

A Joint Context for Training at the Combat Training Centers

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The lesson of this war [Afghanistan] is that effectiveness in combat will depend heavily on jointness and how well the different branches of the military can communicate and coordinate their efforts on the battlefield. . . . Achieving jointness in wartime requires building that jointness in peacetime. We need to train like we fight and fight like we train and, too often, we don't.

—Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld¹

THE COMBAT Training Center (CTC) Program has been an engine of change and a culture driver in the Army since its inception. This revolutionary shift in the collective training strategy has matured over the past 23 years with new training support technology; expanding to brigade combat team (BCT) rotations; adding reception, staging, onward movement, and integration into the CTC experience; and refining techniques for an effective after-action review (AAR).

Within the past 3 years, adapting a contemporary operational environment (COE) as a standard condition at the CTCs has been another evolutionary shift, along with a freethinking, capabilities-based opposing force (OPFOR) that is quite different from a predictable Cold War training threat. The CTC program's evolution has generated a level of training superiority unmatched by any other army and has been credited for the successes achieved in operational missions. Both allies and potential adversaries have tried to copy the program. We must continue to evolve the CTCs to retain training superiority.

A training-transformation (T2) effort across the Department of Defense (DOD) is driving the next evolution in the CTC program. The Army has long acknowledged the combat potential gained by fighting as part of a combined arms team and has drilled

collective warfighting skills at the CTCs. The Army's shift to modular units drives its training strategy to include a joint context in key training events so Army formations can rapidly contribute to the joint team.

DOD's T2 strategy acknowledges that to achieve success on future battlefields we must fight as part of a joint team. The DOD T2 strategy expands beyond interoperability issues and deconflicting service operations, providing training guidance and specific programs to achieve joint interdependence down to the lowest tactical levels, while changing the concept of what we have historically understood as "joint."

The strategic plan for transforming DOD training states that "[t]he focus of [DOD] Training Transformation is to better enable joint operations in the future, where 'joint' has a broader context than the traditional military definition of the term. [DOD] must be able to plan, coordinate, and synchronize its actions across the full spectrum of service, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations."²

This white paper establishes a framework for analysis and discussion on continuing the CTC program's evolution with a joint context for training at the CTCs. Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Peter J. Schoomaker's guidance to the CTC/Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) focus area task force was clear: "Rescope the CTC program to train in a joint context."³ This condition must be present at the maneuver CTCs and in the BCTP Brigade Command and Battle Staff Training constructive simulation and applied to the tactical unit's rotational experience just as we have applied the COE.

The physical presence of joint, interagency, or multinational (JIM) participants in a CTC rotation is

within the revised scope of the CTC program and will help create a joint context. We must recognize, however, that because of operational missions and scheduling conflicts, full JIM participation, in the physical sense, will not be routine. Our effort to establish a joint context at the CTCs must identify the specific joint *effects* we want the rotational training unit to experience and influence, regardless of JIM participation.

Through live-virtual-constructive (L-V-C) training integration, coupled with exercise design and control (EXCON), the CTCs apply the effects as conditions in the training scenario. CTCs should inject the effects at specific points in the rotation to facilitate leader and unit joint cognizance and drive the learning objectives with OPFOR activity. As observer-controllers develop their AAR topics, they should highlight joint issues and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to increase the level of joint competence.

Defining Joint Context

The Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), the centerpiece DOD T2 program, is designed to increase joint warfighting proficiency. This integrated global network of L-V-C training enablers will create a seamless environment to support a broad range of joint and service training requirements. Modeled after the Army's CTC program, JNTC identifies the elements of joint context that enhance service training and core competencies. U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), as the DOD propo-

nent for JNTC, will adjust these elements of joint context to specific joint tasks and objectives in a JNTC event as follows:

- Appropriate mix of L-V-C forces required to accomplish joint training objectives.
- Realistic joint command and control (C2) tailored to meet joint training requirements.
- OPFOR tailored to meet joint training requirements to include planning, integration, and C2.
- Scenario that supports joint training objectives/joint tasks.
- Ability to provide timely feedback on joint task performance based on common ground truth.
- Use of joint doctrine and TTP.
- An event control group that supports accomplishment of joint training objectives/joint tasks.
- Pre-event joint task training in support of selected joint training objectives.
- Appropriate observer-trainer and senior mentor support.

