

The Serpent's Eye: The Cinema of 20th-Century Combat

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Military Glory—that attractive rainbow that rises in showers of blood, that serpent's eye that charms to destroy.

— Abraham Lincoln¹

In the 20th century, motion picture and modern warfare techniques developed alongside each other. Movie cameras recorded the devastating effects of the wars of a turbulent century, which historian Eric J. Hobsbawm aptly called “the Age of Extremes.”² For the first time in human history, documentary film made it possible to capture the bombing of cities, aerial combat at sea, and mechanized land battles. For filmmakers, it was only a short step from recording real war on film to creating war movies as a form of mass entertainment. As a subject, war has always been ideal for commercial cinema since it embraces all of humanity's great themes—life, death, love, faith, hope, duty, defeat, and victory.

As a genre, the war film is broad. Many famous films use wartime settings: *Gone With the Wind* and *Casablanca* spring immediately to mind.³ War films can be biographical and character-driven, such as *Patton* and *MacArthur*.⁴ They can probe the problems of command, as in *Twelve O'Clock High* and *Paths of Glory*, or prisoner-of-war survival, as in *The Bridge on the River Kwai*.⁵ They can concentrate on the homefront and life during or after wartime, as in *Mrs. Miniver* and *The Best Years of Our Lives*.⁶ War films about military medicine, military legal issues, or military training have also been made, including *M*A*S*H*, *The Caine Mutiny*, and *The Long Gray Line*.⁷ Whatever the merits of these diverse films, none of them is specifically about frontline fighting or, more properly,

the art of combat. As German military strategist General Carl von Clausewitz reminds us, “It is inherent in the very concept of war that everything that occurs *must originally derive from combat*.”⁸

The Cinema of Combat

In this essay, for the purpose of precise analysis, American combat cinema is rather narrowly defined. Combat cinema is regarded as a sub-genre of the war-film category and denotes films about war that concentrate on organized conflict between uniformed men on a battlefield—usually, but not exclusively, infantrymen. Although many fine American war films set on the sea and in the air have been combat movies—one thinks of *The Enemy Below* and *Wings*—the struggles they depict are often mediated or decided by the power of machines in a way that does not occur in infantry warfare.⁹ For this reason, films about combat that are not focused on the clash of rival infantrymen are not considered in this essay.

Many Western countries have made films about infantry combat, but no single country has produced a body of film work on 20th-century combat as vast and as influential as that of the United States. On sheer volume of output and in terms of quality and cultural significance, American combat films are global in their appeal and effect.

Generations of young men in the West have gone to war with Hollywood images of warfighting, performed by such actors as John Wayne and Audie Murphy, running through their imaginations. The extraordinary cult of what historian Garry Wills calls “Wayne-olatry” in much of the English-speaking West largely began with the release of

Sands of Iwo Jima.¹⁰ The drill sergeant's refrain: “Stop trying to be John Wayne!” has been a staple of military training institutions across the Western world since the 1940s.

The evidence that American combat films have significantly influenced attitudes toward serving in the Armed Forces is considerable. In his 1977 book *A Rumor of War*, writer Philip Caputo writes of his decision to fight as a Marine in Vietnam: “I saw myself charging up some distant beachhead like John Wayne in *Sands of Iwo Jima*, and then coming home a suntanned warrior with medals on my chest.”¹¹ In his 1976 memoir, *Born on the Fourth of July*, Ron Kovic recalled the influence of *To Hell and Back* in persuading him to volunteer for service in Vietnam: “I'll never forget Audie Murphy in *To Hell and Back*.¹² At the end [of the film] he jumps on top of a flaming tank that's just about to explode and grabs a machine gun blasting it into the German lines. He was so brave I had chills running up and down my back wishing it were me up there. There were gasoline flames roaring around his legs, but he just kept firing that machine gun. It was the greatest movie I ever saw in my life.”¹³

Kovic was not alone. Lieutenant William Calley, who was court-martialed by the U.S. Army for leading the massacre at My Lai in Vietnam, said that he and his comrades wanted to “go to Vietnam and become Audie Murphys.”¹⁴ In 1991, U.S. Army Colonel David Hackworth, the most combat-decorated soldier in U.S. history, observed of the behavior of Western troops in the Gulf War: “Hollywood completely colors their way of seeing war.”¹⁵

Combat films have influenced the way war has been viewed in the popular imagination, but despite the

pervasiveness of war in the 20th century, few people in the West have actually seen a battle or been in one. In World War II only 6 percent of U.S. troops (700,000 out of 11 million) were in the infantry. In Vietnam only 14 percent of U.S. troops ever saw action. The Western world's view of war over the past half century comes either from commercial films or, more recently, from television—as during the 1991 Gulf War. An understanding of the evolution of combat cinema offers more than merely a history of certain war films. It is a subject that has a wider cultural significance and the potential to contribute to a deeper appreciation of human motivation in wartime and the dynamics of military psychology.

Problems of the Combat Film

As a sub-genre, American combat cinema varies, embracing escapist fantasies such as *The Dirty Dozen* and *Kelly's Heroes*, as well as serious studies such as Lewis Milestone's *All Quiet on the Western Front*; Samuel Fuller's *The Big Red One*; and more recently, Steven Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan*.¹⁶ This essay focuses on the serious combat films that seek to educate as well as entertain; that meditate on the nature of war and the human condition; and that seek to encapsulate the experience of killing and the great fear of being killed.

One of the great paradoxes of war is that it is impersonal and meticulous in planning but personal and chaotic in execution. Like military planners, film producers who devise epic combat films often discover that no plan survives the briefing room. Sprawling epics such as the D-Day film *The Longest Day* have faltered—not in conception, but in execution.¹⁷ A common fault of many military film epics is that they are too big and diffuse to be able to subject the various elements of war to disciplined analysis. The intercutting of higher strategy with operations and frontline tactics is difficult to convey simultaneously in a feature film. A panoramic view of war often reduces a film's precision and emotional intensity because either too much occurs on screen—creating disconnection—or

else cliché and sentiment become more important than the attempt to convey realism.

A good example of the difficulties in making a war epic is Francis Ford Coppola's visionary Vietnam film *Apocalypse Now*, based on Joseph Conrad's famous novella, *Heart of Darkness*.¹⁸ Like *The Longest Day*, the parts of the film are greater than the whole. Some scenes are memorable, notably the spectacular attack on a village by 9th Air Cavalry helicopter gunships, complete with loudspeakers playing Richard Wagner's "The Ride of the Valkyries."¹⁹ After the attack, the deranged Colonel Kilgore, wearing a Stetson, dismounts from his command helicopter, which is emblazoned with the insignia "Death From Above," surveys the carnage his attack has caused, and pronounces, "I love the smell of napalm . . . it smells like victory."²⁰ The making of *Apocalypse Now* proved so chaotic and expensive that it inspired a separate documentary record of the production titled *Hearts of Darkness: A Filmmaker's Apocalypse*.²¹ Coppola recalls, "The way we made it [the film] was very much the way we were in Vietnam. We were in the jungle, there were too many of us, and little by little we went insane."²²

With the possible exception of Stanley Kubrick's *Paths of Glory*, the American cinema of 20th-century combat has usually been at its most powerful when it has concentrated on the small rather than the big—on those that really fight—the squads and platoons of infantry rather than the brigades and divisions with well-staffed headquarters.²³ The combat film sub-genre is often at its most effective in films that are situated in a minimalist setting. In such an environment, a sense of war's social realism and its murderous immediacy can be explored with precision, and the nature of war can be revealed with detail.

Two important questions remain: Can a reenacted film reflect the soldier's experience? Can films reconstruct what the American poet, Walt Whitman, called "the seething hell" of war?²⁴ Much depends on the period of history being depicted. For example, major films dealing with

19th-century warfare—such as *The Red Badge of Courage*, *Zulu*, *Glory*, and *Gettysburg*—are arguably easier to recreate than 20th-century conflicts because they deal with wars in which the predominant tactics were extended infantry lines employing volley fire.²⁵

Encounter battles between opposing massed forces, which might be using edged weapons or muskets and rifles in compressed space, lend themselves to the movie camera. When it comes to reconstructing the 20th-century battlefield, however, commercial cinema has found matters more difficult. Since World War I, the increasingly lethal character of modern weapons has led to the growing dispersal and concealment of ground troops in action. The phenomenon of the empty battlefield caused by the sheer density of firepower is a staple of modern infantry combat and is not conducive to clasp shots in films or the verbal interplay between individuals that film drama requires.

Although the technology of special effects has helped filmmakers simulate 20th-century combat, modern war on film remains essentially artificial in nature. Fuller, a D-Day veteran, once remarked dryly, "You can't show war as it really is on the screen, with all the blood and gore. Perhaps it would be better if you could fire real shots over the audience's head every night, you know, and have actual casualties in the theater."²⁶ Because this is not a viable proposition, films of 20th-century combat have always been limited by technical and commercial considerations. Nonetheless, in the hands of accomplished, intelligent filmmakers, the combat film has sometimes transcended its boundaries and succeeded in illuminating important aspects of warfare.

Some of the best combat films have been the work of auteur-style directors—filmmakers who bring an originality of style, intelligence, and authorial vision to the task of interpreting the experience of the battlefield, qualities that can supersede artificiality and simple commercial values. American filmmakers that belong in the auteur category include Kubrick, Coppola, and Terrence Malick.

The auteur approach has not always succeeded, however. A celebrated casualty was the outstanding director John Huston, whose bold attempt in the early 1950s to make a purist version of Stephen Crane's great Civil War tale, *The Red Badge of Courage*, was undermined by nervous studio executives who feared a backlash against an "art film."²⁷ The executives forced Huston to reedit the final version in a bid to meet box-office appeal. In the process, the film was hacked down to a mere 69 minutes running time. Although *The Red Badge of Courage* is now regarded as a classic work of cinema, on its release it proved to be an artistic and commercial failure. Huston's experience is a reminder that the film industry is foremost a business enterprise governed by market forces.

Not surprisingly, some of the most successful combat-film directors have been those who have worked within the Hollywood system rather than against it and have succeeded in spite of studio constraints and commercialism. Over a space of 30 years, Milestone made a fine trilogy of combat films that includes *All Quiet on the Western Front*, *A Walk in the Sun*, and *Pork Chop Hill*.²⁸ These films are distinguished by a concentration on the fate of the common infantryman, without any mawkishness or false heroics.

20th-Century Combat Film Evolution

The demands of commercialism and a reliance on artificiality have meant that many 20th-century combat films have been highly stylized, especially when depicting actual fighting. Between the 1940s and the 1970s, various social conventions dictated that the physical trauma of 20th-century combat could not be shown in graphic detail on film. Violence could only be implied in war films by creating mood and using camera angles.

Milestone's first installment of his brilliant military trilogy—a version of Eric Maria Remarque's novel *All Quiet on the Western Front*—is all the more remarkable because of the above restraints.²⁹ Milestone's film is a vivid, moving study of young Ger-

man soldiers confronted with the harrowing task of frontline combat in the trenches of World War I. Asked to describe the experience of combat, one of them states simply, "We live in the trenches out there. We fight. We try not to get killed, but sometimes we are—that's all."³⁰ Despite its primitive cinematography, the film provides a powerful emotional impact.

As a sub-genre of war, combat cinema came of age during World War II when Hollywood tapped the realism of the spate of wartime documentary films such as Huston's *The Battle of San Pietro*.³¹ After the mid-1940s, filmmakers established the structural formula of the combat film by focusing on the squad and the platoon to conceptualize and dramatize the problems of men at war. This formulaic approach sometimes created cliché and caricature (the weak officer, the tough sergeant, the rookie soldier, the coward, the cynical but ultimately brave private), but in skilled hands it also produced memorable cinema.

In the second half of the 1940s, a number of remarkable infantry combat films in austere, documentary-style black-and-white cinematography emerged. In 1945, William A. Wellman's film *The Story of G.I. Joe*, based on the writings of war correspondent Ernie Pyle, was the first serious attempt to try to reflect documentary-style realism in the portrayal of U.S. soldiers serving in Italy.³² The movie is stark and unpretentious in its depiction of fear and fatigue in combat, and it celebrates the dignity of the common soldier. The film made Robert Mitchum a star and was acclaimed by both soldiers and film critics. United States General Dwight D. Eisenhower called the film "the greatest war picture I've ever seen," and the great American film critic James Agee pronounced it "a tragic and eternal work of art."³³

In 1946, Milestone made one of the greatest of all combat films, *A Walk in the Sun*.³⁴ The film follows a platoon of U.S. soldiers from the Texas Division in 1943 who "came across the sea to sunny Italy and took a little walk in the sun."³⁵ Astute, but cool and detached in analysis, the film captures the immediacy

of the miniature, surreal world of infantry warfare, using intimate characterizations and dynamic combat sequences, and offers powerful insight into the infantryman's lot. One GI complains, "We've got a grandstand seat, only we can't see nothin'. That's the trouble with war: You can't see nothin'. You have to find them [the enemy] by ear."³⁶ Milestone's lack of contrivance and the self-effacing nature of his direction combined to make the film allegorical in tone. The movie encapsulated the entire experience of World War II into one representative group of soldiers confronted by the realities of small-unit warfare in one combat zone.

Wellman's *Battleground* and Allan Dwan's *Sands of Iwo Jima* appeared in 1949.³⁷ *Battleground* deals with a group of soldiers—"the battered bastards of Bastogne"—from the 101st Airborne Division during the German Ardennes offensive of 1944. Robert Pirosh, a Bastogne veteran, wrote the film, which is distinguished by its precise focus on the gritty details of close combat. *Sands of Iwo Jima* was Hollywood's famous salute to the U.S. Marine Corps in the Pacific War and gave John Wayne, as Sergeant Stryker, one of his legendary roles.³⁸

World War II combat films made in the late 1940s were only occasionally matched in their quality and intelligence in succeeding decades. A notable contribution was Fuller's 1980 film *The Big Red One*, a powerful study of four teenage infantry soldiers, nicknamed "The Four Horsemen," who are led by an experienced sergeant played by World War II Marine Corps veteran, Lee Marvin.³⁹ The film, based on Fuller's own wartime experiences, propounds his philosophy that "the only glory in war is surviving."⁴⁰ The film includes searing scenes, such as a memorable firefight between American and German infantry squads in a lunatic asylum in which only the deranged inmates appear to be normal.

The relative decline of the World War II combat film (as opposed to films set in World War II) was caused partly by the rise of television and partly by U.S. military participation in the Korean war in the 1950s and in Vietnam in the 1960s. During the

1960s the World War II combat film was adapted to television, notably, the weekly series that ran between 1962 and 1967 called *Combat*.⁴¹ The wars in Korea and Vietnam removed many of the certainties surrounding what Studs Terkel calls *The Good War* against German Nazism and Japanese imperialism.⁴² In contrast, the war in Korea, waged against a looming nuclear era, was frustrating and unfulfilling for most Americans. A teenage catchphrase of the early 1950s was "There's two things we gotta avoid: Korea and gonorrhea."

