

Unfinished Business

Major Douglas Darling, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired

THE 1993 EDITION of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, expanded its focus to address global social, political, and economic changes brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its publication marked the culmination of a 2-year debate during which the Army examined the implications of the post-cold war era. Including operations other than war (OOTW) into the Army's operational doctrine was a conspicuous change from previous editions of the manual. The 1993 edition also developed operational- and even strategic-level concepts to support joint contingency operations and by doing so represented a profound change with enormous implications for every facet of Army operations. The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 codified—and in some cases established—the basis for changing Army organizations, procurement policies, and training.* However, including operational and strategic discussions and OOTW in the 1993 edition left less space for its traditional discussion of the tactical art—a discussion that, in previous editions, had provided keystone definitions of tactical concepts, terminology, and control measures for the Army's subordinate doctrinal manuals.

The impact of the lack of definitions for keystone tactical terms in the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 soon began to appear. Colonel Ed Thurman, then director of the Concepts and Doctrine Directorate (CADD), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and many others observed the proliferation of nonstandard and nondoctrinal terms throughout the Army in the years that followed FM 100-5's publication. They observed this problem at home station unit training exercises, collective training center rotations, and Battle Command Training

*General Gordon R. Sullivan, "From the Editor," *Military Review* (December 1993), 1.


The primary audience for this new manual is commanders and staffs from battalion to corps when operating at the tactical level. . . . Such a manual had not existed since the early 1960s when FM 100-5 stopped being an infantry division-level manual with the development of FM 61-100, Infantry Division Operations.

Program seminars and warfighters. Commonly accepted terms lacked common definitions, and draft manuals produced by different U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) proponents began to reflect small differences in terminology.

Solving this problem required more than just a doctrinal solution since it also affected training and leader development programs. Nevertheless, Thurman saw the development of a tactics manual as the first step to correcting such a problem in a doctrine-based Army. The primary audience for this new manual is commanders and staffs from battalion to corps when operating at the tactical level. It includes some information that applies at the company/team level. It is also intended for officers and noncommissioned officers at TRADOC schools and cadets in precommissioning programs.

Manual Development Highlights

The 1994 TRADOC reorganization gave Thurman the chance to divert resources from lower-priority missions to produce a manual that would provide the necessary keystone tactical guidance for the entire Army. Such a manual had not existed since the early 1960s when FM 100-5 stopped being an infantry division-level manual with the



An infantry tank team circa 1956. The FM 100-40 writing team was surprised to find that mobile defense was introduced into Army tactical concepts as early as the mid-1950s.

Thurman established a three-man writing team and gave it 6 months to research the development of tactical concepts from the 1940s to the present. CARL greatly assisted in this process because the team could review about 150 obsolete manuals from CARL's collection. The team also checked selected British, German, and Russian tactical concepts and doctrinal publications. The team found remarkable continuity in American tactical thought throughout the 55-year period, with an occasional surprise—like introducing, in the mid-1950s, the mobile defense as a type of defensive operation.

development of FM 61-100, *Infantry Division Operations*. Thurman established a three-man writing team and gave it 6 months to research the development of tactical concepts from the 1940s to the present. Fort Leavenworth's Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) greatly assisted in this process because the team could review about 150 obsolete manuals from CARL's collection. The team also checked selected British, German, and Russian tactical concepts and doctrinal publications. The team found remarkable continuity in American tactical thought throughout the 55-year period, with an occasional surprise—like introducing, in the mid-1950s, the mobile defense as a type of defensive operation.

By August 1995, the team had published an author's draft of FM 100-40, *Tactics*. March 1996 saw an initial coordinating draft of the tactics manual. That draft incorporated and integrated staffing comments from the Army major command

staffs, TRADOC service schools, and Active and Reserve troop units from more than 100 organizations that respond to the staffing of the author's draft. The writing team disbanded after the publication of the initial draft, leaving a single author to complete the doctrine-development process.

New CADD director Colonel Clint Ancker replaced Thurman in February 1996. He allowed the initial draft to be published in March although he was not totally satisfied with its organization and content. He wanted to expand the scope of the tactics manual to discuss each type and form of operation, including the minimal control measures necessary to execute the operation; organization of forces; and appropriate planning, preparation, and execution considerations. CADD, now called the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, published and staffed Armywide a revised initial draft in June 1997 because of the scope of the changes. Representatives from CADD, the Armor School, and the



Soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division alert to subtle movement along a ridgeline near Kandahar Air Base, Afghanistan.