JFCOM's elements of joint context provide a list of capabilities and characteristics required to accredit any training event as a participant in an overarching JNTC-enhanced event. Most of these elements are technical or procedural for exercise control and for establishing a joint C2 structure. Vertical and integrated JNTC events will bring a greater level of joint context because joint headquarters and staffs will actually participate in the event. Following the CSA's guidance to "nest" the CTC program with JNTC, each CTC should possess these capabilities and characteristics. CTC annual training calendars

Restated Mission and Essential Tasks

Develop a strategy to refocus the roles and missions of the CTCs under conditions of a realistic joint, interagency, or multinational (JIM) / joint operational environment (JOE) to produce decisive, self-aware, adaptive units and leaders.

- Develop self-aware and adaptive leaders for full-spectrum JIM operations.
- Integrate COE/JOE training environments into the CTCs.
- Recommend strategies focused on execution of simultaneous, noncontiguous, distributed, and continuous full-spectrum operations in a JIM context.

The Way Ahead

Mission: Develop a strategy to refocus the roles and missions of the CTCs under conditions of a realistic JIM / JOE to produce decisive, self-aware, adaptive units and leaders.

- CTCs have made great progress to date in adjusting scenarios and opposing forces to replicate the contemporary operating environment.
- We have a program that makes sense. Joint is the direction.
- Allow approved recommendations to compete for additional resources.



Soldiers watch for movement of enemy forces during a field training exercise.

U.S. Army

recognize that few rotations will be linked to a JNTC event, and JNTC might narrow the focus of joint context to a specific joint tactical task or joint training objective. However, each CTC must provide joint context across all battlefield operating systems regardless of any link to a JNTC event.

The 2003 draft of DOD's *A Strategy for Joint Training* explains that joint context includes joint C2 architectures above the functional component and/or tactical forces, using real-world command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities.⁴ Our historical relationship between a BCT and a division headquarters has mitigated the need to train in a joint context at the CTCs. That relationship has also evolved. The doctrinal concepts for a modular unit of action (UA) will employ future BCTs in a joint environment and require them to have the C4ISR connectivity to a division that might be acting as a joint task force (JTF) or be directly connected to higher levels in the joint C2 structure.

Important to note is that creating a joint context for tactical operations at the CTCs is not intended to dictate joint training objectives or create a JTF headquarters training opportunity. The BCT's capstone collective training event should replicate these C4ISR relationships so leaders, soldiers, and

units are ready to operate in a JIM environment. Still, establishing a joint context for training goes beyond establishing the joint C4ISR structure around an Army exercise.

The working draft of "Serving a Nation at War—A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset" describes five key interdependencies between the Army and the joint team.⁵ The CTCs must establish the right conditions in each of these areas to build on these interdependent relationships and foster the understanding that operating jointly implies that the battlespace will be shared among members of the joint team.


Joint Battle Command

(Joint Publication [JP] 6-02, *Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems*)⁶

The joint force command, control, communication, and computer (C4) structure will allow commanders to "pull" information from theater- and national-level information sources, establish a common operational picture (COP) of the joint area of responsibility (AOR), and see the relationship between JIM team members. This top-down network includes the protocols and standards for joint C4 interoperability and information management. Spe-

Combat Training Center Operations

Future CTC rotations include simulations and transitional events across the full spectrum of conflict . . . all within a joint, interagency, and multinational context.



Commander's assessment and nature of mission dictates proportion and relationship of the types of military action.

CTC – combat training center; DEF – defense; KFOR – Kosovo Force; MRE/MRX – mission rehearsal exercise; OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom; OFF – offensive; OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom; SFOR – stabilization force; STAB – stabilization; SPT – support

cial considerations are needed for interagency and multinational battle command integration.

The Battle Command System (BCS) for modular brigades will enable these UAs to rapidly integrate with the joint C4 architecture and will facilitate all joint interdependencies. The BCS will be a network operating in a secure, distributed, collaborative environment using standard software and equipment and will provide the science to enable the art of leadership and decisionmaking while facilitating situational understanding. Although the technical aspects of C4 connectivity and simulation wrap-around are essential for battle command, there are additional measures that can establish a joint context for training at the tactical level, as seen in the following examples:

- CTC scenario has the BCT working directly for a unit of employment X (UEX) or a JTF headquarters rather than a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command common scenario unit (52d Mechanized, 21st Infantry Division [Light], 10th Corps).

- CTC scenarios “cycle” modular BCTs into the rotation with a relief in place (under pressure) of the previous training unit, rather than starting

with a prewar scenario.