Such ambiguities were reflected in the combat films made about Korea, notably Fuller's *The Steel Helmet* and Milestone's *Pork Chop Hill*.⁴³ The former emphasized the moral and physical confusion of waging limited warfare in the Cold War era, an approach that later influenced the Vietnam films of the 1980s. The difference between the rules of combat in World War II and in Korea is conveyed by the GI who asks his sergeant, "How do you tell a North Korean from a South Korean?" The sergeant replies, "If he's running with you he's a South Korean. If he's running after you he's a North Korean."⁴⁴

Pork Chop Hill was the best film made about the Korean war.⁴⁵ Based on the book by U.S. combat historian S.L.A. Marshall, the film was the last in Milestone's important cinematic trilogy about infantry warfare.⁴⁶ In the film, Milestone analyzes a company of U.S. infantry that, for purely political reasons, is ordered to seize a tactically pointless hill from the Chinese and to hold it against counterattack. All the while, the soldiers are aware that armistice talks under way at Panmunjon might at any moment bring about a cease-fire. The film features a superb performance by Gregory Peck as the weary lieutenant who must summon up his own courage and that of his men to fight in a cause they do not understand for an objective they know to be irrelevant.

The 1950s also produced perhaps the greatest film on World War I and, indeed, one of the cinematic masterpieces of all time about the subject of war—Kubrick's *Paths of Glory*.⁴⁷ The genius of the film lies in its unusually successful and multilayered

treatment of war. The movie is at once an antiwar film; a film about command and the proper conduct of war; and a subtle and profound combat film; It is a combat film because its central aim is to explore the circumstances surrounding a near-suicidal attack by French infantry on an impregnable German position called the Ant Hill.

Kubrick concentrates on the gulf between commanders and commanded and between frontline infantry and higher headquarters in the rear. He contrasts a tired frontline officer, Colonel Dax (Kirk Douglas) and his battle-hardened infantrymen against two of the most repellent high commanders in film history, General Broulard (Adolph Menjou) and General Mireau (George Macready). Broulard is a pompous, cynical political careerist. The suave Mireau oozes silken malice as a ruthless officer seeking promotion but whose ambition is not matched by any corresponding sense of morality or honor.

From his opulent headquarters in an idyllic, peaceful chateau, Mireau orders Dax's exhausted troops to take the Ant Hill. When the assault predictably falters, the general tries to save face by executing three innocent combat soldiers for alleged cowardice. *Paths of Glory* remains a shattering portrayal of the reality of the front line versus the reality of the rear. The film was banned in France until 1975 and, for a time, was also prohibited on many U.S. military bases.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the combat sub-genre was profoundly affected by U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. The combat films of those years were often subverted vehicles with cultural overtones that reflected the mores of the radical 1960s antiwar movement. Films such as *The Dirty Dozen* and *Kelly's Heroes* were about antiheroes, misfits, and criminals fighting in World War II.⁴⁸ When John Wayne tried to interpret America's intervention in Vietnam in terms of a World War II-type "good war" with *The Green Berets*, the result was a cardboard film distinguished by artificiality.⁴⁹

Only in the late 1970s, with such films as Michael Cimino's *The Deer Hunter*, Ted Post's *Go Tell the Spar-*

tans, and Coppola's *Apocalypse Now*, did Vietnam begin to receive serious treatment.⁵⁰ Of these films, Post's modest movie is perhaps the most interesting. *Go Tell the Spartans* tries to explain U.S. failure in Vietnam by examining an American advisory group helping South Vietnamese troops occupy Muc Wa, a former French garrison post. Muc Wa has a cemetery where 300 French soldiers are buried. A sign post in the cemetery contains the quote about the doomed Spartans at Thermopylae: "Stranger, go tell the Spartans how we lie; loyal to their laws, here we die."⁵¹ The cemetery and the fate of the advisory group serve as metaphors for how the U.S. war effort in Vietnam will be consumed in the future.

By the 1980s, Vietnam provided an environment for the revival of the combat film. However, unlike the 1940s and 1950s, the conventions of sanitized warfare were abandoned in favor of explicit scenes of violence while scripts became notable for the use of profane military slang. These new developments in portraying infantry warfare and military language were part of a search for realism in combat films. As William Broyles, Jr., a U.S. Marine Corps veteran, writer, and film consultant, notes, "A Vietnam movie's reality rests on how it portrays the central experience of war: combat."⁵²

The best Vietnam combat films were Oliver Stone's *Platoon*, Kubrick's *Full Metal Jacket*, and John Irvin's *Hamburger Hill*.⁵³ Stone was a Vietnam veteran whose war experiences clearly influenced his films. *Platoon* opens with words from Ecclesiastes: "Rejoice, O Young Men in Thy Youth."⁵⁴ The film is surreal and metaphysical in tone and concerns the struggle between two sergeants who embody the opposites of good (Willem Dafoe) and evil (Tom Berenger) for the souls of the members of the platoon. The rather heavy-handed plot is of less importance than Stone's stunningly realistic portrayal of combat in Vietnam. *Platoon* set many of the parameters for American cinema's interpretation of the conflict in Southeast Asia, and it remains arguably the most influential Vietnam combat film.

Kubrick's *Full Metal Jacket*, like Coppola's *Apocalypse Now*, is greater in its parts than in its whole. Scripted by the writer Michael Herr, *Full Metal Jacket* is an idiosyncratic and harrowing portrait of the making of the U.S. Marines—the polar opposite of the respectful *Sands of Iwo Jima*. Broyles writes, “The most realistic of all Vietnam films is the first half of Stanley Kubrick's *Full Metal Jacket*, which wired Marine Corps boot camp [on Paris Island] with electric chair voltage and threw the switch.”⁵⁵ The first half of the film is distinguished by an extraordinary performance by actor Lee Erney (a former drill instructor) as Gunnery Sergeant Hartman, whose task it is to turn a raw recruit into “a hard-heart that kills.” In a memorable scene Hartman informs his charges of their new status in life: “If you ladies leave my island, if you survive recruit training, you will be a weapon. You will be a minister of death praying for war. But until that day you are pukers, you are the lowest form of life on Earth. You are not even human-fucking-beings. You are nothing but unorganized grabastic pieces of amphibian shit. Because I am hard you will not like me. But the more you hate me the more you will learn. I am hard but I am fair. There is no racial bigotry here. I do not look down on niggers, kikes, wops, or greasers. Here you are all equally worthless. And my job is to weed out all nonhackers who do not deserve to serve in my Corps.”⁵⁶

Eventually one nonhacker recruit cracks up under the pressure; he shoots Hartman, then himself. The second and more ambiguous half of *Full Metal Jacket* deals with the new Marines skirmishing in the ruined city of Hue during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The squad encounters a female sniper who picks off its members until three of them, led by Animal Mother (whose helmet carries the legend “I am become death”), Joker, and Rafterman spearhead a raid on the source of fire and kill her. Her death symbolizes that the Marines are at last “reborn hard,” and Joker comments: “I am in a world of shit. Yes. But I am alive. And I am not afraid.”⁵⁷

Between the metaphysics of *Platoon* and the idiosyncrasy of *Full*

Metal Jacket lies Irvin's more conventional *Hamburger Hill*.⁵⁸ The latter is a film in the Milestone tradition and resembles *Pork Chop Hill* in both its structure and its effort to achieve documentary realism. The movie is an accomplished examination of a squad from Bravo Company of the 101st Airborne Division and its part in the battle to secure Hill 937 in the Ashau Valley in 1969, an action that resulted in a 70 percent casualty rate for the Americans. The camera follows the 11-day assault on the hill with such painstaking detail that the fighting is almost exhausting to watch. As one soldier laconically remarks, “You don't have to like it [fighting] but you have to show up.”⁵⁹

Toward a New Combat Cinema

In the post-Cold War years the most interesting developments in the combat sub-genre occurred toward the end of the 1990s. In 1998, Irvin's *When Trumpets Fade*, Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan*, and Terrence Malick's *The Thin Red Line* sought to reinvent and reinterpret the American combat film.⁶⁰ All three directors turned their attention to the subject of the “good” war—World War II.

Irvin's *When Trumpets Fade*, a small, modest film, suffered from being released at the same time as the big-budget films *Saving Private Ryan* and *The Thin Red Line*. Yet Irvin's approach to reenacting infantry combat is distinguished by a meticulous search for realism, an approach first demonstrated in his Vietnam war film, *Hamburger Hill*. *When Trumpets Fade* is thus, quintessentially, a soldier's film, a movie that affirms the virtues of a minimalist approach to the cinema of combat and seeks to make few concessions to the requirements of commercialism. The result is a grueling, unsentimental snapshot of the U.S. infantry experience during the harrowing battle of the Hurtgen Forest along the Siegfried Line in November 1944. The struggle for the Hurtgen Forest cost the U.S. Army 24,000 casualties and was dubbed “the Death Factory” by GIs on the line. In *When Trumpets Fade*, Irvin concentrates with laser-like intensity on the front-

line relationship between experienced combat soldiers, a squad of untried replacements, and the decisions of company commanders. The film is an intimate but powerful portrait of close combat and contains excellent characterizations and gritty, unsettling battle action scenes.

Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan* and Malick's *The Thin Red Line*, however, revived the combat film at the end of the 20th century. *Saving Private Ryan* was influenced by the earlier films of Wellman, Milestone, and Fuller. Drained of color and romance, the movie is a bloody memorial to the World War II generation and its great crusade against Nazism. Spielberg focuses on the dynamics of infantry combat, beginning with an astonishing recreation of the landing on Omaha Beach in June 1944. The opening scene is a searing, visceral introduction—as if 15th-century Dutch artist Hieronymus Bosch, who specialized in graphic pictures of Hell, was at work using a camera rather than a paintbrush. The initial 30-minute D-Day landing sequence has been acclaimed by soldiers, film critics, and military historians alike for setting a new cinematography standard for combat films.⁶¹ Hackworth declared that Spielberg's film “captures infantry battle as no other Hollywood film has.”⁶² *Time* magazine's film critic Richard Schickel called the beach landing “quite possibly the greatest combat sequence ever made, in part because it is so fanatically detailed, in part because the action is so compressed . . . in part because the horror is so long sustained.”⁶³ Gerald F. Linderman, perhaps the leading historian of the American combat experience, has observed that the Normandy sequence creates a “new standard for war-film realism.”⁶⁴

After the grueling Omaha Beach scenes, *Saving Private Ryan* becomes much more conventional and reveals its cinematic debt to the films of Wellman, Milestone, and Fuller. Spielberg's squad contains familiar generic figures—the good officer, the tough noncommissioned officer, the Brooklyn kid, the droll Jewish soldier, the Bible-quoting Southern sniper, the sensitive medic, and the squad coward. The film's main events

are also familiar and include a squad assault, a town battle, a sniper duel, and a stand against German armor. In seeking to reinvent the combat film, Spielberg adds elements of potent realism and seeks to avoid cliché, but in so doing he retains—albeit in an updated manner—the classic formula developed in the 1940s.

For an alternative vision of a new cinema of combat, one must consider Malick's beautiful but elusive version of James Jones's 1963 novel *The Thin Red Line*.⁶⁵ The film concerns the experiences of GIs in Charlie Company in the 1943 Guadalcanal Campaign against the Japanese. Malick's movie contains some fine combat sequences, notably the bloody assault on the fortified bunker on Hill 201 by Charlie Company, with its finely etched clash of command philosophies between the ambitious and pitiless Lieutenant Colonel Tall (Nick Nolte) and the sensitive Captain Staros (Elias Koteas). The scenes between the officers on Hill 201 carry echoes of Kubrick's *Paths of Glory*.

No two films could be less alike than *Saving Private Ryan* and *The Thin Red Line*. Malick is an idiosyncratic, reclusive director in the true auteur mold of Kubrick and Coppola. Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan* is a slick, technically brilliant, but ultimately conventional, tribute to the combat soldier. *The Thin Red Line* is a long, slow, unconventional meditation on mankind's self-destructiveness. The latter film juxtaposes human nature (the GIs) against Mother Nature (the Solomons as a battlefield), and focuses on poetic realism. The film recalls aspects of Coppola's *Apocalypse Now* more than any other combat movie in recent years. While Spielberg's film is highly focused in its narrative structure and scalpel-like in its visual precision, Malick's movie is disdainful of narrative convention, preferring unfocused, discursive visual images that convey a mosaic of experiences.

In essence, Spielberg gives us prose; Malick gives us poetry. The former aims for the mainstream audience; the latter is a director's film, the work of a cinematic purist. These differences have ensured that *Saving Private Ryan* has been much more

accessible and, therefore, more popular than *The Thin Red Line*. It comes as no surprise that, whereas Spielberg won the Oscar for Best Director in 1999, Malick was chosen as best director by the more cerebral New York Film Critics Circle.

"It's a Take"

In the 20th century, the motion picture cameras of Hollywood sought to recreate both the horror and the majesty of war. Many filmmakers used the camera like the serpent's eye—charming to destroy—through the romantic propaganda of military glory. Often combat films are shallow, trite, bloodthirsty, jingoistic, and unreal. However, the filmmakers discussed here sought to create enduring works of film art. The serious school of American combat cinema has always sought to master the power of the serpent's eye. To paraphrase William Shakespeare's Henry V, the aim has been "to lend the eye a terrible aspect" by making the camera's lens a witness to the complex realities of war that arise from the clash of rival infantrymen in the field.⁶⁶

Despite the advances in cinematography over the past century, it would be naïve to believe that the feature film has the power to alter the experience of wars in some way. We must always remember that cinema is a commercial medium that is essentially imitative of life. As the French filmmaker René Claire reminds us, "Nobody has yet made a good antiwar picture because we still have wars."⁶⁷ Since the time of Homer and the ancient Greeks there have always been young men who have wished to put on the armor of Achilles and who have been attracted to war as the greatest of all human adventures. In the immediate future, as in the immediate past, cinema is likely to remain the most powerful art form to reenact this eternal truth. **MR**

NOTES

1. Abraham Lincoln, speech against the war with Mexico, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 12 January 1848, quoted in Robert Giddings, *Echoes of War: Portraits of War from the Fall of Troy to the Gulf* (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), vi.
2. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1995).
3. George Cukor and Sam Wood, directors, *Gone With the Wind* (Burbank, CA: Warner Brothers Studios, 1939); Michael Curtiz, director, *Casablanca* (Warner Brothers Studios, 1942).

4. Frank J. Schaffner, director, *Patton* (Century City, CA: Twentieth Century Fox, 1970); Joseph Sargent, director, *MacArthur* (Warner Brothers Studios, 1977).
5. Henry King, director, *Twelve O'Clock High* (Twentieth Century Fox, 1949); Stanley Kubrick, director, *Paths of Glory* (Culver City, CA: MGM Studios, 1957); David Lean, director, *The Bridge on the River Kwai* (Culver City, CA: Columbia/Tri-Star, 1957).
6. William Wyler, director, *Mrs. Miniver* (Warner Brothers Studios, 1942); Wyler, *The Best Years of Our Lives* (MGM Studios, 1946).
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MR Almanac

Voices from the Sierra Maestra: Fidel Castro's Revolutionary Propaganda

Major Russell J. Hampsey, U.S. Army

On 5 November 1956, 82 Cuban revolutionaries based in Mexico boarded a broken-down yacht named *La Granma* and headed for Cuba. Seven days later the yacht ran aground near the Los Colorados beach in Cuba's Oriente Province. The landing was well south of the force's link-up site, where 50 supporters awaited their arrival. Government warships patrolled the coast, and government planes flew overhead. The element of surprise was not a factor.

Three days later, soldiers, tipped off by a local peasant, surrounded the revolutionaries and almost annihilated them. From 12 to 20 of the guerrillas survived and escaped to the Sierra Maestra Mountains to continue their fight against Cuban dictator and strongman Fulgencio Batista.¹ Twenty-four months later the survivors formed the nucleus of a rebel army that marched to Havana to form a revolutionary government that continues to shape international relations in the Western Hemisphere.