FM 3-90 focuses on how battalion through corps commanders conduct tactical offensive and defensive operations and their supporting tactical enabling operations using the word to define itself. Those tactics require judgment in application. The ability to seize and secure terrain, with its populations and production capacity, distinguishes land forces conducting decisive offensive and defensive operations from air forces and sea forces.

Infantry School, who met at Fort Benning, Georgia, in late October 1997, agreed to changes to FM 100-40 resulting from this third staffing.

Relationship With FM 3-0, Operations

A close collaboration between the School of Advanced Military Studies' FM 100-5 writing team and CADD began shortly after the initial draft of FM 100-40 was published. The initial FM 100-5 writing team took advantage of the existence of a supporting draft tactical manual to reduce the scope of material in FM 100-5. Throughout the subsequent development of both manuals, various doctrinal discussions have migrated between the two manuals. Both organizations have frequently reviewed each other's work to ensure the two manuals are synchronized and integrated. When the focus of FM 100-5 changed in 1997, publication of a final draft of FM 100-40 was postponed to allow the implications at the tactical level to emerge.

Publication of FM 100-40 was again delayed until after FM 100-5's approval and publication. In May

1999, FM 100-40 was published as a CGSC student text (ST) for Academic Year (AY) 1999-2000 so that emerging doctrine would be available to students attending the next course. ST 100-40 was also provided to battalion and brigade commander selectees in the Pre-Command Course at Fort Leavenworth. With more than 1,000 CGSC students having used and commented on ST 100-40 during the AY, CADD decided to consider the ST as a final draft of FM 100-40.

The TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine's decision to adopt the joint manual numbering system caused both manuals to be renumbered. FM 100-5 became FM 3-0, and FM 100-40 became FM 3-100.40. The interdependence between the FM 100-5 writing team and CADD increased as other CADD FMs were added to the integration effort supporting FM 3-0. These manuals include FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*; FM 3-13, *Information Operations*; FM 5-0, *Planning*, and FM 6-0, *Command and Control*.

On 30 June 2000, Lieutenant General Mike

Steele, commanding general, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, chaired a TRADOC pre-Doctrine Review and Approval Group (pre-DRAG) video teleconference that concurred with forwarding FM 3-0 to the Army Chief of Staff

The tactics and supporting techniques and procedures described in FM 3-90 are only starting points for tacticians. They must continue studying military history. They must temper this study and evolve their skills through a variety of relevant, practical experiences.

through the TRADOC commander for final approval and subsequent publication. CADD prepared a revised final draft of FM 3-100.40 immediately after the FM 3-0 DRAG because 2 years had passed since it was last staffed Armywide. Comments from that staffing were the subject of a conference held at Fort Leavenworth in October 2000.

The DRAG edition of FM 3-100.40 incorporated results from the revised final draft staffing. Like the revised final draft edition, the DRAG edition was widely staffed throughout the Army and posted on the CADD web page. The tactics manual received its last numerical redesignation—FM 3-90—when the new manual numbering system was approved.

What is the Tactics Manual?

Tactics is the art and science of employing all available means to win battles and engagements. Specifically, it comprises the actions a commander takes to arrange units and activities in relation to each other and to the enemy. FM 3-90 provides the organization of forces; minimum-essential control measures; and general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for each type and form of offensive and defensive combat operation. It is the common reference point for all students of the tactical art within the Army. Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common professional language, a purpose, and unity of effort.

FM 3-90 provides keystone-level tactical doctrine. It introduces those basic concepts and control measures associated with tactics as it applies to offensive and defensive operations. Its companion is FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. Neither can be read in isolation. Also, to understand this manual, one must understand the

operational-level theory of art, the principles of war, and the links between the operational and tactical levels of war described in FM 3-0. The commander should understand how the activities described in FM 3-07 influence offensive and defensive operations and vice versa. He should also understand the plan, prepare, and execute cycle described in FM 6-0 and how that cycle relates to the military decisionmaking process described in FM 5-0. These publications provide the framework for understanding FM 3-90.

