles in which he fought are limited, they do provide a view of conflict through the eyes of a soldier rather than that of a general who might have a self-serving view of the fight.

LTC Richard L. Kiper, *USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas*

RIPCORD: Screaming Eagles Under Siege, Vietnam 1970, Keith W. Nolan, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 2000, 447 pages, \$29.95.

In *Ripcord: Screaming Eagles Under Siege*, Keith W. Nolan gives a brilliant account of a crucial engagement at Dienbienphu during the latter stages of the Vietnamese War. I have corresponded with Nolan for 20 years, ever since he was a teenager so articulate and knowledgeable that I initially doubted his authenticity. Since then, I have observed with admiration the development of his historical and literary skills. Also, I have been a friend, subordinate, colleague, or superior to several key figures in the *RIPCORD* story. From my observation of these men in other circumstances, I find Nolan to be a keen judge of character and an unsparing, but not gratuitously unkind, appraiser of professional behavior under the horrendous pressures of close combat.

In 1970, a year into America's withdrawal from the war, the U.S. military decided to buy time for the

said-to-be-improving South Vietnamese forces by interdicting a segment of the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail. The A Shau Valley, running north-south for 50 kilometers just inside the Vietnam border with Laos and dominated by a chain of hills previously occupied by U.S. forces, seemed the logical choice for the engagement. An infantry battalion with supporting artillery occupying a fire base on a supposedly impregnable hilltop could disrupt the southward flow of northern troops and supplies or destroy, by employing massive U.S. firepower, enemy forces sent to dislodge that base.

In Saigon and at U.S. Army, Vietnam, headquarters, the concept undoubtedly made splendid sense. The 101st "Screaming Eagles" Airborne Division command post appears also to have been staffed by true believers. However, at brigade, battalion, and especially company and platoon levels, where helicopters were available, the war consisted of near-impenetrable jungle, near-unbearable heat and humidity, precipitous and always-one-more-to-climb hillsides, and a near-invisible, tenacious, deeply dug-in enemy. Soldiers exhibited astonishing bravery even as casualties mounted and higher headquarters demanded ever-greater effort in pursuit of unachievable ends.

As a study in leadership and organization, this is an important book. As Nolan says, "[The battle was] a tragic metaphor for the entire Vietnam War." As literature, this book is a masterpiece—a moving, insightful illumination of the tragedies of the Vietnam War.

COL William L. Hauser, *USA, Retired, Manhasset, New York*

BEYOND DECLARING VICTORY AND COMING HOME: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations, Max G. Manwaring and Anthony James Joes, eds., Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2000, 264 pages, \$69.95.

The political and increasingly universal practice of "declaring victory and coming home" has provided a false and dangerous domestic impression of success for U.S. and U.N. unilateral and multilateral interventions in failing and failed states around the world. The reality of such

irresponsibility is that the root causes and violent consequences of contemporary intranational conflict are left to smolder, perhaps to soon re-ignite. *Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home* discusses why the international community and individual powers involved in dealing with the chaos of the post-Cold War world must understand that such actions require a long-term, holistic, strategic approach.

Editor Max G. Manwaring is an adjunct professor of political science at Dickinson College and an adjunct professor at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. He is also a retired U.S. Army colonel. Editor Anthony James Joes is the chairman of the international relations program at St. Joseph's University. Both are quick to point out that nations that "declare victory and go home" without having put into place a fundamental infrastructure to provide either the reality or perception of justice or lasting stability are often the same nations that claim to be unable to fathom why problems continue to fester or erupt again.

This book is part of a continuing effort to revitalize strategic thinking as it pertains to "uncomfortable" contemporary conflicts. The essays analyze the global security environment, synthesize the fundamental changes associated with that environment, and project appropriate rules of law to identify essential internal "defensive" conditions that lead to mandated peace and stability. Manwaring and Joes go farther than other paradigms in that they shift from the defensive action of peace enforcement to explore the offensive actions necessary to secure a durable peace.

LTC Dominic J. Caracillo, USA,
Vicenza, Italy

THE BATTLE OF BRISBANE: Australians and Yanks at War, Peter A. Thompson and Robert Macklin, Australian Broadcasting Company, Sydney, 2000, 242 pages, \$29.90 (Australian).

In 1939, Australia went to war. In 1941, the United States joined the fray. The timing and the differences between the armies, leadership, pay, uniforms, post exchanges, life styles, treatment of minorities, and other differences are said to have contrib-

uted to a knockdown, drag-out, bottle-breaking brawl between the Diggers and the Yanks in 1942 that became known as the Battle of Brisbane.

Brisbane is a lovely Queensland town, but beneath the town's beauty and quiet life stirred foreboding of impending threats. In February 1942, the same Japanese aircraft that had bombed Pearl Harbor devastated Darwin, another northern Australian town. The Japanese also came over the famous Kokoda Trail in New Guinea and threatened Port Moresby, the last settlement before the Torres Straits and Queensland. However, the Yanks were coming.

Much to the manpower-short Australians' relief, a convoy carrying U.S. National Guard, Air Corps, and Army soldiers destined for the Philippines ended short of its goal, landing in Queensland. In time, more U.S. troops arrived until there were enough for General Douglas MacArthur to begin military operations in New Guinea. While the build-up went on, Queenslanders breathed easier.

Australia did not have a draft during World War II. So, the Australian army was made up of two types of soldiers: Australian Imperial Force (AIF) enlistees and volunteers who made up the militia. The militia could not be sent overseas, but they could be used for Australia's defense. That defense included areas north of Australia—New Guinea and Papua. Still, the militia was ridiculed by the AIF as being "chocolate soldiers" or chocos. U.S. troops also began heaping derision on them because the Americans were draftees serving overseas and in forward areas.

Another factor in "the war" was the difference between the troops and their provost corps or military police. The Aussie Digger had little or no respect for the military police, who were viewed as misfits who had been shunted into a duty no one else wanted. As a rule, Aussie MPs were unarmed. In Brisbane, the MPs were American, armed, and considered arrogant.