How did this small group of guerrillas eventually defeat an army of 30,000 soldiers who were well equipped and had unchecked power

over the Cuban citizenry? How did the United States, one of only two superpowers at the time, allow a nation 90 miles from its southern coast to slip from its grasp during the height of the zero sum game of the Cold War?

The answers to these questions lie in the guerrilla's use of propaganda and political warfare. The propaganda campaign that Fidel Castro and his followers waged set the conditions in Cuba and internationally. The campaign helped them gain Cuban society's favor and prevented an international (specifically an American) reaction to the insurrection and, ultimately, led to the rebels' victory. The Cuban Revolution's propaganda and political warfare, when examined in its original context, illustrates a well-planned and executed psychological operation (PSYOP) that influenced numerous target audiences and led to behavioral changes that helped Castro seize power while commanding a numerically and technologically inferior force.

Batista Seizes Power

On 10 March 1952, Batista seized power in Cuba for the third time in

19 years. He voided the results of the recent election and appointed himself chief executive, prime minister, and head of the Cuban Armed Forces. Political groups throughout Cuba rejected the coup, but none protested more vehemently than did student groups at the University of Havana. Castro, by then a practicing lawyer, legally challenged the coup and called for a 100-year jail sentence for Batista. However, Castro's brief was thrown out by the federal courts.² Castro continued to work to unite the factions that opposed Batista. One student group, the Santamaría, published a mimeographed underground paper titled *Son Los Mismos*.³ Castro frequently published articles in the paper condemning the Batista government, and in May 1952 he suggested that the group change the name of the paper to *El Acusador*.

Castro's group of students and young leaders later became the nucleus of the 26th of July movement (M-26-7), which favored direct action against Batista's dictatorial government. The group began military training in 1953 and set its sights on direct military action against the Cuban

government. The location of the action would be the Moncada Army Barracks of Santiago de Cuba.

On 26 July 1953, the group attacked the Barracks. The armed Revolution against Batista had begun. Government forces quickly defeated the attack, and Castro's group was forced to retreat. They headed toward the Sierra Maestra Mountains where they sought refuge and strengthened their numbers to continue the fight.

Government forces tracked the rebels and eventually captured all of them. Several were put to death while sheer "luck and public opinion spared the lives of Fidel, Raul [Castro], and some of [their] closest associates."⁴ Cubans were outraged at the summary execution without trial of many of the rebels. This consternation benefited Castro, prevented his death, and allowed him a trial in the courts.

While imprisoned, Castro decided that to conduct a successful revolution against the Batista regime he would have to launch the Revolution from another country. Thus, after his release, he went to Mexico, where he reunited with Raul. Raul had already begun planning the invasion from Mexico and had organized supporters and recruited revolutionary-minded men to form a guerrilla army. He introduced Castro to Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentine doctor, who played an important role in the Cuban Revolution and the propaganda implemented during the struggle.⁵ On 25 November 1956, Castro and 82 others boarded *La Granma* and set sail for Cuba.

Psychological Operations

The term psychological operations was coined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 33-5, *Psychological Operations*, in January 1962.⁶ The term has since been defined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, as "operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."⁷ The term used in the

PSYOP community for these is "target audience." Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines a target audience as "an individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations."⁸

Field Manual 3-05.30, *Psychological Operation's*, defines two types of PSYOP programs—an action program and a product program.⁹ Action programs are "sequential, coordinated presentations of a series of actions to achieve a specific PSYOP objective."¹⁰ A product program is a "sequential, coordinated presentation of a series of products to achieve a specific PSYOP objective."¹¹ Finally, JP 1-02 defines a PSYOP action as "an action or activity planned primarily for its psychological impact."¹²

Broadly defined, psychological operations are designed to influence the attitudes and perceptions and ultimately change the behavior of selected groups so their thoughts and actions favor the goals and objectives of the initiator. All PSYOP plans must begin with an ultimate objective or goal; an example of which, for this study, is "Defeat the Batista regime." This simple, concise statement is the impetus for the development of the plan that Castro implemented during the Revolution.

PSYOP objectives, then, are developed to lead to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective. Another example of a PSYOP objective for this operation would have been "Deter U.S. involvement in the Revolution." From this objective, target audiences could be determined, and sub-objectives could be formed that would help achieve this goal. The target audiences Castro selected were the U.S. press, U.S. policymakers, and the U.S. population in general, all of whom are important in helping Castro achieve his objectives.

Target audiences help the initiator focus on sub-PSYOP objectives that are based on the group's peculiarities. Messages and actions that are effective for one group might not be so for another; therefore, each target audience must be understood and targeted separately.¹³ Study of each target audience helps the planner

determine the themes that will resonate with the target audience. An example of this is the Revolution's denial of any involvement with communism. This sub-objective would read: "Convince U.S. policymakers the Revolution is not communist based." Castro understood the reaction he would incite from U.S. policymakers if he did not make this denial. This theme also played across the spectrum of his target audiences because of U.S. sensitivities toward communist movements during the early Cold War years.

Finally, initiators design PSYOP programs to support each of their sub-objectives. This includes determining the type of media to use and when to use it; actions that when viewed by the target audience will cause a desired reaction; themes to stress and themes to avoid; and the frequency and timing of dissemination plans.

Castro's plan called for two PSYOP objectives that his cause needed to accomplish to defeat the Batista regime. First, the group had to convince fellow Cubans of the Revolution's legitimacy and that it could succeed. Second, they had to deter U.S. involvement in the Revolution. To achieve these objectives, they had to reach numerous audiences in and out of Cuba.

The Cubans that could influence the achievement of the revolutionaries' first objective were the population of Santiago de Cuba, the Guajiros in Oriente Province, Cuban youth movements, and the Cuban military. To achieve the second objective, they had to reach the U.S. press and population and U.S. decisionmakers.

Objective 1: Convince the Cubans of the Revolution's legitimacy.

Target Audience: The Santiago de Cuba population, the Guajiros, Cuban youth movements, and the Cuban military.

The Santiago de Cuba population. Castro said, "No weapon, no force is capable of defeating a people who have decided to fight for their rights."¹⁴ Santiago de Cuba, located

on the eastern end of Cuba near the Sierra Maestra Mountains in the Oriente Province, “is shut off from Havana as surely as if it were another country.”¹⁵ Residents believed people from Havana looked on their city as backward, and they felt exploited by the Havana government.¹⁶ Santiagueros were proud, defiant, and antigovernment in general. Throughout Cuba’s history, Santiago de Cuba served as a starting point for revolution. Castro recognized and exploited these qualities in choosing to attack the Moncada Army Barracks in 1953 and later during the Revolution when using the Sierra Maestra Mountains as his operational base. Castro’s objectives were to increase the discontent among Santiago de Cuba’s population; demonstrate the Revolution’s strength and resolve to win; and encourage Santiagueros to support the Revolution.

Part of Castro’s initial plan during the attack on the Moncada Army Barracks was to capture the local radio station so the rebels could use it to “call the people to revolt.”¹⁷ The attempt to seize the radio station failed, but Castro followed up with a rallying cry for the Santiagueros during his trial defense. He repeatedly emphasized the atrocities committed against the population by the Batista regime. He described soldiers whose uniforms became butchers’ aprons. He painted the Batista regime as the worst of all the oppressors of Cuba—a regime that purposely preyed on the Santiagueros, a peaceful, liberty-loving people. He described the deaths of innocent children at the hands of soldiers: “After the battle, they threw themselves like wild beasts on the city of Santiago de Cuba and on its defenseless population.”¹⁸

Castro did not forget Santiago de Cuba as he launched his second attempt at revolution. He planned to coordinate his landing with an uprising in Santiago de Cuba through Frank País, the movement’s leader in the city. The plan would make Santiago de Cuba “the rebel stronghold” of the Revolution.¹⁹ Because of the delay of Castro’s landing, the synchronization that the plan called for never materialized. However, País did conduct an uprising and con-

trolled the city in the name of the 26th of July movement for hours on the day of the planned landing.

País was instrumental in gaining support for the Revolution in Santiago de Cuba and was the key executor of propaganda in the city from the 1956 landing until his death in 1957. During a pro-Batista rally organized by Roland Masferrer on 18 May 1957, “País used a clandestine radio to cut into Masferrer’s speech.”²⁰ País called for revolution and exalted Castro and his followers throughout the city, and the 26th of July movement gained support from the Santiagueros. The movement shipped arms through Santiago de Cuba and received medical treatment, shelter, and provisions in the city.

The Guajiros. The refuge for the rebels in the mountains consisted of “2,500 square miles and 50,000 Guajiros.”²¹ The Guajiros can be described as “poor, illiterate black, white, and mulatto peasants” who lived in the villages and farms throughout the Sierra Maestra area.²² Most of them were squatters who cleared land for subsistence farming and built huts in which to live between sugar harvests. During harvests, they left their mountain homes and worked as sugarcane cutters. Castro understood that to survive in the mountains he needed the Guajiros’ support. He had to convince them to support the 26th of July movement; to recruit them to join the Revolution; and to persuade them to inform the rebels of government action in the area.

Guevara served to motivate the Guajiros. In late 1957, with Castro’s permission, Guevara began to build a small-scale infrastructure in his sector of the Sierra Maestra—El Hombrito. Guevara’s action demonstrated to the local population the rebels’ commitment to improving their lives. Guevara oversaw the construction of a small hospital, a bread oven, pig and poultry farms, a cigar factory, and a small armory.²³ The guerrillas paid farmers to grow certain types of vegetables so the rebels could purchase them for subsistence. The benefit of seeing words transformed into actions served to steel the resolve of the Guajiros to support the rebels.

Guevara also established a news-

paper and radio network to serve the area. The small newspaper, *El Cubano Libre* was copied on a mimeograph and distributed throughout the area.²⁴ Articles written by Castro, Guevara, and others served to illustrate the ideology of the 26th of July movement and their plans for Cuba’s future. The radio station started small, broadcasting only in the local area but widening its area as the war progressed: “When we began to broadcast from our own transmitter, the existence of our troops and their fighting determination became known throughout the Republic; our links began to become more extensive and complicated, even reaching Havana and Camagüey in the west, where we had important supply centers, and Santiago in the east.”²⁵ The results of the intensive campaign waged among the Guajiros served the rebels well. The network of supporters kept the rebels informed of “the presence of not only the Army but of any stranger” who entered the rebel zone.²⁶ The combination of civil and military development provided a working model of the society the Revolution hoped to create.

The Batistas also targeted the Guajiros, but the strength of Castro’s campaign prevented government inroads into the rebel zone. Castro was able to give the Guajiros hope, and the Guajiros gave Castro the time and support he needed for success.

Cuban youth movements. Another key group Castro targeted was Cuba’s youth movements. Castro’s objectives were to establish the legitimacy of the 26th of July movement to unite all revolutionary efforts and to convince youth movements that the main effort was in the Sierra Maestra Mountains.

Castro understood the importance of uniting all of the revolutionary movements throughout the island, and he began his campaign to do so even before the Moncada Barracks attack. On 23 July 1953, he released a manifesto declaring the philosophy of the Revolution to the Cuban people. The manifesto defined the vanguard of the Revolution as “a youth that wants a new Cuba, a youth that has freed itself from all the faults, the mean ambitions, and the sins of the past.”²⁷

Castro continued efforts to unite Cuban youth movements during his time in Mexico. In September 1956, he and José Antonio Echevarría, the leader of the University Federation of Students (FEU), signed the Mexico pact that united the revolutionary efforts of these two powerful organizations.²⁸ Point 16 of the pact reads: “The FEU and the 26th of July movement adopt as their watchword the unity of all the revolutionary, moral, and civic forces of the nation—students, workers, youth organizations, and all men of dignity—so that they will support us in this struggle which will end in our victory or our death.”²⁹ Thus, on the eve of Castro’s invasion, unity with a powerful youth organization took shape and legitimized the 26th of July movement in the eyes of other youth movements throughout Cuba.

The Cuban military. Castro’s embrace of a soldier as Castro left his prison cell on the Isle of Pines was a symbol of his attempt to stop the military from participating in the violence directed by the Batista regime. Castro knew that if he could influence the Cuban military to support the Revolution by either joining him or, at least, not fighting him, he could rapidly achieve Batista’s overthrow. The objectives he established to influence the military were to erode military support for Batista, stress the legitimacy of the 26th of July movement, and emphasize the inevitability of the military’s defeat.

In June 1957, Batista began an all-out offensive against Castro that led to Castro being surrounded on a mountain crest near La Plata. With no more than 40 men, he and his men held their position, wearing down the attackers. Castro used this opportunity to apply tactical “psychological warfare for the first time in the Sierra war by installing loudspeakers that blared the national anthem, patriotic songs, and revolutionary exhortations at the exhausted Batista soldiers.”³⁰ Castro’s force denied the military a victory at that decisive point.

Castro opened a dialogue with military commanders, and several exchanges illustrate his PSYOP objective of eroding support to the regime. To General Eulogio Cantillo he wrote,

“I appreciate your noble feeling toward us, who are, after all, your compatriots, not your enemies because we are not at war with the armed forces, but against the dictatorship.”³¹ During the battle of Mompie, Castro fought against a former law student colleague, Major José Quevedo. Castro reportedly held a dialogue with Quevedo guaranteeing the good treatment of the soldiers if they surrendered. After several days of this, Quevedo surrendered. The rebels fed Quevedo’s soldiers before turning them over to the International Red Cross.³²

Castro’s humane treatment of his prisoners of war served to legitimize his fighting force in the eyes of his armed adversary. As Castro’s army marched across the island in 1958, Cuban military commanders could not rally their troops to fight the rebels. One commander cautioned his soldiers not to be impressed “by what ‘Fidel Castro’s radio station and his propaganda organs—or the ill-born Cubans who propagate rumors—may say.’”³³ Castro’s campaign against Cuban Armed Forces was effective and greatly hastened his march to victory.

Objective 2: Deter U.S. involvement in the Revolution.

Target Audience: The U.S. press and population and U.S. decisionmakers.

U.S. press and population. Castro possessed a radio in the Sierra Maestra Mountains, which allowed him to monitor Cuban broadcasts and U.S. broadcasts from Florida. He knew that to further the Revolution, he had to get the right message out so the international press and, more important, the U.S. press would not disregard the rebellion in Cuba. His contacts led him to Herbert L. Matthews, a Latin America expert for *The New York Times*, who conducted an interview of Castro in Cuba. Matthews’ interview became a three-part series of articles about the Cuban revolt and, more important, Castro, its leader. Allowing Americans to see his ideas in print would lend legitimacy to Castro’s cause, as would his denial of it being a com-

munist-based revolution. “Above all,” he said, “we are fighting for a democratic Cuba and an end to the dictatorship.”³⁴

Matthew’s articles had a de-legitimizing effect on the Batista regime. After Cuban officials challenged the validity of the story, *The New York Times* responded by publishing a photograph of Matthews and Castro together in the Sierra Maestra Mountains.³⁵ The effect of Matthews’ article was invaluable to Castro.

Castro presented to Matthews a force that appeared to be well organized. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Castro said his army “works in groups of 10 to 40,” and, he further stated that he had “no less than 50” rifles with telescopes that Cuban soldiers feared.³⁶ The reality of the situation was that at the time Castro’s army numbered “less than 20 armed men.”³⁷

Matthews’s articles were filled with admiration for Castro and his cause. As a result, U.S. attention turned toward the Cuban situation. Matthews’ scoop opened the floodgates, and U.S. journalists hastily tried to reach the Cuban rebels. Money, recruits, and support flowed to the Sierra Maestra.