FM 3-90 focuses on how battalion through corps commanders conduct tactical offensive and defensive operations and their supporting tactical enabling operations using the word to define itself. Those tactics require judgment in application. The ability to seize and secure terrain, with its populations and production capacity, distinguishes land forces conducting decisive offensive and defensive operations from air forces and sea forces. FM 3-90 is not prescriptive but authoritative, and its tactical fundamentals do not change with the fielding of new equipment. However, integrating new equipment and organizations usually requires changes in related techniques and procedures. This manual provides combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to exploit emerging Army and joint capabilities that have shown promise during the Army's advanced warfighting experiments.

A benefit of the tactics manual is that it reduces the need to have the same tactical-level material in multiple manuals by providing a single-source reference. Therefore, this manual does not repeat tactical enabling operations discussed in other manuals such as information operations (FM 3-13), river-crossing operations (FM 3-97.13), and combined arms breaching operations (FM 3-34.2). A family of subordinate manuals addresses the techniques and procedures a specific type of unit uses at a specific echelon.

FM 3-90 follows the doctrinal hierarchy established in FM 3-0. It has 16 chapters grouped into 4 parts and 5 appendixes. It defines 155 tactical terms. It makes three terms—zone, sector, and coordination point—obsolete because of their redundancy. Zone and sector are redundant with area of operations, and coordination points are redundant with contact points. Part I introduces the art and science of tactical operations, and its key points follow:

- Your opponent is always thinking and wants to beat you.

Doctrine Hierarchy

Types of Military Operations

Offense	Defense	Stability	Support
<i>and Their Subordinate Forms</i>			
<p>Types of Offensive Operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movement to contact <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Search and attack • Attack <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Ambush – Demonstration – Spoiling attack – Feint – Raid • Exploitation • Pursuit 	<p>Types of Defensive Operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Area defense • Mobile defense • Retrograde <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Delay – Withdrawal – Retirement 	<p>Types of Stability Operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace operations • Foreign internal defense • Security assistance • Humanitarian and civic assistance • Support to civil defense operations • Combating terrorism • Noncombatant evacuation operations • Arms control • Show of force 	<p>Types of Support Operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domestic support operations • Foreign humanitarian assistance
<p>Forms of Maneuver</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Envelopment • Turning movement • Frontal attack • Penetration • Infiltration 			<p>Forms of Support Operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relief operations • Support to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction • Support to civil law enforcement • Community assistance

Types of Enabling Operations

Information Operations

Combat Service Support

Types of Tactical Enabling Operations

- Reconnaissance Operations
 - Zone
 - Area
 - Route
 - Reconnaissance in force
- Security Operations
 - Screen
 - Guard
 - Cover
 - Area (includes route and convoy)
 - Local

- Troop Movement
 - Administrative movement
 - Approach march
 - Road march
- Combined Arms Breach Operations
- River-Crossing Operations
- Relief in Place
- Passage of Lines
- Tactical Information Operations

- Mastering the art and science of tactics requires study and training.

- There are no checklists; doctrine merely provides a set of tools that the tactician must adapt to meet the needs and conditions associated with a specific situation.

FM 3-90 defines tactical concepts and control measures common to both offensive and defensive operations. It formally introduces the doctrinal hierarchy shown in the diagram. The tactician must understand the basic tactical concept and definitions contained in this chapter and used by military professionals. It further provides additional information

FM 3-90 provides the organization of forces; minimum-essential control measures; and general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for each type and form of offensive and defensive combat operation. It is the common reference point for all students of the tactical art within the Army. . . . Its companion is FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations. Neither can be read in isolation. Also, to understand this manual, one must understand the operational-level theory of art, the principles of war, and the links between the operational and tactical levels of war described in FM 3-0.

to that contained in FM 3-0 on contiguous and non-contiguous areas of operation. The concepts and terms specific to a single type or form of operation are discussed in sections on that particular operation.

Parts II, III, and IV discuss the organization of forces and minimum control measures associated with all types and forms of offensive and defensive operations. They also discuss those tactical enabling operations that are not addressed in separate manuals such as riverine operations or mountain operations. They provide general considerations associated with planning, preparing, and executing these operations.

Part II discusses offensive operations, provides the basics of the offense, and further defines those in FM 3-0. It also discusses movement to contact. Attacks are offensive operations that destroy or defeat enemy forces, seize and secure terrain, or both. Attacks must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with a tempo and intensity that the en-

emy cannot match; the resulting combat should not be a contest between near equals. It further discusses exploitation, a type of offensive operation that exploits success rapidly to disorganize the enemy in depth. Finally, pursuit operations leave the enemy trapped, unprepared, unable to defend, and faced with either surrender or complete destruction.