In 1942, two things that could set men brawling were women and authority. The American GI had money, a smart-looking uniform, PX privi-

leges, and a multitude of other characteristics that gave him a head start in wooing an Aussie lass. The girls thought the Yanks were something; their own men were something less.

The incident began when a U.S. private was having beers with some Aussie soldiers. When American MPs approached him, demanding to see his pass, words were exchanged. The tensions that had been building over little incidents spilled over, and the MPs found themselves trapped by a mob of taunting soldiers. Rescuers came with a shotgun, and an MP accidentally shot and killed a Digger. Random attacks went on until unit officers restored order.

Journalists Peter A. Thompson and Robert Macklin tell the Battle of Brisbane story well. They cite all of the factors that contributed to the brawl and leave readers with this message: when troops are placed into other countries, even allied countries, leaders need to be sensitive to the indigent population's feelings and be aware of when the welcome mat might be wearing thin.

Peter Charles Unsinger, San Jose State University, California

THE DOUGHBOYS: America and the First World War, Gary Mead, Overlook Press, New York, 2000, 478 pages, \$37.95.

The Doughboys: America and the First World War, Gary Mead's attempt to "redress the balance of history by reinstating the vital importance of the American contribution to the defeat of the Central Powers in November 1918" is an absolute success.

Mead, an English journalist, wanted to prove that the U.S. entry into World War I and the fielding of a U.S. Army in France was essential to the culminating victory of 1918 and, in many ways, set the stage for America's ongoing engagement as "Europe's policeman." Mead's target audience is in part the covey of French and English academics who dismiss U.S. participation in the Great War as too little and almost too late. Yet, he is far more interested in telling the military history of America's part in the war than in engaging in a drawn-out historiographical debate.

In 20 tightly written, engaging chapters, Mead recounts America's entry into war and the chronology of building, fielding, and fighting in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France. Perhaps because of his training as a journalist, Mead skillfully weaves the personal narratives of individual soldiers and generals into the big picture, producing a compelling, broadly focused narrative.

The photographs are well chosen and captioned, and the maps are new and clear, not the tired reproductions of previously published work. Mead's use of previously unpublished memoirs, narratives, and diaries culled from the holdings of the Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks is remarkable, and it is refreshing to see some new first-person accounts about the AEF experience.

In "Falling Apart in Russia," Mead details the experience of the often forgotten Americans who served in Siberia and North Russia, elements of U.S. participation in the war usually glossed over if not omitted entirely from other accounts. The final chapter, "Aftermath," which pulls together the threads of his narrative, argues that the U.S. contribution, long overlooked, minimized, and in part forgotten, was nothing less than vital to allied victory.

**MAJ Stephen C. McGeorge, USA,
Retired, Clackamas, Oregon**

PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE, Robert A. Divine, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2000, 128 pages, \$29.95.

In *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*, Robert A. Divine examines U.S. involvement in 20th-century wars. Although Americans like to think of themselves as peace-loving people and of the United States as a peaceful nation, war is an integral part of U.S. history. Divine explores the historical record to determine if there is a distinctive U.S. motive and style of war. His conclusion is that the United States seeks to use war as a way to create a better, more stable world, only to see its good intentions nullified by unexpected outcomes that seed new hostilities.

Divine wraps his main points up in a discussion of how U.S. leaders bring wars to an end, which he believes reveals the most about America's national character. Feeling an obvious need to address the post-Cold War decade of the 1990s, Divine tacks on an epilogue that addresses recent U.S. interventions, focusing on the conflict in Kosovo.

Divine's analysis of each 20th-century war is methodical and succinct, as are his conclusions. Sometimes, however, this results in an oversimplification of an event in order to show a continuous pattern. For example, Divine finds that the U.S. often enters wars by figuratively "drawing a line," thereby surrendering the initiative to its opponent. This is not true for describing U.S. entry into the Korean and Persian Gulf wars; it is even more of an oversimplification for the Kosovo conflict.

A more detailed analysis might bring out greater distinctions between U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power that do not necessarily fit Divine's pattern. In war and crises that lead to war, the president often faces the competing demands of domestic concerns and foreign policy. Recognizing this and fully incorporating these factors into the analysis before deciding that every war fits a particular pattern is important.

I am disappointed that Divine does not mention U.S. National Security Strategy or National Military Strategy. Bringing these relatively new documents into any analysis is critical. Despite its flaws, Divine's book is thought provoking. I recommend that all military professionals, especially military strategists, read his book.

**MAJ Joseph E. Whitlock, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

TRAINING, TACTICS AND LEADERSHIP IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY OF TENNESSEE: Seeds of Failure, Andrew R.B. Haughton, Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, OR, 2000, 356 pages, \$49.50.

While the American Civil War is one of the most written about conflicts in history, few books deal with issues outside conventional battle

histories, biographies of major commanders, or the war's effect on society. Andrew R.B. Haughton's *Training, Tactics and Leadership in the Confederate Army of Tennessee: Seeds of Failure* adds an entirely new dimension. Historians and social scientists have attempted for years to answer the question of why soldiers fought in the war. Haughton answers the question of how they fought and why the lack of doctrine and experienced leaders doomed them.

The story follows the Army of Tennessee from its cradle to its grave. Haughton even covers the antebellum period as he refutes the legend of Southern martial prowess. His simple, but ignored, observation is that the "honour, self-will, and recklessness cited so often as evidence of a propensity for military life are qualities that actively militate against the concepts of discipline, absolute obedience, and deliberate fire which were the basis of nineteenth-century tactics."

Southern soldiers who showed the "proper" Southern virtues were more of a hindrance than a help to any officer attempting to fight by the tactics of the era. Consequently, in a futile attempt to meld the force into an efficient army, discipline was brutal. According to Haughton, and backed by solid evidence, Southern officers knew how to discipline troops but not to train them. As a result, the Army of Tennessee never reached a level of competence that its Union opponents did and paid for its failures with soldiers' blood.