Such interviews allowed Castro to publicly separate himself from Cuba’s communist movement. He understood that U.S. citizens, decisionmakers, and the U.S. press needed to hear his denial of communist affiliation for themselves. Anticommunist sentiment in the U.S. was strong during the late 1950s, and Americans would oppose any rebellion with communist connections. If Castro convinced the U.S. press that his movement was not communist, he also would be able to reach other important target audiences.

Castro convinced Matthews that his group had no links to the communists. The second article in the series focused on the rebels’ anti-dictatorial stance and, more important, for the rebels, the separation of the movement from the communists: “Communism has little to do with opposition to the regime. There is a well-trained, hard core of communists that is doing as much mischief as it can and that naturally bolsters all the opposition elements, but there is no

communism to speak of in Fidel Castro's 26th of July movement or the disaffected elements in the Army."³⁸

Castro continued to distance his movement from the communist movement before the U.S. press. In a February 1958 *Look* magazine interview, Andrew St. George questioned Castro on charges that the Revolution was communist-inspired.³⁹ Castro credited Matthews with discrediting this claim and stated that "the Cuban communists, as your journalist John Gunther once reported, have never opposed Batista, for whom they have seemed to feel a close kinship."⁴⁰ Castro not only denied the charges, he attempted to link Batista with the communist movement.

In a letter to the U.S. policy journal *The Nation*, Castro summarizes the programs of the 26th of July movement that the rebels would implement when they won. The program is outlined in six paragraphs, with paragraph 5 addressing the international affairs of the proposed government: "In international affairs, the establishment of close solidarity with the democratic nations of the American continents."⁴¹ Again, through the U.S. press, Castro attempted to demonstrate his distance from the communist movement.

Before Matthews' interview, the Cuban press covered mostly articles about the resort atmosphere of Havana, and the Cuban government did a fairly good job of controlling the stories that left the island. Entries in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* focused on how Americans could vacation cheaply in Havana, of the visits of high-profile celebrities to the island, and so on.⁴² After Matthew's interview, *Reader's Guide* articles focused on rebel demands and interviews with Castro, which kept the Revolution on the front pages of the U.S. press.

U.S. decisionmakers. Castro had to convince U.S. decisionmakers that the movement was not communist. He had to persuade them to stop shipping small arms and planes to Cuba, and he wanted to dissuade them from intervening in the Revolution.

Castro's programs with regard to the U.S. press, concerning the movement's political goals, also served to affect U.S. decisionmakers. Castro's public rejection of communism was reflected in correspondence, dated 7 December 1957, between the U.S. Department of State and U.S. American Embassy policy officer Wayne Smith. Smith wrote: "The Cuban Government accuses Castro of being a communist, but has not produced evidence to substantiate the charge."⁴³ Castro's campaign of distancing himself from communism was reaching his intended audience.

Castro, no stranger to Cuban history, was well aware that the United States believed it had a legitimate reason to intervene in Cuban politics. He had to maintain a delicate balance of fighting against a demonstrably illegitimate dictator, while simultaneously not offending the United States enough to cause intervention in Cuban affairs. Part of the program to reduce the chances of U.S. intervention was the anticommunist rhetoric he spouted. Matthews wrote that Castro "has strong ideas of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the constitution, to hold elections."⁴⁴ In the interview, Castro said, "We are fighting for a democratic Cuba and an end to the dictatorship."⁴⁵ In the *Look* interview, Castro said, "Under our constitution, I am far too young to be a candidate."⁴⁶ The ideals that Castro presented through the press to the U.S. public made it difficult for U.S. decisionmakers to justify an intervention on Batista's behalf.

Lessons Learned

Examining Castro's propaganda effort is valuable for the PSYOP specialist because it illustrates the effectiveness of a well-planned, flexible plan. The most important aspect of the effort was never losing sight of the mission, in this case the overthrow of the Batista regime. Propaganda can take on a life of its own, but Castro was able to direct his program to support his objectives at all times. Incidentally, the program Castro successfully executed parallels current U.S. PSYOP doctrine, illustrating the soundness of these

principles.

Castro's successful propaganda campaign also was due to his understanding of target audiences and his sense of timing in applying the art of PSYOP. Castro quickly responded to U.S. concerns when his brother kidnapped U.S. citizens. He could have chosen that moment to demonstrate the movement's increased strength, but he stuck with his goal of avoiding U.S. intervention, understanding that the kidnappings would only serve to anger his northern neighbor.

PSYOP officers must also examine the propaganda Castro conducted in the sense of a potential adversarial PSYOP effort. The program Castro followed could easily be replicated in today's information-age environment. The advances in media technology actually would assist a guerrilla effort in gaining, or preventing, international support. One only has to look at propaganda efforts by Philippine and Colombian insurgents exploiting the Internet to sense the possibilities available to potential adversaries.

Epilogue

On 3 January 1959, Cuban revolutionary commander Fidel Castro began his "long march on the central highway from Santiago to Havana."⁴⁷ The march was a move to gain the popular support of the people as the column crossed the island. Mounted on a captured tank, Castro addressed Cubans at various stops along the way. People clamored for this "liberator." Castro used these opportunities to spell out what Cuba's future should look like, and he promised to "punish those who have been responsible for so many years of suffering."⁴⁸

Castro arrived in Havana on 8 January 1959. He gave his respects to the president he had appointed, Manuel Urrutia Lleó, and gave a speech to the thousands of people gathered there. Castro, elevated to legendary status, received the monikers "Savior of the Fatherland" and "The Maximum Leader." He had achieved his goal—the overthrow of Batista. His use of propaganda enabled him to achieve that goal in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds: "We cannot become dictators;

we shall never need to use force because we have the people, and because the people shall judge, and because the day the people want, I shall leave."⁴⁹ **MR**

NOTES

1. Accounts vary on the number of survivors from *La Granma*, although there is no number less than 12 or greater than 20. In several press interviews, Castro gives the number as 12. Maps that show Castro's movements from 1956 through 1959 can be accessed online at <www.rose-hulman.edu/~delacova/cuban-revolution.htm>.
2. Fidel Castro, *Revolutionary Struggle*, eds., E. Rolando Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1972), 40.
3. *Ibid.*, 37.
4. *Ibid.*, 53. Raul Castro was part of the group that attacked the barracks.
5. Enrique Menses, *Fidel Castro* (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1966).
6. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 33-5, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), superceded).
7. U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 10 July 1996).
8. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: GPO, 12 April 2001).
9. FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 19 January 2000).
10. *Ibid.*, glossary.

11. *Ibid.*, glossary.
12. JP 1-02.
13. This statement does not mean that some messages and actions do not cross target audiences. In fact, many messages might, and often do, cross target audiences. Only by studying each target audience individually can one determine if this will happen and how to plan for it.
14. Castro, 182.
15. Herbert L. Matthews, "Cuban Rebel is Visited in Hide-out," *The New York Times*, 24 February 1957, 1.
16. Menses, 22.
17. Castro, 50.
18. *Ibid.*, 197.
19. Ramon L. Bonachea and Marta San Martin, *The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959* (Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1974), 79.
20. *Ibid.*, 140.
21. Menses, 46.
22. Jon Lee Anderson, *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: Grove Press, 1997), 220.
23. *Ibid.*, 287.
24. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, *Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1968), 205.
25. *Ibid.*, 207.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Castro, 157.
28. The FEU founded the Directorio Revolucionario (DR) in September 1955 as an answer to Castro's revolutionary movement. The DR formed the nucleus of the urban guerrillas in Havana.
29. Castro, 339.
30. Tad Szulc, *Fidel* (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1986), 447.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, 447-48.
33. Bonachea, 272.

34. Matthews, *Cuban Rebel is Visited*, 1.
35. *Ibid.*, photo.
36. *Ibid.*, 34.
37. Anderson, 236.
38. Matthews, "Rebel Strength Gaining in Cuba, But Batista Has the Upper Hand," *The New York Times* (25 February 1957), 11.
39. Andrew St. George, "Interview with Fidel Castro," *Look* (4 February 1958), 30.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Castro, "What Cuba's Rebels Want," *The Nation* (30 November 1957), 400.
42. *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*.
43. John P. Glennon, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957*, vol. VI, *American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1963), 866.
44. Matthews, "Cuban Rebel is Visited," 34.
45. *Ibid.*
46. St. George.
47. Bonachea, 326.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*, 330. See also online John T. Skelly, "The Men Who Left the 26th of July Movement," <www.sigloxxi.org/menleft.htm>.

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U.S. Intervention in Siberia as Military Operations Other Than War

Dr. Paul E. Dunscomb

The stuff of an age now dead.

— S.L.A. Marshall¹

If the 1990s are any indication, the "future" mission of the U.S. military is occurring now. Military operations other than war (MOOTW), as in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, will almost certainly become more the rule than the exception during the early 21st century. Given the likelihood of such missions, the need for creating and evolving doctrine is paramount. However, limiting study to solely those operations conducted by U.S. Armed Forces during the 1990s makes creating a truly comprehensive, flexible MOOTW doctrine unlikely.

Reevaluating historical events in terms of MOOTW doctrine provides lessons and approaches we can use with profit in future operations. Yet, just as MOOTW requires the U.S. military to develop new skills beyond traditional warfighting, future military historians will not be able to confine themselves strictly to the old description of operations. A broader, deeper approach will be necessary. Fortunately, 20th-century history is rich in

potential MOOTW case studies, such as the U.S. intervention in Siberia from 1918 to 1920.

Siberia 1918-1920

In July 1918, after months of prodding from World War I allies, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson invited the Japanese to join the U.S. in sending a force of about 7,000 men each to Vladivostok, Russia. The troops' mission was threefold: guard the vast quantity of military stores that had piled up in and around the port; secure the eastern end of the Trans-Siberian Railway so Czechoslovak troops, who had seized much of the railway in June, could push west and establish contact with their fellows; and "steady any efforts at self-government and self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance."² Wilson was adamant that troops sent to Siberia were not there to take sides in the Russian civil war but, rather, were only to provide a stable environment in which the Russians could determine for themselves what sort of government they might have.³

The American Expeditionary Force (AEF), Siberia, was comprised largely of the U.S. Army's 27th and 31st In-

fantry Regiments normally based in the Philippines under the command of Major General William Sidney Graves. The British dispatched an infantry regiment from Hong Kong, and the French sent a regiment from Indo-China. Italy, Canada, China, Serbia, Poland, and Rumania also sent token units. Czech forces, numbering around 50,000, largely served west of the Ural Mountains as the spearhead of White armies driving on Moscow. The Japanese had the largest number of forces by far. Several divisions, ultimately totaling about 73,000 men, were sent into the Maritime Province of eastern Siberia through Vladivostok and into the Trans-Baikal region in western Siberia through North Manchuria. Although the supreme commander in Siberia was Japanese, most forces—particularly U.S.—operated under a parallel command structure.⁴

The area of action in Siberia was vast, stretching over 1,200 air miles from Vladivostok to Irkutsk, just west of Lake Baikal. The most direct route between these two locations transited northern Manchuria. In 1896, the Russians had secured treaty rights to build a railway (the Chinese

Eastern) along this direct route, and the railway zone was virtually Russian territory.⁵

Although Britain and France expressed desire for U.S. and Japanese forces to proceed west of the Urals to attempt reconstituting an eastern front against Germany, both nations declined. For all intents and purposes, Irkutsk marked the westernmost area of operations. Russian authority in the region was generally fragmented, even after Admiral Alexander Kolchak took control of the “All Russian White” (counter-revolutionary) government at Omsk. Two regional leaders of Cossack armies, Gregory Semenov at Chita in the Trans-Baikal and Ivan Kalmykov in the area around Khabarovsk in the Maritime Province, acted largely independently with more or less open support from the Japanese.⁶ This severely undermined the effectiveness of the Kolchak regime and eroded the region’s stability. After the collapse of the White government at the end of 1919, the U.S. announced its intention to withdraw from Siberia, and the last troops departed Vladivostok on 1 April 1920.

Combat was not the principle mission of the AEF, Siberia. Once Czechoslovak forces had overthrown Bolshevik-controlled administrations throughout the region during the summer of 1918 and allowed more moderate elements to establish themselves, security for U.S. forces was not considered a major problem. The principal mission of U.S. forces was to provide security for the Trans-Siberian railway. The 27th Infantry Regiment operated in the Trans-Baikal region around Verkhne-Udinsk, and the 31st Infantry Regiment operated in the area just north of Vladivostok and the small mining town of Suchan. Japanese forces provided security along the remainder of the railway. Czech forces performed this service west from the 27th Infantry Regiment’s sector up to the White capital at Omsk.⁷

Winter weather initially was the principal foe of forces stationed in Siberia, but as White government authority declined and the anti-Bolshevik operations on the part of Semenov, Kalmykov, and the Japanese alienated the population, parti-

san activities became a greater threat. In February 1919, a detachment of 300 Japanese troops was virtually wiped out by a partisan ambush at Yufra.⁸ In early 1920, partisans—turned freebooters—seized the city of Nikolaevsk and massacred White forces as well as two companies of Japanese infantry and numerous Japanese civilians.⁹ American forces were not immune; in June 1919, 31st Infantry Regiment units were attacked at Suchan and Romanovka and suffered several casualties. The same month, partisan forces at Uspenka attacked units of the 27th Infantry Regiment. Throughout the year, small-unit operations and sniping took place at bridges and other isolated points on the railway where U.S. forces provided security.¹⁰

A Classic MOOTW

Attacks on U.S. forces occurred despite the fact that, by and large, the Americans stuck doggedly to their neutral stance to the ultimate frustration of the White Russians as well as the American troops.¹¹ This and other factors highlight the way in which the commitment of nearly 9,000 U.S. soldiers to eastern Siberia possessed all the hallmarks of a classic MOOTW.

Throughout the intervention, members of the exhibition spent much time working with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and the American Red Cross as well as with various quasi-official government organizations, such as the American Relief Administration and the U.S. technical mission known as the Russian Railway Service Corps. The Siberian intervention was also a multinational affair, which proved a distraction to the U.S. Government at home and its representatives—civilian and military—in the field.

The Japanese Armed Forces proved fractious and troublesome coalition partners. Even with lesser coalition nations such as Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia, questions regarding unity of effort and objectives proved nearly insoluble.¹²

Apart from their vigorous anti-Bolshevik operations, Japanese atti-

tudes toward guarding the railway also differed sharply from the Americans’. The Japanese did nothing to stop Semenov and Kalmykov from interfering in railway operations or from hijacking or holding up badly needed arms, ammunition, or other vital supplies for the Omsk government. The Japanese also used their control of border crossings with China to facilitate the entry of Japanese products and goods into Russia (without paying tariffs or dues) while excluding other nations’. The British 25th Middlesex Infantry Regiment was essentially sent to Siberia as an allied force for the Whites. They operated far beyond the intended zone of operations and called constantly for support from other coalition partners, which never came.¹³

The intervention in Siberia also resembles the modern MOOTW in the way in which its story cannot be told strictly through the eyes of the U.S. Army. The U.S. Navy posted several ships to Vladivostok (Admiral Austin M. Knight served as supreme commander of coalition naval forces) and undertook extensive intelligence-gathering operations. U.S. Marines, detached from the ships, engaged in security patrols in the city. Naturally, U.S. Department of State personnel played vital roles in MOOTW operations, as did Roland Morris, the ambassador to Japan, and various consuls in Siberia. But, simply studying joint operations or adding diplomatic history to the mix in Siberia is not enough for a historian. He requires a broader survey and must take into account the activities of numerous other actors.