- CTC higher headquarters control cell (HICON) provides the BCT with a standing joint task force (SJTF) standard operating procedures (SOP) for reports, information management, and battle rhythm. If the BCT/UA is conducting a mission rehearsal or readiness exercise in preparation for a known deployment, the CTC HICON should issue the actual deployment higher headquarters’ SOP to the training BCT/UA.

- CTC has the capability to provide a relevant, joint wraparound COP that can simulate or stimulate data in the BCT’s BCS. Information requirements include friendly locations (including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]; fire support; and air defense sensors, enemy information, joint graphic control measures, joint information data bases, joint text messaging).

- CTC replicates print or broadcast media outlets (domestic or foreign) in support of training unit information operations (IO). These outlets should have a positive or negative influence on a unit’s IO plan, and the OPFOR can use them for counter IO. BCT establishes 360-degree communication with or

exchanges liaison officers (LNOs) between JIM team members.

- BCT directed to provide security or support to interagency sites or operations.

- Known or unknown JIM operations within the BCT AOR affect or provide support to the BCT's operations.

- BCT leaders and staff understand the roles, missions, capabilities, and potential friction points among JIM team members.

ISR is a critical subset of joint battle command at the tactical level. The joint ISR structure integrates strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence operations in support of the joint force commander and subordinate force commander priorities and requirements. CTCs must balance the need to provide actionable intelligence in support of training objectives against any expectation of perfect intelligence. Simulated and stimulated intelligence products from joint ISR systems must be realistic presentations reflective of a thinking adversary who works hard to avoid detection. The context for joint ISR in a maneuver BCT's CTC experience can include the following:

- BCT commander and staff understand the joint ISR environment, its content, and available products and must pull information from these resources to support their own intelligence requirements.

- Provide reasonable intelligence products (imagery, human, signal and measurement and signature intelligence) from strategic, operational, or adjacent tactical unit sources.

- BCT receives limited unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) feeds in support of their operations.

- BCT receives specified ISR task in support of joint ISR requirements.

- Interagency role players in the BCT area of operations (AO) provide information or request intelligence products from the BCT (with varying levels of cooperation).

- BCT is tasked with specified missions in support of JIM ISR operations in the BCT AO.

Joint Fires

(JP3-09, *Fire Support*)⁷

Joint fire support, the synergistic product of three subsystems (target acquisition, C2, and attack resources) links weapons effects to land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces (SOF) movement, maneuver, and control of territory, populations, and key waters. The lethal and nonlethal effects from joint fires are integrated with the supported force's fire and maneuver to achieve a synergistic application of combat power and can

be delivered by air, land, naval, SOF, and space assets.

Lethal weapons effects include those from naval surface fire support, indirect fire support, maneuver operations, SOF direct-action operations, air operations, and even nuclear weapons. Nonlethal-weapons effects include those from electronic warfare (EW); certain psychological operations; some IO, such as disrupting the enemy's information networks; and the use of special-effects munitions such as illumination, smoke, or incapacitating agents. Within their AO, land-force commanders synchronize joint fires with maneuver and have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing.

At the tactical level, maneuver BCT commanders and staffs will not normally participate directly in the joint targeting process, but they can reap the benefits of such fires via appropriate nomination and monitoring. The BCT must understand the process and products in order to influence the allocation of joint fires to receive the greatest effect on the targets they nominate. Besides establishing connectivity between the tactical and joint fire support C4 systems, other measures and effects are needed to develop a joint context for training and to ensure the soldier has all assets at his disposal during battle. Examples include the following:

- BCT understands the air tasking order process and timeline and can influence the process to synchronize the allocation of close air support (CAS) with their maneuver plan.

- BCT fire-support system is populated with joint airspace and fire support control measures.

- BCT is tasked to provide fire support to SOF operating within or near the BCT AO.

- BCT fire-support assets are dedicated to executing joint suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions for limited periods, requiring adaptive synchronization.

- BCT is tasked to provide assets for target acquisition in support of a joint force commander's target within the BCT AO.

- Emphasis is on enlisted tactical air controllers and tactical air control party employment as the key to CAS integration.

- Provide supporting fires from joint assets (lethal and nonlethal) in support of the BCT scheme of fires.

- Provide immediate CAS at specific opportunities from Air Force, Navy, Marine, or multinational air assets.

- Interagency activity in the BCT AO generates restrictive fire control measures or procedures.



Soldiers plot a fire mission during a night exercise at Baghdad International Airport.