This book has some weaknesses. For example, Haughton devotes little discussion to cavalry operations, a field in which the Confederates did show some innovation in tactics and organization with the 1862-1863 raiding campaigns of Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan. He also ignores the extensive partisan and guerrilla operations in the region, tactics that used the strengths of Southern horsemanship and independence antithetical to the organized battle lines of the period.

The focus on infantry and artillery operations almost exclusively gives the book a slightly unbalanced feel. Given the book's length, this single omission is understandable, as is the

lack of discussion on Union innovation. Despite these deficiencies, the book is excellent.

**MAJ Robert R. Mackey, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL ETHNIC CONFLICT: Case Applications of a Process Model, Thomas S. Szayna, ed., RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, 329 pages, \$25.00.

Policy analysts and regional experts at the RAND Arroyo Center in Santa Monica, California, have undertaken the daunting task of creating a process model for identifying and predicting so-called ethnic conflicts. They acknowledge that the idea of predicting ethnic conflict has two basic flaws. First, the term that is currently widely used is a poor substitute for the broader term “communitarian intrastate strife” that might or might not have an ethnic dimension. In RAND’s model, ethnicity is one component of conflict causes and accelerators. The second flaw, which the authors freely admit to, is that there are so many subjectively valued variables (they identify 56) in the prediction of conflict that no model can be fully predictive or universally applied.

The model consists of three stages. The first stage uses an ascriptive approach, which is a refined version of social psychologist Ted Gurr’s perceived relative deprivation theory, to identify the potential for strife within a country. The RAND authors contend that Gurr’s theory indicates only the potential for strife, not its likelihood.

The second stage of the model describes the change from potential to likely strife centering on the mobilization of a dissatisfied group to political action. The authors contend that the simple notion of being excluded or expelled from the process will not compel large groups to action and that several catalytic factors must be present. Such factors might include charismatic leaders, tipping events, access to resources, changes in the balance of power, or foreign influence.

The third stage of the model is the most critical. The model analyzes the state’s capacity to accommodate the desires of a disenfranchised group and the strategic bargaining that must

occur to allow peaceful resolution of potential conflict. The theory is that states that can successfully incorporate the political demands of mobilized groups can diffuse any conflict because the movement will not be able to provide members of the group with sufficient cause to act on their frustrations.

After describing the model, the authors apply it to four cases. In the first two cases they apply the model to two conflicts—in Yugoslavia and South Africa—to prove that the model would have given indications of each conflict before its occurrence if it had been used. Relying on perfect *hindsight*, the authors selectively ascribe importance to events and situations that fit the model. They show the motivations behind the behavior of some key actors that could only have been determined *post facto*.

In the second two case studies, the authors apply the model to Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia. The authors assess the likelihood of future strife and conclude that, while conflict is quite possible, there is no certain way to determine when or if the missing requirements for violent conflict will occur.

The authors have undertaken the difficult task of identifying potential conflicts and attempting to distill information gathered into a manageable list of factors and logical deductions with which to develop policy and strategy. They admit that the science is inexact but contend that the model can be especially useful to the intelligence community. Unfortunately, too many of the factors require in-depth knowledge of attitudes and perceptions of groups and individuals that the current intelligence structure could not reasonably hope to collect.

**MAJ J. Matthew Venhaus, USA,
Leavenworth, Kansas**

SOUNDING THE SHALLOWS: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862, Joseph L. Harsh, Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio, 2000, 280 pages, \$39.00.

Joseph L. Harsh has become a renowned expert on the Confederate Maryland Campaign of 1862. His two earlier award-winning books,

Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861-1862 (Kent State University Press, Kent, OH, 1998) and *Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862* (Kent State University Press, Kent, OH, 1999), examine the campaign. *Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862* is a companion to the first two books.

Students of the battle and campaign waged in Maryland during September 1862 will find *Sounding the Shallows* to be an essential source of information about the movements of the armies and the battles. There are detailed weather reports giving temperatures, winds, and precipitation for every day of the campaign. The Confederate Order of Battle includes summary histories of each unit down to brigade and battalion levels. He presents demographic information on the area of operations to the detail of the number of residents, farms, blacks (both free and slave), livestock and crops, and total railroad mileage. Harsh also analyzes every major event involved in Lee’s invasion and how it contributed to the culmination of the campaign in the bloodiest day in U.S. history.

This important reference book should be used to supplement all examinations of the Maryland Campaign regardless of author. Without this information any study of the campaign is incomplete.

**COL James L. Speicher, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

CENSORING HISTORY: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States, Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., M.E. Sharpe Inc., Armonk, NY, 2000, 301 pages, \$24.95.

In the book *Nineteen Eighty-four* (Knopf, NY, 1992), George Orwell says, “Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.” Can we deny that educators play a key role in shaping the citizens of the future? If they do not, there would be little debate about the role of education in the United States today. Every U.S. politician wants to be known as the “education” governor, congressman,

senator, or president, but who really controls education, in particular, the study of history? Politicians or teachers? Perhaps it is the writers and editors of textbooks.

Those in power control *what* is taught, but the textbook certification process controls *how* students view themselves, their nation, other nations, and key actors of the world. In the movie *The King and I* (Fox, Hollywood, CA, 1956), the King of Siam's children are horrified when they see a map of the world that their English schoolteacher shows them. They were accustomed to the officially sanctioned map that showed Siam as a large and, by inference, powerful nation. They had great difficulty accepting the actual geographic size of Siam until assured that England was much smaller. To students "truth" is what they are taught.

As the global village shrinks, the way nations present their histories *vis-a-vis* other nations is becoming a worldwide issue. Japanese textbooks portray World War II quite differently from those of Korea or the United States. German textbooks portray war experiences differently from those of their neighbors. If each nation views the same action differently, what happens to the truth?