The YMCA and Red Cross have already been mentioned, but psychological operations (PSYOP) also played a role. The Committee for Public Information’s propaganda effort to help convince the Russians of America’s friendly attitude and to build support for democratic, pro-capitalist institutions is an important early example of PSYOP.¹⁴ Many private individuals—representatives of financial, railway, mining, and other interests hunting for concessions and promising prospects for investment and development—also complicated the scene, particularly in terms

of inter-allied cooperation.

Then there is the case of John F. Stevens, chairman of the Inter-Allied Railways Technical Control Board, who was left with the thankless and virtually impossible task of trying to operate the Trans-Siberian Railway in a way that would satisfy various factions among the intervening coalition, not to mention the Russians.¹⁵ Indeed, the central pillar of the U.S. effort in Siberia had less to do with the forces engaged than it did with U.S. efforts to control and manage the various railways. Certainly without the efforts of the Russian Railway Service Corps, whose members held ranks in the army but were civilian professional railwaymen—dispatchers, shop managers, right-of-way maintenance engineers—it is unlikely that there would have been a Siberian intervention as we know it. With the lines under Japanese control, efforts to create a pro-Japanese buffer state in the Russian Far East might have been more successful. Certainly it would have prompted a fiercer Russian resistance.

One aspect of MOOTW that might illuminate a study of the Siberian intervention is the question of mission objectives. Viewed in new light, AEF, Siberia, commander Graves might manage something of a posthumous vindication. Still widely criticized as being too passive in either suppressing the Bolsheviks or supporting White forces, Graves is generally portrayed as a man seriously out of his depth who held pedantically to the letter of his orders while an anti-Bolshevik government, the support of which was the assumed object of his mission, withered and died.

From today's perspective, it is easy to see that Graves' orders, given in August 1918 and never subsequently changed or clarified, were vague and contradictory but did enjoin strongly to maintain a neutral stance. Rather than mulishly refusing to confront the realities that faced him as the situation deteriorated, it is possible to envision Graves as the patron saint of all subsequent commanders who have desperately sought to avoid the dread specter of mission creep. That the object that many desired in Siberia was not at-

tained is certainly true. Courtesy of Graves, it might be possible to say the situation was not made infinitely worse.¹⁶

Areas for Further Study

Siberia, of course, was not the sole arena where foreign forces conducted operations in Russia in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution. However, the effort in Siberia was the only one where the U.S. played an extensive, extended role in terms of leadership and commitment of troops. Although several hundred U.S. troops participated in the allied intervention at Archangelsk and Murmansk, they were there for a shorter period and served under British command.¹⁷ Siberia, therefore, is most productive in terms of analyzing the intervention as a species of MOOTW. An examination of existing scholarship on the intervention as a whole, however, indicates that the approach also could be useful in studying operations in other theaters as well.

The value of such study would be twofold. First, as a case study in the conduct of MOOTW, allied operations in Siberia and elsewhere provide examples of the many pitfalls inherent in such exercises. This could begin with major questions of the validity of the basic concept of operation. Was there adequate security for forces involved? Was there unity of effort, both in a joint and a multinational context, on the part of forces involved? Questions of coordination, cooperation, and liaison also crop up in reference to the work of the forces involved and to NGOs. Did the organizations pursue ends compatible with forces involved? Were their efforts mutually supportive, redundant, or in conflict? Did the mission have legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian and American peoples? Was the amount of restraint used by forces involved appropriate? Did commanders in the field and command authority back home possess sufficient perseverance? Finally, were there achievable mission objectives, and were cooperative mechanisms for working with coalition or host-country entities capable of accomplishing them?¹⁸

The second benefit of an examination of intervention as MOOTW is

the liberating effect it might have on scholars in their study of U.S. efforts during the Russian Civil War. Scholarship on allied intervention in Russia over the last 50 years has tended to fall into certain categories, all of them unsatisfying because they fail to describe the true breadth and scope of the intervention. In one category, doubtless the one most familiar to military historians, histories of the intervention are campaign narratives that sacrifice all to a description of battles and participants that gives a seriously distorted view of what most coalition troops did during their time there. With the exception of the Czechoslovaks during 1918, active fighting made up a small percentage of military activities in Siberia among Japanese troops, let alone Americans.

Not only does the concentration on operations give a distorted view of soldiers' experiences, it ignores the far more active work done by civilian agencies during the period. Among some of the works falling into this trap are Richard Goldhurst's *The Midnight War*, Christopher Dobson's *The Night They Almost Bombed Moscow*, Benjamin Rhodes's *The Anglo-American Winter War with Russia*, and R. M. Connaughton's *The Republic of the Ushakovka*.¹⁹

To an extent, it is not to be wondered that writers working during the Cold War would bend their stories through the prism of subsequent U.S.-Soviet relations, viewing the intervention as a doomed effort against the inevitable and an unfortunate beginning to an important relationship. Works by George F. Kennan and Betty Miller Unterberger, still some of the most authoritative on the period, were written in the late 1950s and are clearly imbued with a distinct "presentism."²⁰ The Cold War was reaching one of its early peaks, and the Soviet Union appeared to hold an upper hand. The Communists had defeated the Fascists and had beaten the U.S. into space. The Red Star appeared to be ascendant. Given this apparent reality, how could the intervention be viewed as anything less than a foolish or quixotic undertaking? Even later writers, none of the caliber of Kennan or Unterberger, while possibly less in awe of the

Soviet Union, were still impressed by its influence. Robert James Maddox's *The Unknown War with Russia* is an example.²¹

In the 1990s, writings on intervention tended toward the opposite direction, suffering an equally intense "pastism." If the Soviet Union was doomed to eventual collapse, might the process not have been hastened? They tend to see the intervention as a lost opportunity to prevent much of the suffering that has been the hallmark of the 20th century. Ilya Somin's *Stillborn Crusade* is one such work that looks back in anger.²² Although less passionate, Victor M. Fic, in his two recent monographs on the progress of intervention in 1918, *The Collapse of American Policy in Russia and Siberia* and *The Rise of the Constitutional Alternative to Soviet Rule in 1918*, is dazzled by the opportunities which appeared to exist for overthrowing the Bolsheviks.²³

That the world would likely have been a much better place had the Bolshevik tyranny been destroyed at the outset is a supposition hard to argue against. Yet, while post-Cold War works demonstrate that numerous openings for achieving this end did exist, others clearly demonstrate that Western leaders lacked the intent, will, or desire to make such an effort. Historical contingency operates only in cases where actors act. Concerns about what the intervention did or did not accomplish prevent people from coming to grips with what intervention actually did do. On the U.S. side, particularly, it was a stability operation with a limited commitment of forces as part of an overall effort to provide basic security and economic stability to avoid a humanitarian disaster and to foster an environment where host-nation political forces could determine their own destinies.

By taking the MOOTW approach in looking at the intervention or by focusing on the distinctly limited nature of the American effort instead of the stakes involved for history in a White or Red victory, we might be able to wean ourselves from the dazzling possibilities and confine ourselves to consideration of what such

a limited effort could realistically accomplish. Even on these terms there is little doubt that the U.S. effort in Siberia can be called anything short of an unmitigated, long-term failure. Security was neglected, which led to confrontation and casualties. The complete lack of unity of effort, the conflicting objectives of the multinational forces, and the lack of restraint of Japanese forces eventually compromised the mission's legitimacy for the Russians and the Americans and undermined any desire Wilson or the U.S. public had to persevere. During the period the intervention was actually underway, a degree of stability was achieved, but basic conceptual flaws in the intervention meant that no local regime could be established that was capable of, or particularly interested in, sustaining the necessary political and economic stability.

This is not to suggest that looking at the intervention as MOOTW can free us of previous biases or can help produce an undistorted picture of the intervention as a whole. The questions we ask of the intervention and the lessons we attempt to draw from it are as much the product of our obsessions of the moment as they are of a desire to provide a new perspective. The real value of this approach, then, is not in creating a new interpretation of the intervention that can finally illuminate the truth where others have failed, but in providing examples, models, case studies, and lessons that can help us with today's needs.

Possibly the greatest criticism that can be leveled against the intervention-as-MOOTW approach is the indisputable fact that absolutely no one involved in the U.S. effort in Siberia had any conception of what MOOTW was or any inkling that they might be engaged in such a thing. That no one on the U.S. side was able to articulate the military challenge in terms of MOOTW doctrine is certainly true. However, virtually everyone involved felt, at one level or another, the lack or the necessity of dealing with some or all of these operational concepts.

The activities or, more frequently, the inactivities in which forces were engaged and the frustrations and

confusion seemingly contradictory mission objectives engendered bedeviled the troops in the field, their commanders, the decisionmakers in Washington, and the American people, generally in much the same way that missions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia have troubled us since the 1990s.

The success of the intervention-as-MOOTW approach has two important potential consequences for military historians. The first, by providing an answer to the ever present "so what" dilemma, would be to give historians an opportunity to productively reexamine or rescue from obscurity many of the peacetime operations the U.S. military conducted during the 20th century; for example, the Central American and Caribbean "banana wars" or the dispatch of U.S. Marines to Lebanon in 1958 and 1982-84. The second, and by far the more important, is that it can provide a wider audience—not just military planners or civilian "policy wonks" but ordinary citizens—with an understanding of the complexities and frustrations that such operations inevitably entail.

An informed citizenry will be in a much better position to pass judgment on the decisions of their civilian and military leaders to involve U.S. forces in various situations throughout the world. Ultimately, the people most likely to benefit from such an informed citizenry would be the soldiers themselves. The words of S.L.A. Marshall eloquently describe the stakes involved: "But, someone may argue, the grandeur and misery of the Americans who stood at Archangel or fought in the Russian hinterland are the stuff of an age now dead. The ways in which they were fooled and failed, and the lessons that derive from their heartbreak, are better buried, having no application to the present. Such sentiments are expressed after every war, which is the main reason that deadfalls stay unposted as a warning sign."²⁴ **MR**

NOTES

1. S.L.A. Marshall quoted in E.M. Halliday, *The Ignorant Armies* (New York: Jonathan Cape, 1931), xvi.
2. George F. Kennan, *Soviet American Relations, 1917-1920: The Decision to Intervene*, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 398.
3. *Ibid.*, 396-99.

4. Richard M. Connaughton, *The Republic of Ushakovka: Admiral Kolchak and the Allied Intervention in Siberia, 1918-1920* (London: Routledge, 1990), chap. 5.
 5. John Albert White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 18-22.
 6. Connaughton, 45-46; Kennan, 65-71; James William Morley, *The Japanese Thrust into Siberia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 95-100.
 7. Connaughton, 137; White, *The Siberian Intervention* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), 150-51. See also John M. House, *Wolfdogs and Polar Bears in Siberia: America's Military Intervention* (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1986), chap. 9.
 8. Bolshevik partisans ambushed and killed all but 8 of the 300-man Tanaika detachment of the 72d Infantry Regiment, 12th Infantry Division. Although reported in the Japanese newspapers, this reverse caused nothing like the sensation over the massacre of Japanese soldiers and civilians at Nikolaevsk a year later. The incident is virtually forgotten today. Nothing exists on the incident in English. A description of the battle is in Takahashi Osamu's novel *Hahei [Troop Dispatch]*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1973), 411-28.
 9. White, *Siberian Intervention*, 286-92.
 10. House, 141-54.
 11. Connaughton, 113-17.
 12. *Ibid.*, chap. 7.

13. *Ibid.*, 131-33.
 14. James D. Startt, "American Film Propaganda in Revolutionary Russia," *Prologue* (Fall 1998), 167-79.
 15. White, *Siberian Intervention*, 134-35, 144-50; Kennan, 64-65.
 16. Connaughton, 171-72. Graves makes his own case in *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920* (New York: Jonathan Cape, 1931).
 17. Halliday, *The Ignorant Armies* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), describes the action in North Russia.
 18. Operational questions concerning MOOTW are taken from Joint Publication 3-0, *RSD* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 December 1999), chap. 5, 2-6.
 19. Richard Goldhurst, *The Midnight War: The American Intervention in Russia, 1918-1920* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978); Christopher Dobson, *The Night They Almost Bombed Moscow: The Allied War in Russia, 1918-1920* (New York: Atheneum, 1986); Benjamin Rhodes, *The Anglo-American Winter War with Russia: a Diplomatic and Military Tragicomedy, 1918-1919* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); Connaughton, 171-72.
 20. Kennan, *Soviet American Relations, 1917-1920: Russia Leaves the War*, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), and Kennan, vol. 2, 398; Betty Miller Unterberger, *America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1956); Unterberger, *American Intervention in the Russian Civil War* (Lexington:

D.C. Heath, 1969); Unterberger, *The United States, Revolutionary Russia and the Rise of Czechoslovakia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).
 21. Robert James Maddox, *The Unknown War with Russia: Wilson's Siberian Intervention* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1977).
 22. Ilya S. Somin, *Stillborn Crusade: The Tragic Failure of Western Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1918-1920* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996).
 23. Victor M. Fic, *The Collapse of American Policy in Russia and Siberia, 1918: Wilson's Decision Not to Intervene* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1995); Fic, *The Rise of the Constitutional Alternative to Soviet Rule in 1918: Provisional Governments of Siberia and All-Russia: Their Quest for Allied Intervention* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1998).
 24. Halliday, xvi.

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MR Review Essay

Martin van Creveld on *Men, Women & War*

Dr. Robert J. Bunker © January 2002

I was at first apprehensive when approached about writing a review essay on Martin van Creveld's new book, *Men, Women & War: Do Women Belong in the Front Line?*¹ The topic was not a key interest of mine, and more pressing real-world needs required my attention. While the sporadic conversations I have had with van Creveld over the last couple of years made me aware of his growing interest and deep fascination with the topic of women in general, this work seemed a diversion from his repertoire of such seminal works as *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallerstein to Patton*; *Command in War*; and *Technology in War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present*.² Luckily, I relented and decided that I should expand my knowledge base by reading van Creveld's book. As I read and reflected on his new text, I realized that by following his instincts he has once again created a unique work.

The immediate benefit I gained from reading the book is a better understanding of the military historical context of women in relationship to future warfare. The book also helped explain why emerging mercenary companies are male-dominated. I had long ago recognized but never really placed this trend into a gender

context. While these lessons might or might not have been van Creveld's intent, it is of primary interest to me and, I suspect, to many *Military Review* readers. The danger many of us fall into is getting too operational in our thinking and focus. The revolution in military affairs, operations other than war, and stability and support operations are examples of such focus. Sometimes we must take in more encompassing views at the cultural and societal level in which war is waged. Since women make up at least half of our populace, understanding their historical roles in warfare is important. This understanding will allow us to better understand the current context in which they operate in the Armed Forces, with the U.S. Army of particular interest, and what their future roles in warfighting might be.