US Army

Joint Air and Missile Defense

(JP 3-01, *Counterair*)⁸

The purpose of joint counterair operations is to attain a degree of air superiority to allow freedom of action and to protect the force. Joint counterair missions might employ aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, artillery, SOF, or IO against a variety of threats. Offensive measures attempt to dominate enemy airspace and prevent the launch of air threats, while defensive counterair attempts to defeat the threat after launch. Key C2 nodes in this effort include, but are not limited to, the Air Operations Center, the Air Force Control and Reporting Center, the Marine Corps Tactical Air Operations Center, the Navy AEGIS Control Information Center, and the Army Air and Missile Defense (AMD) Task Force (TF) headquarters. AMD TFs are modular and tailorable units that can support a BCT with active AMD measures to protect the force. AMD TFs are also linked to a joint identification engagement authority and can assist in airspace management.

Tactical training at CTCs might include offensive counterair operations (raids, SEAD, EW), if the unit lists those operations as part of their training objectives. The joint air and missile defense-training context at the CTCs should include active and passive

defensive counterair measures. Besides establishing connectivity to the air and missile defense C4ISR network, there are other measures to effectively replicate this to create interdependency. Examples include the following:

- CTC replicates the AMD TF headquarters and populates the BCT's Air and Missile Defense Workstation with airspace control measures and operational information.

- JTF HICON operations order (OPORD) or fragmentary order restricts aircraft engagement authority for certain periods.

- JTF HICON OPORD directs specific identification, friend or foe, procedures.

- BCT understands the AMD TF's active and passive support capabilities in the BCT AO and their ability to provide situational awareness and airspace management.

- BCT integrates air defense assets into the AMD TF and the joint defensive counterair plan.

- BCT is linked to and receives timely early warning on ballistic missile, UAV, cruise missile, and asymmetric attacks on BCT high-value assets.

- BCT maintains a COP (through CTC wrap-around) of enemy air and missile activity in adjacent unit areas. If BCT does not increase protective measures, they also receive attacks.

- BCT is tasked to provide air defense coverage to critical joint assets in or near the BCT AO.
- BCT is tasked to provide route security or force protection for Patriot units operating in the BCT AO.
- Joint and/or AMD TF assets reinforce BCT assets in the reception and staging areas and at certain decisive points in the rotation.

Joint Logistics

(JP 4-0, *Logistics Support*)⁹

Joint logistics is a rapidly changing area in both organization and execution. Currently, the regional combatant commander (RCC) level plans and monitors joint logistics, but service components execute it. Joint logistics functions include supply distribution, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services, and other services. The RCC retains the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders and shift logistic resources within the theater. Each service is responsible for accomplishing RCC-specified tasks and supporting their own forces unless the support is specifically tasked through assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing support directives and agreements.

At the maneuver BCT level, joint logistics do not radically alter the standard methods of combat service support (CSS). BCTs will still rely on their habitually associated CSS unit for logistics, even when division or corps support command structures transform into Army expeditionary support commands. Besides establishing connectivity between BCT CSS and joint logistics C4 structures, there are other effects that can help develop end-to-end logistical interdependencies. We must continue to monitor the changes in joint logistics and replicate emerging opportunities to establish the right joint context for training. Examples include the following:

- BCT is required to coordinate with JIM-sponsored and/or contractor-provided support in the CTC reception and staging areas (intermediary staging or forward operating base operations, Force Provider, Harvest Eagle/Falcon) and within the BCT AO.
- Training unit is under the provisions a SJTF SOP for logistics reports, management, and execution.
- Training unit receives support from a joint or multinational logistics organization.
- Training unit logisticians and leaders understand and interact with the joint logistics centers, offices, and boards for CSS planning and execution.
- Training unit must provide contracting officers to receive essential services from the support area or within their AOR from host-nation assets.

□ Interagency and private organizations request logistical support from the BCT.

□ BCT is tasked to manage or provide common-user logistics (maintenance, medical, salvage, mortuary affairs, transportation, Class I, and so on) to other JIM team members or go to other joint CSS units for support.

□ BCT is required to coordinate with contractors or host-nation agencies for logistics support.

Joint Force Projection

(JP 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations* and JP 4-01-2, *Sealift Support*)¹⁰

U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has the mission to provide strategic common-user, air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, support, and redeploy forces in support of combatant commander requirements. USTRANSCOM normally retains control of intra-theater lift assets and serves as the single manager for common-user port operations. JFCOM's joint deployment, employment, and sustainment project is also rapidly changing this interdependent relationship.