The various teachings of history certainly have ramifications for international relationships. For example, as long as Koreans teach their history as being filled with Japanese aggression and paint the Japanese as aggressors, having an international relationship based on mutual trust will be almost impossible. Can Americans be powerful, yet humble, if their history teaches them that they are the world's protectors and have a "manifest destiny?"

Editors Laura Hein and Mark Selden have selected nine scholarly essays that cover Japanese, German, and U.S. experiences in developing and publishing textbooks. Unfortunately, Hein and Selden's selections are not balanced. They try too hard to convince the reader that their agenda is "right." They see patriotism and national pride as being great evils and root causes of war. For example, Japanese historian Fujioka insists that Japanese history be writ-

ten so Japanese students can develop national pride. Some of the essayists castigate Fujioka and his group for calling themselves "liberal," as if doing so is an affront to true liberality and an attempt at false legitimacy. Yet these same writers see nothing wrong with the dictatorial communist regimes of East Germany, North Vietnam, and North Korea using the term "democratic" to describe themselves. Teachers who fight against national pride are called "progressive." People who want to take pride in their nation are referred to as having "knee-jerk patriotism."

History has been called society's memory. The blurring of historical facts is a loss of collective memory, leads to inaccurate decisionmaking, and can destabilize national interaction. In *Censoring History*, Hein and Selden present a clear, accurate assessment of the problems that confront the teaching of history and the importance of protecting truth and accuracy. Their selection of singularly one-sided articles reinforces this requirement and shows that perhaps "we, the people," should keep a watchful eye on the academics who are trying to reshape U.S. and world history.

LTC David G. Rathgeber, USMC,
Retired, Fallbrook, California

THE SPIRIT OF 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany, Jeffrey Verhey, Cambridge University Press, MA, 2000, 268 pages, \$59.95.

Some of the most enduring images from World War I are photographs of enthusiastic crowds of people surrounding ranks of youthful soldiers as they march off to battle. Standard historical accounts build on such images to suggest that the coming of war was a hugely popular event across most of the world. In Germany, at least, this is not true, so argues Jeffrey Verhey, a research fellow at the Friederich Ebert Foundation in Bonn.

According to Verhey, the excitement captured in film reflects the sentiments of only a fraction of the German people. Nevertheless, such sentiments fed the enduring myth and produced important consequences for German political culture. In *The Spirit of 1914*, Verhey sets

himself the task of discovering the true nature of German public opinion at the beginning of the war, how and why the myth of national unity was created, and how the myth was used to advance the agendas of rival factions in a Germany deeply divided along class and party lines.

If the Spirit of 1914 was a myth, on what was it built? Using newspaper account as his primary source, Verhey finds that news of the July crisis, mobilization, and opening battles created enormous interest across Germany. However, the carnivalesque outpourings of nationalist fervor were limited to students and the urban bourgeoisie. These were expressed in train send-offs, a variety of charitable works, and celebration of early victories. The fervor subsided in six weeks.

In working-class districts and in the countryside there was no jubilation—only anxious concern. In fact, in the early stages of the crisis, the Social Democrats (SPD) organized significant antiwar rallies, but these are generally overlooked in accounts of the early stages of the war. In spite of such rallies, when the Kaiser asked for war credits, the SPD voted along with the remainder of the *Reichstag* to support the war. Wilhelm II expressed his appreciation by repeating his assertion that he no longer recognized parties, but only Germans. Thus was founded the myth of patriotic unity.

As the war dragged on, the myth of German unity was difficult to maintain. Nevertheless, in the last two years of the war, German strategist Erich Ludendorff's demand for a total national war effort invoked the Spirit of 1914 in order to remobilize Germans for greater exertions. Against an overwhelming Allied superiority in manpower and munitions, Germany would counter with a greater will—the kind of will the German people had exhibited in 1914. Enthusiasm would be replaced by iron resolution. As the tide turned against the Central Powers, the German Army's heavy-handed efforts to revitalize the myth with a Patriotic Instruction Program failed to overcome the people's war weariness.

The post-war period pushed the idea of the Spirit of 1914 into the

background of German political life through most of the 1920s. The rise of the National Socialists saw the myth resurrected and coupled with the stab-in-the-back legend to support a fictionalized account of World War I that portrayed a brave and unified Germany betrayed by Jews and communists. The Nazis used the story to great propaganda effect when they came to power in 1933. Yet, significantly, there was no popular euphoria when Hitler led the country to war in 1939.

Verhey's superbly researched, convincingly argued case study illuminates the Clausewitzian relationship between popular passion, government policymaking, and military capability.

**LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**

MARINES UNDER ARMOR: The Marine Corps and the Armored Fighting Vehicle, 1916-2000, Kenneth W. Estes, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000, 267 pages, \$32.95.

At a time when the U.S. Army is developing intermediate brigades equipped with light armored vehicles, a history of the U.S. Marine Corps' experience with armored fighting vehicles is useful and relevant. *Marines Under Armor* fills the bill, although readers hoping for stories of blood on the track treads will be disappointed.

Kenneth W. Estes, who graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and has a doctorate from the University of Maryland, was a career Marine Corps tanker. In the book's preface, Estes admits that the book is not a history of combat operations; instead, it is "a study of how the U.S. Marine Corps came to acquire the armored fighting vehicle—why, how, what, from where and when, and what it tried to do with it."

Estes paints a picture of a Marine Corps only grudgingly interested in the combination of firepower, protection, and mobility that has become the essence of Army heavy forces. In the book, retired Commandant Charles C. Krulak says he "would eliminate the tank fleet found in the Marine Corps today if I could." Organizations that do not like innovations, even ones that would

better allow them to accomplish their missions, tend not to incorporate them fully.

Armor conflicts with the Marine Corps' vision of itself as America's 911 Force. This self-image helps to explain the Corps' absence of doctrine for combined arms operations and its inability to deploy large ground units to the field even during training exercises. After reading *Marines Under Armor*, it will come as no surprise that the Marines had to depend almost exclusively on the Army for mobile protected firepower during the Persian Gulf War.