Overview and Analysis

Men, Women & War sports a camouflage cover, making it look somewhat like a field manual. The preface discusses how poisoned the relations between the sexes are in this field of scholarship and lays out van Creveld's historical view concerning how it has been the man's "duty to protect woman, by fighting for her if necessary."³

The introduction provides van Creveld's intent. He goes beyond "construction of gender" arguments to instead seek to show that a "great illusion" exists concerning women in the military today. He states "that the influx of women into the military, far from representing some historical step in women's unstoppable march toward liberation, is both symptom and cause of the decline of the military in question. The process was triggered by the introduction of nuclear weapons over 50 years ago. Since then, the armed forces of no developed country have fought a major war against a major opponent who was even remotely capable of putting its own national existence in danger; compared with the recent past, and with very few exceptions, all they have done was to engage in skirmishes."⁴

He argues that this process has been ongoing for about 30 years, as has the rise of military contractors and mercenaries who are almost completely absent of female personnel. The former South African mercenary group Executive Outcomes and the private security group Military Professional Resources Incorporated founded by retired U.S. Army generals are two examples of the types of groups of which van Creveld is

speaking. He states that “it might almost be said that those armed forces that have been forced to incorporate women no longer fight; whereas those that still fight have very few, if any, women.”⁵

Part I surveys how women have been caught up in wars—as instigators, causes, objects, or as protégés of men. Van Creveld views women as critical to war in these capacities and claims that to some extent war owes its existence to women as much as it does to men because it is an organized social and political activity; that is, take away women, and war would not exist.

Part II, which covers actions of women in war through the ages, is the most interesting section to read because of the various case studies discussed. The chapters on the “Warrior Women of Dahomey” and the role of women in “Revolts, Revolutions, and Insurgencies” are particularly noteworthy.

Part III looks at the period from 1945 to the present. Van Creveld details the decline of the military in one country after another and how, in his view, this has allowed the influx of women. He contends that this has exacerbated the problem and led to further military decline, which, continuing the cycle, allows more women to enter the military.

Based on van Creveld’s detailed analysis in the middle sections of the book, his conclusions appear to focus on three items that, from a women’s-studies perspective, might light the fuse to a powder keg. He says “pro-feminist scholars, attempting to prove that women can and should take an active part in armed conflict, have inflated the role played by women in the past out of all proportion.”⁶ He dispels the myths relating to the over significance of the Amazons, the warrior women of Dahomey, the Soviet women in the Russian Civil War and during World War II, and the Israeli women serving in the Israel Defense Forces.

Van Creveld contends that “contrary to the claims of some, it was not feminist pressures but the beliefs entertained by politicians, soldiers, and scholars concerning the shape of future war that first enabled

women to gain a prominent toehold in the military during the years after 1945. [In] most countries it was not feminist pressures but military requirements—meaning a shortage of men—which triggered the growth of that toehold from about 1970 on. Often women, instead of freeing men for combat, simply took up positions men no longer wanted; in which respect the military are [sic] quite typical of other feminizing professions.”⁷

He continues, “Military women are often absolutely detested by the male majority. As a result, the more determined and the more successful their quest for equality the more their special privileges were taken away and the more exposed they felt to ‘sexual harassment,’ both real and imaginary.”⁸ In 1998, this resulted in some U.S. servicewomen demanding the process be put in full reverse with the return of separate chains of command and facilities. As a result, “women’s attempt to improve their social positions by joining the military has not only failed but backfired. Instead of showing they are equal to men, it has proved they cannot do without special protection.”⁹

An underlying secondary theme in this work, which is likely to be seen as controversial for various branches of the military, is van Creveld’s projection that as “the number and importance of wars between states, particularly developed ones, continue to decline it is likely that more women will enter the armed forces of those states. As more women enter them, the armed forces in question will become both less willing to fight and less capable of doing so.”¹⁰ Van Creveld suggests that “true warriors” will eventually be found only in the U.S. Marine Corps; other elite, male-dominated units; and mercenary corporations.

Because van Creveld is not an established scholar of women’s studies, he has done an immense amount of research on the topic. He draws on English, German, Italian, French, Hebrew, and Russian (via scholar support) works and cites more feminists and women’s studies literature than I ever imagined existed. In fact, this book has more notes than have any of his other books. This level of

research and detail, one supposes, will somewhat protect van Creveld from the firestorm of criticism he might well be subjected to by his treatment of this controversial topic.

The major strength of the book is van Creveld’s willingness to take risks. Time and again he wades into uncharted territory and places it into context with his own form of intellectual overlay. That overlay helps define each topical area, such as logistics in war, and is something other scholars and military professionals have been forced to contend with even years after the publication of one of his books. This topical area without a doubt will be no different.

My specific criticism of the book is minor and based on van Creveld’s superficial knowledge of American pop culture. His references to *Charlie’s Angels* and *Xena, the Warrior ‘Queen,’* are inaccurate.¹¹ But these are minimal mistakes. He was able to accurately pinpoint a subplot focus of the U.S. film *GI Jane* found in its infamous one-liner indicating Demi Moore’s character’s “symbolic growth” of a male sexual organ, which allowed her to pass survival, escape, resistance, and evasion training.¹²

The only real difficulty I had with the mechanics of the work was matching the three conclusions of the book listed on page 13 with the actual text discussing those conclusions found in the “Change and Continuity” chapter which spans pages 228-37. No clear-cut listing of the conclusions existed in the final chapter, which made it somewhat difficult to highlight them. That I might have missed some part of van Creveld’s conclusions is troubling. Better delineation of each conclusion is needed. While acknowledging my limited background in gender studies, to me this work appears to be tightly written. Also, I cannot suggest that the book’s political incorrectness is a weakness, because the book is meant to be incorrect in the sense that its point is to challenge a woman’s right to be a front-line combat soldier.

Because of his academic freedom as a tenured professor, van Creveld simply calls it as he sees it. He can play the devil’s advocate quite well,

but I think he has gone way beyond it here in scope and intent. He is sincere about the topic and passionate about his views that, he argues, are quite convincingly historically accurate. In my view, he has literally created an “intellectual grenade” with this book. He has opened the door on the women in combat roles debate and tossed in some controversial contentions. Since he does not have a dog in that fight, he can now walk away and let the fragments fly where they may.

Future Implications

The future implications of this book are twofold. On an individual level, it portrays the broadening in van Creveld’s scholarship to include the study of women. He has published many books on the topics of strategy and military history and has, to some extent, exhausted the study of men and war. For this reason, this is a transitional work for van Creveld. We can expect, at some point, for him to write stand-alone works on the topic in addition to his more familiar martial-focused books.

At a societal level, this book also has direct implications for the U.S. Army. The conceptual link to his brilliant work *The Transformation of War* is quite clear.¹³ If a viable and real state-based threat should appear, then “the expanded role of women in the military will vanish like the chimerica it is.”¹⁴ So unless a peer competitor or hostile regional power should emerge some time in the near future, the long-term prospects for the U.S. Army—the military institution that fights and wins the Nation’s wars—is rather bleak by van Creveld’s analysis.

The current war with the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda network, an early form of a transnational non-state, warmaking entity, only serves to support van Creveld’s thinking. The postmodern, criminal-soldier, and new-warrior-class “blackfords” (criminal opposing forces) represent networked entities who seek nothing less than the destruction of America and the way of life it represents. As a result, national archetypes of 21st-century soldiers are now based on the front-page photos of U.S. Special Forces on horseback in Afghanistan

and firemen raising the U.S. flag over the still-smoldering ruins of the World Trade Center. Women viewed through van Creveld’s lens would, in this context, have no place in either venue because these venues represent war at its most primitive and brutal.

Those who see push-button, standoff war as the future will probably find van Creveld’s work backward looking and out of sync with current gender realities. Others, including male and female service members, will take issue with his thesis, observations, and conclusions. But, while no one must agree with him, no one can ignore him. He proves to be one of the most influential military writers of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Whether van Creveld will focus more and more on “Venus” or whether his past association with “Mars” will ultimately prevail, he will continue to create a unique synthesis between the two fields of study. Regardless, *Men, Women & War* has now put him on a collision course with the profeminist scholars of the world. Let the battle be joined! **MR**

NOTES

1. Martin van Creveld, *Men, Women & War: Do Women Belong in the Front Line?* (London: Cassell & Co., 2001, distributed by Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., New York).
2. Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallerstein to Patton* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
3. *Men, Women & War*, 7.
4. *Ibid.*, 10-11.
5. *Ibid.*, 12.
6. *Ibid.*, 228.
7. *Ibid.*, 232-33.
8. *Ibid.*, 234.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, 236-37.
11. On pages 63 and 64, van Creveld calls the three “angels” policewomen. In the 1970s television series, they were private detectives (*Charlie’s Angels*, Columbia Pictures Television, Hollywood, California). Van Creveld calls Xena, a warrior queen. The name of the 1990s series is *Xena, Warrior Princess* (Oxygen Media, New York).
12. Ridley Scott, director, *G.I. Jane* (Hollywood, CA: Hollywood Pictures Studios, 1997).
13. Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
14. Van Creveld, *Men, Women & War*, 237.

Robert J. Bunker, a less-than-lethal weapons and counterterrorism consultant to the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center—West, El Segundo, California, is a former adjunct professor, National Security Studies program, California State University, San Bernardino. He is a past fellow, Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Claremont Graduate University. He is a frequent contributor to Military Review. He can be reached at <bunker@law-west.org>.

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MR Book Reviews

A RAIN OF LEAD: The Siege and Surrender of the British at Potchefstroom, Ian Bennett, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2001, 256 pages, \$34.95.

In Africa in 1880-1881, a detachment of about 200 soldiers and two cannon, garrisoned in a 25-yard-square earthen fort, withstood a Boer siege for 95 days. The fort, located outside of Potchefstroom, Transvaal, South Africa, had no internal source of water, and the artillery horses and wagon oxen were kept outside in the fort's surrounding trench. Under-provisioned in food and ammunition and burdened with civilian women and children, British commander Lieutenant Colonel Winsloe faced a Boer force many times his detachment's size.

Because of the Boers' desire to publish a proclamation reestablishing the independence of the South African Republic, a skirmish occurred that resulted in the siege of the fort and government offices in Potchefstroom. The offices held out in isolation for four days before surrendering.

Meanwhile, at the fort, the parapet was not sufficiently high, so the soldiers used their bags of provisions to add to its strength. The lack of water was felt immediately. The soldiers could not refill water barrels until night. As the siege tightened, they could not even accomplish this, so they dug a well—unsuccessfully. Eventually, they had to release what animals they possessed, which had been the source of their fresh meat supply.

The besieged soldiers continued to sink wells until they found a water source, but their next problem was how to prevent its contamination. The near-constant rains, which began during the second week of the siege, caused more problems—inadequate drainage, spoilage of food, and lack of sanitation. To provide fires, soldiers tore apart wagons and used any burnable material, such as boxwood, they could find. Tents to pro-

tect the soldiers from the elements were almost useless because they were riddled with bullet holes and rot. Reduced rations were the norm. Morale and discipline were maintained, however, throughout the entire siege. Bugle calls announced mess and other activities, and singing was a common means of passing time.

When Winsloe did surrender, his rations were almost exhausted, he had lost one-third of his force, and the remainder was sick and weakened. Only later did he find out that he had not needed to surrender; the Boers had withheld information of the armistice so they could take possession of the British cannon and other arms when the small garrison finally surrendered.

MAJ William T Bohne, USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

THE MAKING OF A PROFESSIONAL: Manton S. Eddy, USA, Henry Gerard Phillips, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2000, 245 pages, \$65.00.

Colonel Henry Gerard Phillips' biography of Manton S. Eddy is a delightful and rare combination of admiration and scholarship. Phillips, who served in the 9th Infantry Division during Eddy's tenure as division commander, clearly respects and admires Eddy, but he is also able to see Eddy's foibles and limitations. Yet, Phillips finds, and argues convincingly, that Eddy is worthy of admiration.

Arguably one of the best corps commanders of World War II, Eddy is relatively unknown. Perhaps serving with flamboyant General George S. Patton accounts for his lack of fame. Certainly, serving and prospering under Patton are testimonies to Eddy's competence. Patton had little time for those who were not up to the task of command and even less for those who might overshadow him.

Though Eddy never graduated from college, leaving Princeton after

3 years to accept a commission in the regular Army, he rose to the top in an Army dominated by West Point graduates. Despite not completing his formal education, Eddy proved to be a first-rate student and, subsequently, an outstanding instructor at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Still later he commanded at Fort Leavenworth where, in addition to serving as Commandant of the college, he directed a study on the direction of officer education. The results of the study (small classes, branch basic courses, and a focus on decision-making) continue to be felt. Eddy concluded his career with a tour in Europe first as deputy commander in chief, U.S. Army Europe, then as commander in chief. He retired in 1953.

Phillips' approach to Eddy's life is classical. His work might be aptly titled "A Life of General Manton S. Eddy." In some ways, the book is a bit old-fashioned, but delightfully so. Phillips, meticulous in details, carefully cites every source and uses Eddy's war diaries and exhaustive interviews to develop his account. Because Phillips' citations are so thorough, critical readers may form their own judgments. Phillips is, however, guilty of inventing dialogue where precise quotations from conversations were not available. Phillips alerts the reader and describes how to recognize these occasions. Still, deducing dialogue is beyond the pale.

Despite some flaws and his obvious admiration of Eddy, Phillips strives to remain objective to the extent that he sometimes overcompensates. In any case, the result is satisfying. Eddy emerges as human and accessible, cautious yet courageous, meticulous but decisive. Eddy saw the world in simple terms; he acted expediently in accordance with his understanding of conditions. Simply put, he focused on the desired end

state and strove to do the right thing as well.

In some ways, Eddy was naïve. In North Africa, when confronted with high rates of venereal disease in his division, Eddy acted decisively. Despite his own prim nature, he took the view that since abstinence was unlikely, then supervised bordellos were the right course. Accordingly, the 9th ran “official” brothels. Eddy never staffed the idea; he merely ordered it done. Not surprisingly, Eddy’s bubble burst. An outraged chaplain urged his flock to write home to complain. When Eddy learned of the chaplain’s “disloyalty,” he attempted to have him removed. In the middle of this contretemps, higher headquarters intervened instructing him to close down the “Octofoil Cathouse” and to take no action against the chaplain. Eddy is supposed to have commented to his chief of staff, “Never underestimate the power of prayer.”

Phillips perhaps makes too little of one of the most controversial events in Eddy’s tenure in corps command. In December 1944, Eddy relieved the flamboyant and often-praised Major General “P” Wood, then commanding the 4th Armored Division. Eddy and Wood fell out over whether Wood moved quickly enough to take advantage of a perceived opportunity. Specifically, Wood asked for and received a temporary boundary shift enabling him to use routes belonging to Major General Wade H. Haislip’s XXV Corps. He overstayed his welcome, which tied up XXV Corps. Wood had asked for two days on XXV Corps routes, but after a week he remained astride them and missed a perceived opportunity as well. After a stormy session, the last of several during the course of their 4 months together, Eddy, with Patton’s concurrence, relieved Wood.

Wood’s popularity and acknowledged tactical brilliance make him a far more sympathetic character than Eddy, but Phillips argues that Eddy was right. Phillips not only reviews the case for and against Wood and Eddy, he also cites Eddy’s critics. Once again, thoughtful readers may reach their own conclusions. Some might argue that Phillips is wrong or that he has not given adequate space

to the controversy, but Phillips has done more than enough to make his case and to acknowledge that the conclusions he reaches are not universally agreed on. Most historians would not do as much.

Whether learning the limits of his power or learning the art of command, the ability to learn is the trait that Eddy shares with all great battlefield commanders. No one event defined him; he continued to learn throughout his life. He learned from and adapted to the exigencies of the battlefield and from superiors and subordinates alike. Phillips accounts of Eddy’s battlefield decisions demonstrate Eddy’s insight and occasional lapses, and what is clear is that Eddy learned from success as well as from his own mistakes and those of others.