For maneuver BCT training at a CTC, strategic-force projection might be outside the scope of joint context capabilities. CTCs could support limited strategic lift from home station to the CTC, with a "fight off the ramp" scenario at company or platoon levels. Intra-theater lift is the more feasible context at the CTCs, but it still requires physical JIM transportation assets to participate in the rotation. This might be difficult to coordinate given scarce resources; however, the CTCs can still adjust their operations to replicate realistic force-projection effects and train in a joint context. Examples include the following:

□ Replicate Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, Military Traffic Management Command, defense contractors, or host-nation support offices and coordination points in the CTC reception and staging areas.

□ Provide resupply from joint intra-theater assets (precision aerial guided Global Positioning System heavy drop or sling load) and combat configured loads directly from depot-level resources.

Joint SOF Integration at the CTCs

Although this is not a specified interdependency in the joint and expeditionary mindset white paper, SOF integration with conventional forces at the tactical level of war and sharing the battlespace have increased the need to train this relationship at the CTCs. While joint doctrine normally employs these highly capable assets in a compart-

mentalized joint special operations task force, Operations Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom experiences and lessons learned have driven a more integrated relationship between conventional units and SOF and might signal changes in joint doctrine. As with joint participation, operational requirements often limit SOF participation at the CTCs. The CTCs can, however, still create full SOF integration effects for training throughout the entire rotational period. Examples include the following:

- BCT is required to create a flexible, responsive C2 relationship with SOF operating in the BCT battlespace for short periods.
- CTC scenario includes covert and overt joint SOF activity in and around the BCT, creating coordination requirements for converging forces.
- Scenario includes SOF acting as advisers to coalition, host-nation, or irregular forces in the BCT area.
- SOF units under tactical control (TACON) to the BCT or BCT units TACON to SOF for short periods to execute time-sensitive targets.
- BCT is tasked to provide a reaction force to assist SOF in the zone of action and is required to effect appropriate coordination.
- BCT and SOF units exchange valuable/actionable intelligence, which answers priority intelligence requirements and affects BCT courses of action.
- BCT establishes contact or exchanges LNOs with the joint SOF team.
- Directed no-fire areas around SOF Operational Detachment (ODA) A or SOF time-sensi-

tive target missions in the BCT rear area.

- BCT coordinates aviation operations in support of joint SOF requirements.
- BCT is directed to provide security or logistical support to SOF ODA during operations or at a forward operating base. Support should include Class I and III(b) forecasting and distribution and medical evacuation.
- Unanticipated SOF aircraft enter the BCT AO.
- SOF operations within the BCT area that affect or provide support to BCT operations.
- BCT commander and staff understand the capabilities of joint SOF teams and can integrate SOF operations into conventional operations.

The Future

The Army will organize, equip, train, and sustain its first modular BCTs by the end of fiscal year 2004. The CTCs are directly involved in ensuring these UAs are a relevant and *ready now* land power for the combatant commander and in preparing them to operate as decisive members of the joint team. Work on the effort to establish a joint context for training at the CTCs has begun.

CTC EXCON and HICON cell adjustments and a more extensive L-V-C wraparound can realistically replicate many of the desired conditions and effects. Still, we must continue to develop this concept through discussion, innovation, sharing ideas, and leveraging the initial JNTC experiences. The CTC program continues to evolve, but its role as a culture driver and engine of change remains steady. **MR**

NOTES

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 2. Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training," memorandum, Washington, D.C., 10 June 2002, on-line at <www.t2net.org/StrategicPlanMemo_061002.pdf>, accessed 28 July 2004.
 3. Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, address to the CTC/BCTP Focus Area Task Force. See Gary Sheftick, "Focus TF linking joint virtual training to 'box,'" Army Chief of Staff Focus Series, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, on-line at <http://Carlisle-www.army.mil/banner/focus.htm>, accessed 28 July 2004.

4. U.S. Department of Defense, "A Strategy for Joint Training," Washington, D.C., draft.
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 6. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 6-02, *Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1 October 1996).
 7. JCS, JP 3-09, *Fire Support* (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1988).
 8. JCS, JP 3-01, *Counterair* (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1989).
 9. JCS, JP 4-0, *Logistics Support* (Washington, DC: GPO, April 2000).
 10. JCS, JP 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, August 2001), and JP 4-01-2, *Sealift Support* (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1998).

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