This book offers other important lessons to an Army attempting to incorporate light armored firepower to increase 21st-century strategic deployability. Perhaps the most telling is the Marine Corps' desire for minimal weight at the cost of its essential combat capability. Estes suggests stretching the capability of transportation systems rather than cutting into vehicle capabilities, admittedly an easier task for a seaborne service than for one seeking air-transportability. Still, it is a thought worth contemplating.

Making the U.S. Army's equipment procurement and doctrine-development processes look like success stories is not easy, but this book succeeds. That alone makes it worth reading.

**MAJ John A. Nagl, USA,
Fort Riley, Kansas**

WHEN AMERICA FIGHTS: The Uses of U.S. Military Force, Donald M. Snow, Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington, DC, 2000, 289 pages, \$24.95.

Donald M. Snow's *When America Fights: The Uses of U.S. Military Force* is a thoughtful view of current foreign policy and an insightful vision of what the U.S. could face in the future. Snow addresses current policy, options for engagement in the post-Cold War world, and his vision of dilemmas that might arise from engagement issues.

Several major points, represented by five logically developed chapters, support Snow's thesis. The first chapter establishes a foundation for current security strategy. Snow poses questions with which to determine if U.S. security strategy adequately ad-

resses national needs and whether it is applicable for any area of the world.

Chapter 2 focuses on how U.S. strategy should be fashioned in the post-Cold War environment. The military instrument of power was used in realist paradigm scenarios up to the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, however, events in Bosnia and Kosovo changed the framework.

The third chapter addresses options for military action. Snow discusses the spectrum of conflict and ways the military can be used in the changed paradigm. He focuses on Kosovo and Bosnia because of recent lessons learned and the tragedy of possibilities for future internal wars.

Snow logically addresses the problems that can arise from U.S. intervention in new internal wars in chapter 4, illustrating how current national security strategy does not adequately address the complexities of engagement. In the last chapter, Snow projects how the United States should proceed and presents guidelines for involvement.

When America Fights is not just for the military strategist; it is an excellent book for officer professional development and should be placed on professional reading list because of its simple concepts and background analysis, coupled with original foresight and insightful ideas for addressing the needs of future U.S. security strategy.

**MAJ Paul Michael Paolozzi, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

PRELUDE TO TRAGEDY: Vietnam, 1960-1965, Harvey Neese and John O'Donnell, eds., Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001, 309 pages, \$32.95.

Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam, 1960-1965, is a good book for former military advisers to the U.S. Armed Forces of South Vietnam as well as for readers interested in the nonmilitary advisory and aid effort. The use of the word prelude in the title sets the stage for the surge of military advisers who arrived in Vietnam from 1964 until 1965. The surge gained even more momentum thereafter in the form of increasing commitment of U.S. combat forces.

Editors Harvey Neese and John O'Donnell tell the story of just what "went on" in South Vietnam before the major commitments of U.S. military resources. What went on was the rural-development program designed to counter Viet Cong influence and control in the countryside.

The theme the essayists' convey is the inability of U.S. policymakers to think of the Viet Cong insurgency in unconventional terms. The authors confess their general lack of confidence in most senior U.S. policy leaders, including those sent to Vietnam to oversee the counterinsurgency effort and those in Washington who had no grasp on the insurgents' energy, drive, and willingness to go to extreme ends to displace the South Vietnamese government and replace it with a communist regime.

Some readers will regard this short compendium of personal accounts as a revisionist account of the authors' perception of the situation in South Vietnam in the early 1960s. Others will see it as an effort to say "we told you so" on the coattail of Robert MacNamara's admission that he and the administration failed to listen to the experts. Perhaps this is so, but most likely not.

**COL James D. Blundell, USA,
Retired, Arlington, Virginia**

A GREAT CIVIL WAR: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, Russell F. Weigley, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2000, 612 pages, \$35.00.

Russell F. Weigley has a grand legacy of studying, teaching, and writing military history and applying critical assessment to the art and science of military operations. *A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865*, does not disappoint.

Historian Bruce Catton once described the American Civil War as "a risky new experiment which involved nothing less than working out the relationships that must exist between a popular government and its soldiers at a time when the popular government is fighting for its existence." This chronological weaving of political and military events as they unfolded is precisely what makes Weigley's book a real achievement.

Despite Weigley's vast knowledge of the subject, a one-volume narrative of this crucial point in the nation's development is a daunting task. He lists James McPherson's *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (Oxford University Press, NY, 1988) as perhaps the best of this genre. As a veritable Civil War bible in its own right, however, Weigley's book will have no problem sitting next to *Battle Cry* on most readers' shelves.

Weigley notes individual unit participation in most actions down to brigade and regimental levels, and he lists general officers and their dates of rank. He also meticulously lists the numbers of killed, wounded, and missing from each engagement. These numbers support one of his central conclusions: that the South, despite numerous victories, could not afford the accumulated losses as the war progressed. The book is also painstakingly footnoted, with nearly one-quarter of the 600 pages devoted to references, providing the reader with a nearly endless list of follow-up sources for additional research.

One of the most interesting threads throughout the book is Weigley's attention to the evolution of what has become known as operational art, which he describes as "thinking in terms of campaigns to link individual battles to the entire war effort." He credits the Prussian and German armies as the first to actually develop this idea, but he notes several instances during the war that point to the beginning of this progression. However, it was the lack of true operational thinking that limited the armies of the North and South and prevented them from exploiting situations that had the potential to end the war quickly.

Weigley points to Confederate General Robert E. Lee's orchestration of General Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 as the first instance of the South's emerging perception of operational art. Similarly, when Lee maneuvered Jackson's and General James Longstreet's forces against Union General John Pope's army in the Battle of Second Manassas, he showed understanding of operational warfare and came close to achiev-

ing a decisive victory over the North as a result. Weigley notes that "Jackson's flank march to Manassas Junction had been a *manuver sur les derrières* as brilliantly executed as any by Napoleon himself."