Phillips successfully manages to pay tribute to his old commander, doing so in a way that completes the record of a soldier who deserved more attention than he received in his lifetime.

**COL Gregory Fontenot, USA,
Retired, Lansing, Kansas**

FROM THE FLAME OF BATTLE TO THE FIERY CROSS, James Van Eldik, Yucca Tree Press, Las Cruces, NM, 2001. 392 pages, \$25.00.

The author of *From the Flame of Battle to the Fiery Cross*, James Van Eldik, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, believes that the Confederate Army of the Tennessee has received far too little coverage in scholarship of the American Civil War. Thus, Van Eldik decided to write about the 3d Tennessee Volunteer Infantry Regiment, which was a part of the Confederate Army from the war’s beginning until the regiment’s surrender at Greensboro, North Carolina, on 17 April 1865.

Recruited from a four-county area in central Tennessee, the 3d Tennessee acquired an admirable combat record and participated in some of the most important battles and campaigns of the Civil War in the west—Fort Donelson, Vicksburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and the Atlanta Campaign. Van Eldik contends that he intended to “provide a sense of what combat was like for these men” and to bring to the reader a

sense of how battle looked, sounded, and felt.

Van Eldik also focuses much attention on the 3d Tennessee’s first commanding officer, John C. Brown, who became a major general and divisional commander during the war. After the war, Brown served two terms as governor of Tennessee and became a railroad baron.

In the final chapter, Van Eldik discusses the post-Civil War origin of the Klu Klux Klan—comprised of former members of the 3d Tennessee. The organization, which stemmed from a college fraternity-style prank to amuse unemployed veterans, eventually grew into the reviled terror of the South.

Based on primary sources, including written accounts by regimental officers, reports by the regiment’s commanders, and comments taken from soldiers’ diaries and letters, *From the Flame of Battle to the Fiery Cross* paints a detailed picture of this Confederate regiment’s service. Perhaps the most useful item in this book is a 70-page appendix that includes a brief account of the service records of roughly 1,000 men of the 3d Tennessee. Although this book is necessarily limited in scope, I recommend it for those interesting in the American Civil War.

**Alexander Bielakowski, Ph.D.,
Findlay, Ohio**

THIS IS NO DRILL: Living Memories of the Attack on Pearl Harbor, Henry Berry, Berkley Books, NY, 2001 (reprint), 257 pages, \$13.95.

At dawn, 7 December 1941, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on the U.S. Navy fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. In *This Is No Drill*, Henry Berry, author of the classic oral histories, *Semper Fi, Mac: Living Memories of the U.S. Marines in World War II* (New York: Berkley Pub., 1995) and *Hey, Mac, Where Ya Been? Living Memories of the U.S. Marines in the Korean War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), tells the story of this momentous event through the eyewitness accounts of the survivors of that fateful day.

Because of the recent movie, *Pearl Harbor* (Burbank, CA: Walt Disney Studios, 2001), there has been a revival of interest in the events of 7

December. This book goes much farther than the movie does in providing a realistic feel for the shock, chaos, and confusion that reigned that day. The observations and recollections of those who lived through the attack are much more dramatic and compelling than any fictional account. Berry puts a face on this historical event, and his book is a must for anyone who wants to understand the full effect of the sneak attack that launched the United States into World War II.

**LTC James H. Willbanks, USA,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

MAKING CITIZEN-SOLDIERS: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Science, Michael S. Nieberg, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000, 264 pages, \$39.95.

Making Citizen-Soldiers is an interesting, informative book that belies author Michael S. Nieberg's biases regarding ROTC vis-à-vis military academies. Nieberg describes the sometimes-tormented relationships of schools that have ROTC programs and examines the reasons why.

What is of particular interest is the reason why academic institutions have had problems with ROTC on their campuses. I suspect antipatriotic sentiments; Nieberg claims otherwise. I am not completely convinced. Nieberg makes good claims, backed with some substance, that force a closer look at other reasons. Many schools could dislike the military and the Vietnam War but not be against ROTC. Nieberg's explanations are believable but incomplete. I do not really believe that schools have altruistic intentions; they are more pragmatic and might be more influenced by economic benefits derived from the presence of an ROTC on campus.

Some of the major irritants that academic institutions have cited in their objections to ROTC include substitution of courses, credits for military subjects they consider underserving, accreditation of the military faculty and staff, use of professional titles, and allegiance of the ROTC to an outside institution. Much of the grumbling I consider to be the worst kind of intellectual snobbery, which

often appears to be motivated by sophomoric retaliation, by many who could not (or would not) serve in the military.

To keep ROTC alive, the Department of Defense has attempted to alleviate many of the problems encountered with the universities. Some efforts can be seen as plain, unadulterated, shameful pandering. For example, a number of ROTCs lost academic credit during the Vietnam war—or were thrown off campus.

I find a number of small problems with Nieberg's analyses based on broad generalizations. He misuses the word "professional" in describing the education of military academy cadets. The converse would be that ROTC cadets' military educations are "unprofessional," a distinction I do not believe he intended. The designation was used in his often-cited, but poorly substantiated, claim that graduates from military academies are more likely to be proponents of antidemocratic and militaristic governments. His interpretation is based on a single canvassing of cadets regarding this issue. A Navy post-graduate poll of junior military officers of all commissioning sources shows something different from what Nieberg asserts. In fact, a surprising number held what can be considered antidemocratic, but politically correct, views. A survey of officers at the 10-year mark might be much more indicative of the true nature of cultural beliefs.

Nieberg is guilty also of parroting several other myths that seem to gain adherents the more they are quoted. For example, he asserts that the Army had a policy of placing "white southerners" over blacks because the southerners knew how to "deal with" blacks. This tenuous assertion, for which I have yet to find substantiation, reflects bigotry against southerners and does not consider the fact that the Army, run by northerners for years after the American Civil War, ran a segregated Army until 1952. Like others, this myth just will not die, and no one seems able to produce evidence—other than speculation—that this was an official policy.

Another myth that Nieberg perpetrates regards Vietnam battlefield ca-

sualties among blacks. Nieberg states that they were "disproportionate," giving rise to claims by black politicians (not service personnel) during the Persian Gulf war that blacks would again have to shoulder the burden. If, in the Persian Gulf, U.S. forces had incurred the casualties projected, they would probably be right. However, of the casualties in Vietnam, only 12.5 percent were black. This is statistically insignificant because it correlates closely with the black population. Should there be a full-scale conflict today, casualty figures are bound to be much different because a much higher percentage of the Armed Forces is black.

What *Citizen-Soldiers* does show is that based on rising costs and performance statistics, ROTC is much more a bargain than are military academies. The formation in 1986 of the Cadet Command has done much to standardize training and raise the overall quality of ROTC graduates so they are more competitive with graduates from military academies. While Nieberg does not do a cost analysis, the comparison is unavoidable.

This is a good book, but it could have been better. While Nieberg's analyses are flawed in a number of cases, his subject will surely spark excellent discussions.

**LTC Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr., USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**

GRISWOLDVILLE, William Harris Bragg, Mercer University Press, Macon, GA, 2000, 155 pages, \$29.95.

William L. Bragg's book, *Griswoldville*, explores the history of the town in central Georgia. This well-researched, profusely illustrated, and well-written book covers the role Griswoldville played in Stoneman's Raid of July 1864 and Union General William T. Sherman's March to the Sea.

In trying to protect his long wagon train, which was having trouble keeping up with the infantry, Union General Oliver Otis Howard stationed General Charles Walcutt's Brigade near Griswoldville. A motley force of Georgia State Line soldiers and militia composed of old men and boys attacked the brigade but were promptly repulsed. The engagement

was the only infantry-on-infantry battle during Sherman's March to the Sea and is neither famous nor significant. The book's only flaw is the lack of detail on the actual battle. The section about the fight is rather short. Nevertheless, I recommend the book simply because it is enjoyable to read.

**MAJ D. Jonathan White, USA,
Smithfield, Virginia**

AN HONORABLE DEFEAT: The Last Days of the Confederate Government, William C. Davis, Harcourt, Inc., NY, 2001, 512 pages, \$30.00.

Pulitzer Prize nominee William C. Davis's exceptional work, *An Honorable Defeat: The Last Days of the Confederate Government*, tells the story of Confederate General Robert E. Lee's duels with the Army of the Potomac during the last months of the Civil War. Although much of the story has been recounted in great detail, little has been written that illuminates the plight of the Confederate government as Union Major General Ulysses S. Grant tightened the noose around the neck of the Confederate capital at Richmond, Virginia.

Davis's extensive use of primary sources as well as his continuing scholarship on the Confederacy makes this book a welcomed update to the previous standard on the subject—Alfred Jackson Hanna's *Flight into Oblivion* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1938). Davis combines his definitive work on Secretary of War John C. Breckinridge (*Breckinridge: Statesman, Soldier, Symbol*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1992) with other works on Confederate President Jefferson Davis to develop the relationship between these two powerful men whose relationship forms the basis for Davis's analysis of the flight of the Confederate cabinet from Richmond.

In addition to spotlighting Breckinridge's role in the escape, Davis develops other themes to a degree that surpasses previous narratives. The first is Jefferson Davis's insistence that the Confederacy would not die but would live on west of the Mississippi. Davis's dogged determination to reach the Trans-Missis-

sippi Department drove him toward Florida, where he hoped to find a ship that would convey him, the archives, and the Confederate treasury to Texas. There he hoped to rally loyal soldiers to continue to resist Union armies.

Unlike previous works, such as *A Long Shadow: Jefferson Davis and the Final Days of the Confederacy* (University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1986), Davis delves into the actions of the cabinet members who accompanied the Confederate President during the flight. Such illumination provides a more complete picture of the events between 2 April, when Jefferson Davis left Richmond, and 10 May, when Union cavalry finally caught up with him near Irwinville, Georgia. Finally, Davis again dispels the persistent myth that Jefferson Davis attempted to escape by disguising himself in his wife's raglan and shawl.

Elaboration on the events subsequent to the capture of Jefferson Davis and his cabinet (and the surrender of others) would have made this work complete. Davis covers the aftermath of their attempted escape too briefly. Particularly lacking are the events of the few years that Breckinridge lived after Jefferson Davis's capture. That detail can be found in Davis's book about Breckinridge, but more detail here would have provided a sense of closure to this work. This point is trivial, though, when compared to the details Davis provides of the flight and, particularly, the relationship between the strong-minded Confederate president and his secretary of war. Despite his sincere belief that the Confederacy was dead, Breckinridge remained loyal to his president until the end.

**LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA, Retired,
Ph.D., Leavenworth, Kansas**

FLYING TIGERS OVER CAMBODIA: An American Pilot's Memoir of the 1975 Phnom Penh Airlift, Larry Partridge, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, NC, 2001, 196 pages, \$28.50.

Larry Partridge's 25 days of flying from Saigon with the Flying Tigers to feed a starving Phnom Penh population is a great story of love and heroism. Partridge volunteered for service knowing that three million

people there faced starvation and that Khmer Rouge guns ringed the city. Despite the danger during the initial part of the airlift, Partridge helped deliver over 2,737,000 pounds of rice.

The story of the daily pattern of flying, eating, and sleeping is exciting as the Tigers found new ways to land, unload, and take off quickly to avoid being killed. They could have quit, but they continued their flights of mercy until the airport was closed. A sense of duty and love of others kept them flying.

Many have read about the Flying Tigers in Robert L. Scott's stirring book, *God is My Co-Pilot* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), which adds historical information in context to *Flying Tigers Over Cambodia*. History buffs, pilots, and Flying Tiger fans will also like *Flying Tigers Over Cambodia*; it is a well-written, exciting book.

**MAJ Herman Reinhold, USAF,
Yokota Air Base, Japan**

WAR AND NATURE: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to Silent Spring, Edmund Russell, Cambridge University Press, NY, 2001, 315 pages, \$54.95.

War and Nature is a history of chemical warfare and the "war on bugs." Parallels are drawn between the development of chemical weapons and insecticides. Direct lines are also drawn between such developments and the propaganda that justified them.

Author Edmund Russell's research draws on related literature and primary sources. The book is chronological, alternating between chemical weapons and insecticides, well written, and flows smoothly. A special attraction is Russell's inclusion of reproductions of war posters and insecticide advertisements that support his theory of total war as it pertains to chemical warfare and insecticides.

Russell gives the history of how the insecticide DDT was developed and used extensively during World War II. After the war it was used heavily in the civilian sector. During the war, the chemical's possible long-term effects received little consideration because of the drastic needs of the times. After the war, however,

these considerations became important because of the circumstances under which DDT was used. Findings regarding the adverse effects of chemical use support Russell's theme regarding the dangers of materials developed during war and their subsequent risk to the civilian world.

Overall, the book is well written and readable, and the author's theories are well supported. There is little doubt that the book has value for the defense community as part of military history.

CPL David Schepp, USA,
Fort Benning, Georgia

TRUST BUT VERIFY: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War, David T. Lindgren, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000, 248 pages, \$32.95.

David T. Lindgren's book, *Trust but Verify*, charts a concise but complete history of America's strategic surveillance capabilities. However, Lindgren has not simply brought to the forefront a historical record of what transpired, he dramatically illustrates numerous salient points. For example, he shows that in the early days of strategic surveillance, between 60 and 90 percent of all usable intelligence came from aerial photography. During that time, also, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's strict fiscal policy led indirectly to the development of sophisticated photo-reconnaissance systems. And, far from being a casualty-free Cold War, over 30 aircraft and 150 aircrewmembers were lost while performing their missions. The field of imagery analysis truly came of age at that time.

Technological changes and improvements were a direct result of the enormous demands for information placed on the intelligence community and the nation's leadership, which in turn, were brought about by the strategic threat the United States faced from strategic nuclear weapons. While certainly not a substitute for human eyes on the target, imagery capabilities that the U.S. possesses have literally drawn the curtain of secrecy away from the Soviet Union, demolished the myth of Soviet supremacy, and allowed for an accurate appraisal of potential enemies' armed forces. Perhaps the greatest benefit derived from these capabilities is the monitoring of compliance within the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). In all likelihood, without these capabilities, the earlier treaties would not have been signed or accepted.

If a professional military student wanted to read one book to gain an understanding of how imagery analysis and strategic reconnaissance systems came to be, this is the one I would highly recommend.

LTC Richard D. Koethe III, USA,
Millington, Tennessee

THE GREAT WAR AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, Jay

Winter, Geoffrey Parker, and Mary R. Habeck, eds., Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2000, 356 pages, \$30.00.

The advent of the end of the 20th century inspired historians to reflect on and reconsider World War I, which was the one event that most clearly shaped the 20th century. The

historical significance of the war is unquestionable, especially if one views World War II as a product of World War I.

With 80-plus years separating us from the cataclysmic events of 1914-1918, we might expect scholars to share a high degree of consensus about what happened and why. Yet, ironically, the Great War's effect on modern culture served to undermine such a consensus. As Modris Eksteins explains in the final essay of *The Great War and the Twentieth Century*, World War I exploded the unifying cultural power of history. No single version of history remains; there are only historians and their distinctive interpretations.

This collection of essays reflects the diverse and somewhat fractured nature of modern historiography. The contributors offer a variety of approaches ranging from Michael Howard's traditional argumentative essay on the meaning of the war to Leonard Smith's postmodernist analysis of soldier experience. The topics vary considerably as well and include cultural analysis by Eksteins, a survey of diplomatic history by Zara Steiner, an analysis of economic mobilization by Gerald Feldman, and a historiographical expose by Holger Herwig.