Part III discusses defensive operations. It first discusses the basics of defensive operations—operations designed to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. It provides additional definitions to FM 3-0. It also describes common defensive scenarios such as defending against airborne and air assault attacks or defending a linear obstacle, perimeter, or reverse slope. It discusses the area defense as a type of defensive operation that uses a mix of static and active measures to deny an enemy force access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than to destroy the enemy outright. The area defense focuses on retaining terrain by absorbing the enemy into an interlocked series of positions from which fires can largely destroy him. It also discusses the mobile defense, which concentrates on destroying or defeating the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force. Finally, it discusses retrograde operations and addresses two unique retrograde situations: denial operations and stay-behind operations.

Part IV discusses the conduct of those tactical enabling operations that are not part of separate FMs. Commanders do not conduct tactical enabling operations as independent operations. They conduct them to assist in conducting one of the other four types of military operations. Part IV discusses security operations, including screen, guard, and cover. It also addresses area security and local security operations. It reintroduces the concept of combat outposts into tactical doctrine. Next, it discusses reconnaissance operations in its four doctrinal forms—route, zone, area, and reconnaissance in force. It then discusses troop movement—moving troops from one place to another by any available means. Methods of troop movement, conducting administrative movements, tactical road marches, movement techniques, and the approach march, are addressed as well. Finally, it covers how to conduct a relief in place and a passage of lines.

The five appendixes discuss Army branches and tactical echelons, tactical mission tasks, airborne and air assault operations, encirclement operations,

and rear area and base security. The branch capabilities and echelons can be rapidly tailored for deployment and task organized for the exact conditions of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians (METT-TC). They discuss how appropriate combinations of these forces provide a balanced and versatile force mix, maximizing the commander's freedom of action in virtually any METT-TC condition.

The tactical mission tasks describe the results or effects the commander wants to achieve—the what or why of a mission statement. These tasks have specific military definitions that are different from those found in a dictionary. In some cases, the discussion includes more than just a definition; it includes results or effects in relation to the enemy, terrain, or friendly forces not associated with any specific type or form of an operation. Many of the tactical tasks have a tactical mission graphic associated with them. The commander is not limited to the tactical tasks listed in specifying what actions he wants from his subordinates in an operation order or operation plan. Both commander and subordinate must have a common understanding of the what and why of the operation.

At the tactical level, airborne and air assault operations are vertical envelopments. This discussion covers the use of the reverse planning process and the enhanced impact of meteorological conditions on both operations. It then addresses the organization of forces, control measures, and planning and execution considerations unique to each operation.

Encirclement operations occur when one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force isolates it by controlling all ground lines of communication and reinforcement. The discussion includes separate sections dealing with offensive encirclement operations, defending encircled, breaking out from encirclement, exfiltrating, attacking deeper into enemy territory, and conducting linkup operations.

Rear area and base security include the closely related areas of route and convoy security. This ap-

pendix provides guidance on resolving command authority with an echelon rear area. The discussion defines threat levels, gives considerations for evaluating the utility of different locations within an echelon rear area, and describes political considerations

Part II [of FM 3-90] discusses offensive operations, provides the basics of the offense, and further defines those in FM 3-0. It also discusses movement to contact. Attacks are offensive operations that destroy or defeat enemy forces, seize and secure terrain, or both. Attacks must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with a tempo and intensity that the enemy cannot match; the resulting combat should not be a contest between near equals.

that apply to conducting operations in an echelon rear area. It describes the organization of forces, control measures, and planning considerations that apply to base defense and route and convoy security while providing additional information on defense beyond defensive operations.

The tactics and supporting techniques and procedures described in FM 3-90 are only starting points for tacticians. They must continue studying military history. They must temper this study and evolve their skills through a variety of relevant, practical experiences. The more experience they gain under a variety of circumstances, the greater their mastery of the art of tactics.

FM 3-90 gives the Army a coherent tactical lexicon and a standard set of basic control graphics. FM 3-90's publication and use can correct the proliferation of nonstandard and non doctrinal terms throughout the Army only if leaders at all levels personally use doctrinally correct terminology. They must study current doctrine constantly so they do know that correct terminology. **MR**

Major Douglas A. Darling, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired, is currently a resident student at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, with permanent duty as the senior military analyst, Tactics Team, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in command and staff positions in the United States and Europe. He is the author of FM 3-90, Tactics.