The South did not hold a monopoly on operational thought during the Civil War. Weigley gives several Union examples of planning and execution above the tactical level. Union attempts to understand operational art were imperfect, though, and like those of the Confederacy they led to minimal achievements. Union General George McClellan attempted to maneuver multiple separate forces during the 1862 Peninsula Campaign. However, Lee's corresponding aggressiveness quickly put an end to this endeavor, as McClellan's legendary caution overcame his ability to think operationally.

In 1863, Union General Ulysses S. Grant demonstrated a basic understanding of the benefits of operational thinking during his prolonged attempt to capture the city of Vicksburg, Mississippi, the last remaining impediment to free movement on the Mississippi River. His coordinated movements of distinct elements against a central objective were key to the success of this critical campaign. Unfortunately, Grant would not again demonstrate such enlightened achievement until the end of the war, with his movement of forces around Richmond and Petersburg and the subsequent cornering of the Confederate Army at Appomattox.

Weigley remains convinced that despite these flashes of operational brilliance, the ability of military leaders, North and South, to think in operational terms was restricted in part by the failure of politicians to define strategic priorities.

Weigley's narrative is graceful and eminently readable. He does not introduce any particularly new theories or original insights, but the packaging of information is what makes this volume conspicuous. Weigley's ability to seamlessly intertwine military battles and campaigns with the political activities in Washington and Richmond enables the reader to gain a unique perspective on all the critical events of the time.

Weigley's analysis of technological advancements and their effect on warfare, combined with the introduction of operational thinking on the part of a few select generals is extremely enlightening. A few more maps would have been welcome. In the final analysis, however, every Civil War historian would be well served by acquiring this book.

**MAJ John A. Tokar, USA,
Fort Stewart, Georgia**

MACARTHUR AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY: A Reader, William M. Leary, ed., University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2001, 560 pages, \$82.50.

In February 1945, when asked what General Douglas MacArthur was really like, General Thomas Blamey, commander of the Australian Army in the South Pacific theater, replied, "The best and the worst thing you hear about him are both true." *MacArthur and the American Century* is a compilation of first-class essays that document the truth of Blamey's observation. However, readers searching for the definitive, unequivocal MacArthur should look elsewhere.

Leaders willing to struggle with the many facets—good and bad—of a complex man will be grateful that editor William M. Leary bound these stellar articles into one convenient book. Most of the essays, including one by H. Pat Tomlinson, titled "Inchon: The General's Decision," which appeared in *Military Review* in 1967 (April 1967, pages 28-34), have been printed in academic or Army journals.

Edward Drea and Stephen Taaffe's essays, printed here for the first time, are shortened versions of previously published monographs on MacArthur's use of military intelligence and his conduct of operations in New Guinea in 1944. Readers can get the complete picture elsewhere if they have the time to devote to the topic. I, for one, am happy to have a shortened version on hand from the acknowledged expert on the particular subject.

Michael Schaller, author of *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* (Oxford University Press, NY, 1989), conveniently summarizes the 300-page book into a 28-

page article. Schaller maintains that MacArthur was primarily concerned with doing what Washington opposed. Washington wanted reform; MacArthur advocated the preservation of the Imperial social order. Washington wanted economic growth and social stability; MacArthur advocated reform.

Essayist Robert Textor, a New Dealer who had worked in the Occupation, acknowledges that although Washington might have conceived the general plans to democratize Japan, "it was MacArthur whose leadership succeeded in implementing them. This, alone," says Textor, "was an achievement of major historical significance."

Leary's book covers MacArthur pro and con. Although the book is welcomed, it reminds me of an old adage: "There is a simple answer to every complex question—but it is invariably wrong."

Michael Pearlman, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR, John G. Stoessinger, Bedford/St. Martin's, Boston, MA, 2001, 286 pages, \$59.95.

Barnes and Noble and Amazon.com classify *Why Nations Go to War* by John G. Stoessinger as a history textbook. I agree. While Stoessinger attempts to convince readers of the "pivotal role leaders play in pushing a nation over the threshold into war," the true value of his book lies in providing a basic understanding of the causes of eight conflicts.

Stoessinger's thesis is summed up by the following quote. "With regard to the problem of the outbreak of war, the case studies indicate the crucial importance of the personalities of leaders." I agree that a leader's personality plays a large part in why nations go to war; I am not convinced that it is of such pivotal importance as Stoessinger would have us believe.

The chapters on India and Pakistan; the Fifty Year War in the Holy Land between Israel and the Arabs; the two wars in the Persian Gulf; and the war over the remains of Yugoslavia are enlightening. Each chapter also includes excellent maps of the areas of conflict.

While Stoessinger is a world-

recognized authority, it is readily apparent from this book that he has not served in and does not understand the military. Certainly not when he writes the following when referring to the air campaign against Serbia: "[T]he main architect of NATO's air campaign was an American [Secretary of State Madeleine Albright] whose childhood had been spent in Serbia during the Holocaust." Also, "NATO emerged victorious with air power alone and without a single combat casualty. It was a victory without precedent in military history." Hardly. Despite this negative criticism, I recommend reading this book simply because Stoessinger lays out the historical causes of the conflicts quite well.

**LTC Kevin D. Jones, USA,
Richmond, Virginia**

6 NIGHTMARES: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them, Anthony Lake, Little, Brown, and Co., Boston, MA, 2000, 386 pages, \$22.36.

6 Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them disappoints. One might expect keen insight into foreign policy from a former national security adviser, but for that one still must rely on Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Anthony Lake's nightmares are real enough, but they are strung together without coherence. The first nightmare is terrorists' possible use of nuclear weapons and almost certain use of chemical and biological weapons. That is hardly a new idea. Lake begins with a maudlin hypothetical example of a little girl and her father poisoned by a terrorist's biological agents at a women's basketball game. The imaginary terrorist even debates with himself before his attack. The story has shock value only for the naive.