If the reader is not sufficiently jaded by the collection's diversity of approach and topic, he will be surprised by the occasionally contradictory conclusions the authors reach. Howard, for example, believes the sacrifices the Allies made were justified because victory by a Germany led by military strategist Erich Ludendorff would have meant "Germany and Europe would have been a much nastier place." William C. Fuller argues that a German victory in World War I might have prevented the rise of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. Whether one accepts his point or not, Fuller's essay on the Eastern Front is the most directly useful to the student of military history.

Fuller acknowledges the enduring influence of Norman Stone's book, *The Eastern Front, 1914-1917* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1976), while taking exception to several of Stone's conclusions. For instance, where Stone argues that

Field Manual Update

On 3 September 2002, Lieutenant General James C. Riley approved Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*. He selected the revised title to emphasize the Army's command and control concept—Mission Command. The manual will not be available online in the General Dennis J. Reimer Digital Library until the U.S. Army Publications Agency authenticates it.

Riley has also approved FM 3-06, *Urban Operations*; FM 3-07, *Stability and Support Operations*; and FM 3-13, *Information Operations Doctrine: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*. Field Manual 3-52, *A2C2 in the Combat Zone*, was published in August 2002 and is online at <www.adtdl.army.mil/atdls.htm>.

Tsarist Russia had overcome its problems with munitions production in the last months of 1915, Fuller finds that the critical shortages in heavy artillery shells dogged Russian military performance well into 1916.

Fuller also believes Russian generalship was not nearly as inept as has been portrayed by Stone and others. Russia's strategic dilemma, Fuller suggests, was the lack of meaningful territorial objectives in the theater of war (only the annexation of the Bosphorus Straits would truly benefit Russia, and that was out of reach).

Two articles present the soldier's experience, and depending on one's view of postmodernist interpretation, the reader will find the articles either enlightening or exasperating. In "Technology in the First World War: The View from Below," Mary Habeck argues that the lethal technology of Western Front outstripped the mind's faculty to handle it. The men in the trenches were driven to describe the "storm of steel" as either something demonic or as something akin to the forces of nature.

Leonard Smith suggests the historical record has been dominated by an overarching meta-narrative, an interpretive framework that portrays the war as a vast tragedy with individual soldiers as its victims. Smith believes historians should consider going beyond the meta-narrative of tragedy to consider alternative views, including ones that emphasize the comic or irrational nature of the war experience. Such an approach would offer insight derived from the post-modernist view of historical reality as changeable.

Challenging stuff. Indeed, the entire collection, with its diverse range of topics and approaches is challenging. Moreover, the authors assume their readers are fairly knowledgeable about the events and key figures of the war. For this reason, and because only a fraction of the book's 12 essays deal with military topics, the book might not appeal to a professional military audience. Nevertheless, the book will reward those who seek a broader view of how the Great War shaped the 20th century.

LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,
Retired, Lansing, Kansas

BLOOD: Stories of Life and Death from the Civil War, Peter Kadzis, ed., Adrenaline Books, NY, 2000, 360 pages, \$16.95.

Many scholars consider the American Civil War (or the War Between the States, depending on your position) as one of the most thoroughly chronicled wars in history. Great leaders, politicians, ordinary soldiers, and noncombatants wrote letters and diaries that describe the feelings and activities of that horrendous conflict.

In *Blood: Stories of Life and Death from the Civil War*, editor Peter Kadzis includes a broad cross-section of writings from the people and combatants the war affected. He includes the works of historians and novelists, whose writings many consider among the best—President Abraham Lincoln, General U.S. Grant, and Private Sam Watkins. We also eavesdrop on the thoughts of non-combatants, such as the poet Walt Whitman, a young Confederate girl, and a former slave. These selections provide glimpses into the period and the personal, physical, and emotional price those who lived it paid.

For the serious student, the book will not provide much in the way of new insight, but it provides entertainment and is an excellent book to read while waiting in airports or the like. The novice will find passages that serve as appetizers that create a hunger for more in-depth reading. Although some sections are long, repetitious, and tedious, overall the book is interesting in its coverage of the full spectrum of the conflict.

LTC David G. Rathgeber,
USMC, Retired, MCTSSA, Camp
Pendleton, California

FIGHTING FOR CANADA: Seven Battles, 1758-1945, Donald E. Graves, ed., Robin Brass Studio, Inc., Ontario, Canada. Distributed by Midpoint Books, NY, 2000, 446 pages, \$20.95.

Donald E. Graves is the author or the editor of several books on the Anglo-American War of 1812. He and the six authors showcased in *Fighting for Canada: Seven Battles, 1758-1945*, address several Canadian military engagements that occurred during the period from the Seven Years' War, which ended in 1763, to World War II, which ended

in 1945. Through combat narratives, they demonstrate that much can be learned from the study of mistakes that lead to defeat and actions done right that end in success.

The contributing authors are experienced historians who examine in explicit detail the weapons, unit preparedness, leadership abilities, operational processes, and order of battle of the forces engaged. The highlighted battles are interesting and insightful. The book's appendixes contain massive amounts of material that could assist in further research and historical review. I recommend this book to those who are serious devotees of the lessons-learned process of combat-operation analysis.

Richard Milligan,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CAPTIVITY, FLIGHT AND SURVIVAL IN WORLD WAR II, Alan J. Levine, Praeger Publishing, Westport, CT, 2000, 272 pages, \$67.50.

There is considerable material in the historical record of prisoners of war (POW) experiences and escapes during World War II. Images from the motion picture *The Great Escape* (Hollywood, CA: MGM Studios, 1963) and other accounts come quickly to mind. Unfortunately, these images successfully satisfy only one aspect of the historical record; they do not service the entire story.

Many personal stories, especially escapes from concentration camps, have been chronicled since 1945, but most lie in obscurity, unread. In Alan J. Levine's *Captivity, Flight and Survival in World War II*, the topic is successfully resurrected. Levin has researched extensively the historical record, and the result is this superb book.

Usually, the subject of escape in World War II is dealt with equally regarding military and civilian experiences. Clearly, escapes from concentration camps have much in common with escapes from Japanese POW camps or flights from early World War II theaters of war. Although some of Levin's accounts are tedious, many are riveting. They communicate suffering endured as well as the strength and ingenuity of individuals faced with dire odds.

Many of the personal accounts in this book have never before been published. For that reason alone this work is essential for anyone attempting to research the topic. For the nonmilitary researcher, the book has equal appeal. Escape as a topic is innately intriguing, and Levine's well-researched details provide interesting reading.

MAJ Ted J. Behncke, Sr., USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DUTY FAITHFULLY PERFORMED: Robert E. Lee and his Critics, John M. Taylor, Brassey's, Dulles, VA, 2000, 268 pages, \$18.95.

Duty Faithfully Performed: Robert E. Lee and His Critics is a useful, although brief, chronological history of Confederate General Robert E. Lee. The book, which covers Lee's entire life, is brief on purpose.

Taylor includes an index and provides several quotes from Lee on various subjects. The bibliography consists of only secondary sources, the footnotes are useful, and the endnotes adequate, but when discussing Lee's battles, the inclusion of maps would have helped the reader understand Lee's maneuvers.

I recommend this book, but only to those interested in what historians have said about Lee and on Lee's reflections on topics such as religion and virtue.

Lynn L. Sims, Ph.D., University of Richmond, Virginia

POGUE'S WAR: Diaries of a WWII Combat Historian, Forrest C. Pogue, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2001, 411 pages, \$29.95.

Forrest C. Pogue's paycheck was missing, so he sent a letter of inquiry. He recalls, "(T)hirty-two endorsements later the letter came back saying that I could not be paid again. One year after the check had been issued, I received a letter asking sternly why I hadn't cashed my check, so the army could clear its books. When I explained it was lost, I was asked why I hadn't said so before." That's Pogue's war.

His war also includes a Korean translator who ended up on permanent KP (kitchen duty) in the replacement depot in Europe; the officer who boated out to a ship to take a shower;

and officers eating off plates while grunts at the front were being griped at by supply personnel for using condoms at too great a rate—not for the usual purpose but to keep their rifles' firing mechanisms and barrels dry. But, mostly, Pogue's war was about keeping dry and warm and clean, same as any other GI.

Pogue's War is not really a rear-echelon view of the war with occasional vignettes of life at the front; it is more a near-front perspective (and there was a clear rear—with servants and all—within a month of D-Day). It is not combat, but closer to that than to the luxurious rear. Even when the front moved on and Pogue turned into a rear-echelon troop with daily bathing and laundry privileges, his war was nowhere near as posh as that enjoyed by the officers, and the visitors, and the big guys in the chateau.

Pogue was the first historian of D-Day, the biographer of General George C. Marshall, and one of the pioneers of oral history. A Ph.D. historian, Pogue joined the army late in the war, found himself in a newly formed combat history unit, went to England, and made it to Normandy shortly after D-Day. The purpose of the Army's history program was to capture the events while they were still fresh and to publish short works on specific aspects and a larger operational history of D-Day and after. Pogue and his colleagues built the program on the spot.

Pogue also kept notebooks full of short entries, which he intended at some point to expand into a full study of his war. Over the years he expanded many diary entries, and that effort became the bulk of this book. Unfortunately, by the time the book was almost finished, Pogue could not read his own writing because of severe macular degeneration. The entries for the four months after mid-January 1945 are his original diary notations. His nephew and the nephew's wife finished transcribing the notebooks and put them together with Pogue's developed narrative, but they could not finish what might have been an important work on the war. Pogue managed to create only 27 notes for the entire book.

This book is not the story Pogue would have fleshed out with elaborate explanatory footnotes if he could have, but it is the story that recaptures a pivotal period along with its dirt, grime, confusion, heroics, and hysterics. The book is worth reading just for Pogue's analysis of the million men ashore on 8 July 1944 that concludes that of that number, only 7,000 rifles were actually fired at the enemy.

Pogue was a master, and this book gives a taste of his mastery. Would that he had been able to finish.

John Barnhill, Ph.D., Yukon, Oklahoma

THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS, John J. Mearsheimer, W.W. Norton & Company, NY, 2001, 448 pages, \$27.95.

In *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, John J. Mearsheimer presents a convincing but troubling description of the nature of the international system and the behavior of regional great powers. Mearsheimer's thesis is that great powers behave according to certain "offensive realist" principles, which can be distilled from study of the history of great powers over the last two centuries.

Regardless of advances in technology, development of international organizations, or the increasing influence of economic associations, great powers will always pursue security. Security for a great power is best obtained through regional hegemony. In modern times, only the United States has achieved this coveted position, yet it is destined always to try to prevent a great power in another region from achieving it. Great powers are doomed (hence the tragedy mentioned in the title) to endless cycles of pursuing hegemony or preventing competing great powers from achieving hegemony. Mearsheimer warns great powers (especially the United States) that failure to realize the true nature of the international system will condemn them to ruin. Thus, offensive realism is not only descriptive, it is prescriptive.

Mearsheimer does not use mere assertion to prove the competitive nature of great power politics.

Instead, he takes the argumentative battle to his theoretical adversaries. In clear layman's prose, he describes—and takes apart—competing realist and liberalist international-relations theories. As a result of this book, Mearsheimer will likely become known as the main proponent of offensive realism in international thought.

Mearsheimer does an outstanding job of presenting and contrasting the tenets of offensive, defensive, and human nature realism. He does a less-thorough job of describing liberalist theories, but the work is not intended so much as a textbook as it is an overwhelming body of evidence to describe, prove, and expand on offensive-realist theory.

From all of the conflicts among great powers in Europe and Asia over the last two centuries, Mearsheimer has compiled research and distilled it into instructive charts to prove how combinations of population, wealth, and military power dictate relationships among great powers. He presents the importance of geography in great power relationships by describing how relative position would predict great power actions in a given circumstance. He then proves (with convincing use of history) how great powers did, indeed, behave as offensive realist theory might predict. Mearsheimer codifies great power maneuvers against each other into useful terms, such as bandwagoning, appeasement, buck-passing, and balancing, to describe and predict how great powers behave.

After this convincing analysis has finally won over—or disconcerted—the reader as to the nature of great power politics, Mearsheimer takes the reader further in his sobering clarification of world affairs by predicting how offensive realism dictates the course of the next several decades. Considerations of the possible courses that Germany, Japan, Russia, the United States, and China could take will certainly disturb those with liberalist and commonly accepted understandings of the international order. Those who believe that an accurate description of the future lies in Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1993) will

be particularly distressed by Mearsheimer's predictions. Those concerned about the looming *Future Shock* (Alvin Toffler, Bantam Books, New York, 1991); *The Clash of Civilizations?* (Samuel P. Huntington, Touchstone Books, New York, 1998); or *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War* (Robert D. Kaplan, Vintage Books, New York, 2001) might be reassured by Mearsheimer's argument that reports of the death of the nation-state system have been "greatly exaggerated."

MAJ Donald F. Gentles, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE HIDDEN HAND: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, Richard J. Aldrich, John Murray, London, 2001, 733 pages, \$25.00.

To the serious student of the Cold War, intelligence or Anglo-American relations often project the image of cheerful cooperation. The period following the end of World War II until the changes in Russia in 1991 is often believed to be one when Britain and America cooperated and coordinated their activities in congenial fashion. Many biographies and studies might lead you to believe that all went smoothly. The story is quite different from Richard J. Aldrich's view.

Aldrich is a serious student of the intelligence community in Great Britain. His previous work, *Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) shows that many divisions existed between the Allies then. *The Hidden Hand* continues Aldrich's theme and shows the various ways of viewing threats, devising means of addressing threats, and the general collection of intelligence that did not always end up in a happy marriage between "cousins." In fact, serious differences extended into many areas, but none were so crucial as the proposed employment of nuclear warfare.

The passage of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act prohibited the Americans from sharing research with the Allies. Britain's slow response regarding the Klaus Fuchs' espionage case did not make matters easier. The U.S. Air Force acted as if dropping the bomb

solved all problems. The Royal Air Force developed its own atomic-strike capability, but Britain's policies differed from the Americans'.

Tension existed in other areas as well. During World War II, the British believed that U.S. personnel undermined their rule in the Empire. This belief continued after the war. As Britain eventually let go of the Empire, the Americans were there to replace them. British policies for handling tensions and gathering intelligence, caused by nationalistic urges, tended to exclude the Americans. One bright shining was the British success in Malaya and the possible application in Vietnam of British techniques by U.S. forces, but policies toward the colonies continued to split the Allies.

Of particular aggravation were U.S. and U.K. attitudes toward Egyptian Colonel Gamal Nasser. The Americans were comfortable with Nasser and believed they understood him. In fact, the CIA recruited him as an agent. In contrast, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden's dislike of Nasser was shared throughout the British establishment, including the intelligence community. So, tensions on handling matters such as the nationalization of the Suez Canal and growing Soviet influence in the British areas of influence in the Middle East put the Americans and the British at odds.

Aldrich's book suffers from a major problem prevalent in all attempts to address the issue of British intelligence in general and Britain-American intelligence in particular: in Britain it is difficult to obtain original documents. The United States is quite open, and Aldrich makes good use of available records, but the mainstays of his research are personal papers and secondary sources available in Britain. Still, the story will be the same even as other documents become available.

The usefulness of Aldrich's book for the student of intelligence and military matters is in understanding that Allies need to quickly find where they agree and clarify where they disagree that can hinder later cooperation. Anyone contemplating coalition work should read this book.

Peter Charles Unsinger, San Jose State University, California