Lake considers it possible to deter state-sponsored use of weapons of mass destruction, but he has no solution to the threat posed by individuals or small groups. Instead, he recites possible motivations for terrorism, including hate. The closest he comes to a solution is to suggest increased intelligence at home and abroad. He considers this to be the

best weapon against nonstate terrorists, but he fails to develop the subject in any detail.

Lake then turns to eTerror and eCrime, correctly pointing out the fertile field for hostile manipulation of computer systems to interfere with communications, power supplies, and air traffic control; to gain access to government and private information; and to enhance international criminal conspiracies. He points out that amateur hackers have led the way for professional terrorists and criminals. Again, he recites the threats but comes up short on solutions, returning, instead, to a general consideration of nuclear proliferation and miscellaneous troubles worldwide.

The next specter in Lake's Dickensian parade is ambiguous warfare, used by several third-rate countries to frustrate the United States. Ambiguous warfare is permanent war as seen by the target. Many forces in the world subscribe to it, recognizing no period of peace. We could find ourselves attacked without knowing by whom or why. Has someone unofficially declared war against us, or is this the work of a madman acting alone? Only tedious intelligence—or detective work—can answer such questions.

In the context of ambiguous warfare, Lake discusses the revolution in military affairs. U.S. Armed Forces have made great strides in intelligence, surveillance, communications, and target acquisition, which enable U.S. forces to "get inside an enemy's decision cycle" and disrupt his plans before he can put them into effect. In its essential parts, though, this revolution in military affairs is only an improved means to develop targets and deliver ordnance—the traditional objectives of Clausewitzian or conventional war.

Lake seems unaware that the revolution, so defined, is no revolution at all and has no relevance to ambiguous and asymmetrical warfare, another concept that Lake throws quickly into the mix. Greatly improved target acquisition helps not at all in ambiguous warfare wherein we do not know whether we are at war, with whom, or to what end. Neither does it help in asymmetrical warfare

in which the enemy employs an entirely different grand strategy from our own.

Lake seems not to understand what happened to us in Vietnam or to the French in Algeria. In these cases, the enemy employed an international strategy of political warfare that made victory in conventional battles irrelevant. We could say of Vietnam that we won every battle. We did, but we lost the war because the battles had no effect on its outcome. The grand strategy of political war turned most of the world against U.S. efforts and undermined support for the war at home. We had to withdraw, not for want of battlefield victory, not for want of target acquisition, but for want of political success.

Lake's prescription of increased military budgets to effectuate the revolution in military affairs will not help in ambiguous and asymmetrical warfare. What is required is a clearly defined grand strategy and a thorough integration of political and military policies. Lake comes closest to this prescription when he recognizes the need for intelligence and makes brief mention of covert action. The latter is probably the best offensive weapon, but Lake discusses only Americans' distaste for it.

Vulnerability to ambiguous and asymmetrical warfare is more than a bizarre tale of a guerrilla war that took place 30 years ago. Iraq's Saddam Hussein, having tasted defeat in conventional war, seems to have learned the lesson. He has undermined the international coalition that expelled him from Kuwait. The coalition no longer exists, and former members are among the most vocal opponents of continued sanctions and enforcement of no-fly zones. Hussein succeeded in driving out international weapons inspectors by applying political pressure. We can assume that he is continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction. Most important, he is still in power, and he is seen in many quarters of the Middle East as the leader who defied the West. Who else has learned the same lessons?

Lake devotes a chapter to the perils of weakness, discussing the need to maintain conventional military

strength. He is correct, as far as he goes, but what country or force is going to oppose "the most powerful nation in the world" in "armor country" when more effective means are available? No potential U.S. adversary can project force far from its own borders. Conventional military threats to the United States are indirect, aimed at friends and allies. Not so the political-military threats of ambiguous and asymmetrical warfare, which can reach us anywhere, anytime.

Lake's final nightmare is the mess in Washington. That is mine, too. This book offers no solution.

**LTC John B. Hunt, USA, Retired,
Leavenworth, Kansas**

GENERAL WILLIAM S. HARNEY: Prince of Dragoons, George Rollie Adams, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2001, 389 pages, \$50.00.

George Rollie Adams' biography of General William S. Harney is a delightful work of scholarship on the 19th-century U.S. Army and one of its key, but lesser known, military leaders. Adams' well-researched, nicely illustrated, and well-written account of Harney and his times effectively combines Western religious historian Francis Paul Prucha's approach of stressing the Army's non-military contributions to national development with historian and writer Edward Coffman's emphasis on the Old Army's maturation from the soldier's perspective. Moreover, Adams highlights the evolution of the officer corps as a profession of arms much the same as does history professor William Skelton. He also includes excellent analyses of tactics, techniques, and procedures the U.S. antebellum military employed, which avid readers of military history will also find in the works of historian Robert Utley. Adams' ability to combine these aspects into a single biography of Harney is most commendable.

Harney's military career spanned more than 50 years. From his commissioning in 1818 to his role in the Indian Peace Commission in the late 1860s, Harney participated in several significant events. Through the Black Hawk War, the Seminole Wars, the Mexican-American War, peacekeep-

ing efforts in Utah and Kansas, to the Indian Peace Commission efforts following the American Civil War, Harney proved to be a legitimate military hero and accomplished military tactician. Adams rightly points out, however, that Harney's irascible demeanor and vindictive temperament occasionally overshadowed his significant contributions to the Army's development. But, Adams concludes, Harney's positive contributions far outweigh his character flaws.

The scope of Adams' book goes beyond what one might find in earlier biographies of U.S. military leaders. He is more sensitive to Native American perspectives in his assessment of Harney's role in federal Indian policy, and he provides a more complete picture of Harney's private life, giving readers insight into the challenges and heartache associated with the family life of an aspiring 19th-century Army officer. Overall, Adams' narrative is excellent.

LTC Tony R. Mullis, *USA, Lawrence, Kansas*

CHILDREN OF A NEW FATHERLAND: Germany's Post-War Right-Wing Politics, J.H. Brinks, David Binder, trans., I.B. Tauris, NY, 2000, 200 pages, \$35.00.

The collapse of communism and the reunification of Germany produced an outburst of right-wing hate crimes that persist although its short-term justification has vanished. According to J.H. Brinks, this persistence has deep roots and raises concern about how fully modern Germany has accepted a democracy that dates only from World War II.

Germany's reunification was poorly planned, and it brought economic hard times to former East Germany. Freedom allowed exercise of the resulting acts of frustration. The eventual recovery did not erase the problems. Brinks argues that the hatred that grew up in the new climate is becoming respectable. Germany's mainstream conservatives are increasingly accepting of and are incorporating the values that underlie far-right violence into their lives.

It would be a mistake to attribute the revived neo-Nazism only to the

short-term dislocations of the past 40 years of democracy. One must look beneath the veneers of democracy and communism to find the true cause found in German history. East or West, democratic or communist, German history contains much anti-foreign, anti-Jewish, anti-democratic, anti-immigrant, anti-anything-not-German sentiment. Violent, militaristic, regimented, racially pure, marginally democratic Germany has a long history of Prussian and Lutheran intolerance and superiority. There is denial of history, especially of the Holocaust, which is cheapened by attempts to equate it to events of the communist era.

Children of a New Fatherland, written by one whose national history gives cogency to the argument for caution, is interesting but, unfortunately, thin. Brinks only allocates a few pages to each element of his argument, which could use more evidence and support than that which 200 pages allow.

Although the book does not make a solid case for the reemergence of the German nightmare, it does remind us that war rarely changes a people—nor does half a century of collective living and indoctrination or half a century of economic prosperity and democratic institutions. Each nation lives with its own history. The rest of the world must understand these histories or risk deluding itself about the true nature of the world. Never should anyone assume that any nation has truly learned from its history. Given the right circumstances the same mistakes could happen again.

John H. Barnhill, *Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma*

THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-WESTERN RELATIONS: Toward a Strategic Plan, Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, \$20.00.

A real estate professional would easily define Turkey's importance in the geopolitical world in terms of its strategic "location, location, location" at the epicenter of the world's great conflicts. Yet, in typical nonsense RAND style, the report's authors, respected Middle Eastern experts, address the fundamental

domestic and regional issues confronting Turkey as it plots its strategic course in the new world order. Zalmay Khalilzad and the other authors believe Turkey is best served by a strengthened participation in a U.S.-Turkish-European triangle.

Historically, Turkey's strategic relevance was a function of its ability to seal the Soviet southern flank. Today, post-Cold War Turkey is at the center of a number of issues on all of its borders: Russia's tacit support of Kurdish separatists coupled with its own sympathy for Chechen rebels; new economic opportunities in the Caspian Basin; a schizophrenic relationship with the Arab world over Iraq; its desire to remain engaged in the Balkans; and an ambivalent European posture toward greater European Union integration. The study proposes several region-specific strategies for Turkey but suggests that Turkey would be best served if it adopted a multidimensional approach that did not overemphasize any particular region.

Examining U.S. interests in a new Turkish relationship, the authors identify three broad areas for U.S. concern: maintaining Turkey as a dependable, democratic ally; ensuring that Turkey remains a positive actor in regional security; and ensuring that Turkey contributes to U.S. freedom of action, particularly in the area of power projection. This last area is the United States' most immediate concern. Turkey's most airbases are within 1,000 miles of virtually every hotspot on the continent; Turkish cooperation is vital.

Ultimately, the report maps out a Turkish-Western strategy centered on four pillars of common interests: ensuring energy security by strengthening ties to the Caspian; counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; a need to both contain and engage Russia, coining a new term, "conengagement"; and a deeper integration of Turkey into European affairs.

Although those unfamiliar with the region's politics might be overwhelmed with the many references to Turkish current events, the authors effectively articulate the numerous challenges Turkey faces. With few surprises, the authors concisely and

systematically analyze the merits and potential pitfalls of a fresh, strengthened Turkish relationship with Europe and the United States. Although the book has an unabashed pro-Western bias, it is an excellent primer for students of this pivotal nation's current events.

**MAJ Greg H. Auld, USAF,
Ramstein, Germany**

IMPERIAL CHINA, 900-1800,
Frederick W. Mote, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 2000, 1,107 pages, \$39.95.

Frederick W. Mote, an emeritus professor of Chinese history and civilization at Princeton University, has spent more than 50 years teaching and conducting research about China. He is one of the surviving members of the pioneer generation of U.S. Sinologists. He is an accomplished scholar and his research in-

terests and publications have ranged from a bibliography of Japanese puppet governments in China during World War II to the religious and political symbolism expressed in the physical design of 15th-century Chinese cities.

Mote's best-known book was a brief, less than 200 pages, analytic narrative history of the foundations of Chinese social and political philosophy titled *The Intellectual Foundations of China* (New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 1988). He also edited two volumes of *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998), the largest project of 20th-century Western Sinology.

Although long, this book is one of Mote's most accessible works; it begins with the formation of the Song Dynasty and the gradual emergence

of the relatively open-opportunity society of late imperial China.

Mote presents a corrective to many of the false ideas about Chinese society and government between 900 and 1800 A.D. He examines many of his colleagues' prevailing theories and cherished interpretations and vividly demonstrates that attempts to explore the vast documentary corpus that is Chinese history have been limited. This is not necessarily a criticism of his colleagues; it is an example of just how new the field of Chinese studies is in Western scholarship.

The chapters on the complexity of the relation of the Chinese State with its neighbors are rewarding. Everyone with a professional interest in China should read this book.

**Lewis Bernstein, Senior Historian,
SMDC, Huntsville, Alabama**

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