

Developing Agile, Adaptive Soldiers

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REMEMBER standing on a hill at the National Training Center watching digitally-equipped fighting units become significantly delayed at the breach point of an opposing force (OPFOR) obstacle. Others around me were surprised: “How could they get delayed? They have excellent situational awareness and the latest equipment?” In truth, they did have new equipment, but they lacked the time needed to develop the nonmateriel or human dimensions of change they needed for success.

As the Army rapidly goes through the Army Transformation process, the majority of effort has been concentrated on equipment and materiel in the conversion to an Interim Force. While successfully fielding thousands of pieces of new equipment is important, the nonmateriel changes in doctrine; training methodologies; leader and soldier development; and institutional adaptation are equally essential and much tougher to change. That materiel changes will only get the Army so far is obvious. However, human dimensions of change can lead to a complete Transformation and a truly agile, adaptive force ready to fight and win in any conflict. For the Stryker Force to address the critical nonmateriel aspects of Transformation is essential to preparing successfully for operations across the full spectrum of conflict and to enable the Objective Force to be successful in the future.

The world has changed, and the U.S. Army is transforming just in time. Gone are the days of a predictable enemy who will allow U.S. intelligence personnel to distribute a common template of threat doctrine. The Army now faces an incredible variety of potential threats. The enemy has become more adaptive and capable of exploiting any weakness they find. Several aspects of the contemporary operating environment (COE) challenge the Army to adapt to meet the threat adequately.

Technology is readily available to adversaries, and they will use it to exploit weaknesses. The immense variety of environments in which the Army could find itself requires a flexible force prepared to re-

spond to incidents within America as well as operations in remote countries. The overwhelming certainty in any COE is that soldiers and leaders must possess incredible flexibility with which to respond to any threat.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of transitioning effectively to the future is to realize the need for change. Current methods have been successful, so why change now? Just as force structure must adapt to keep up with the rapidly changing world, the human dimensions of change must also adapt. The threat is adapting, so the Army must also adapt or face an enemy who is one step ahead. Of course, the Army should not abandon successful methods that have led to success. Rather, it must build on fundamentals and continue to improve. As U.S. Army General Gordon R. Sullivan has said, “The Interim force is the catalyst for the nonmateriel aspects of change—doctrine, training methodologies, leader and soldier development, and organizational adaptation. Addressing these human dimensions of change is setting the conditions for a faster transition to the Objective Force.”¹

The Agile Training Mindset

The U.S. Army is the best army in the world when it comes to conducting tough, demanding, realistic training. The Army’s tactical, technical, and physical aspects of training the force are absolutely superb and the envy of nations worldwide. The ability to be self-critical, analytical, and to focus on critical lessons during after-action reviews has led to having highly trained soldiers throughout the Army. The Army must sustain this critical process.

To succeed in the future, however, the Army must build on a solid training mindset and develop soldiers’ agility and adaptability by focusing on training events that require creative solutions and an ability to focus and concentrate on the important points at hand. Training events must challenge soldiers to be flexible and to adapt to a thinking, flexible enemy. By developing training events that replicate an agile

enemy, leaders can train focused, confident soldiers.

Agility is the ability to move and adjust quickly and easily. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, states, “Agile commanders, both mentally and physically, quickly comprehend unfamiliar situations, creatively apply doctrine, and make timely decisions.”² Training soldiers to be agile requires concentrating on cognitive skills while stressing fundamentals. With proper training, soldiers can improve

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their focus, concentration skills, many other cognitive skills, such as visualization, and the basic warrior ethos. Soldiers must become capable of taking charge one to two levels up and on focusing on the critical task at hand despite a plethora of distractions. To succeed in future conflicts, the Army must strive to attain the “next level—agile training mindset” while maintaining solid training fundamentals and while challenging soldiers by emphasizing cognitive skills through adaptive training scenarios.

While training soldiers to have an agile training mindset, leaders must understand that training should not come at the expense of the solid training fundamentals that have served the Army so effectively. Developing agile, adaptive soldiers requires the same concentration on key fundamentals, but leaders must make the training events more realistic in COE terms. For example, when teaching basic marksmanship, the entire event should be a training event, including convoy movement to the range, the range exercises themselves, and the convoy movement from the range. To replicate realistic conditions in a combat scenario, an artillery battery should set up howitzers and conduct simulated fire missions before conducting marksmanship training. While moving to the range, trainers could expose a unit to many challenging scenarios—nuclear, biological, and chemical simulations; human intelligence play; leader casualties; OPFOR ambushes; and so on. Doing so would turn a routine event into a training event to develop agile soldiers.

Developing agile, adaptive soldiers requires trainers to take individuals out of their comfort zones and force them to develop creative solutions to problems. Such training must occur while training the funda-

mentals, not separately from the training event, to ensure that soldiers and leaders are training in a similar environment to that in which they will operate in future conflicts. One superb example of this is of a unit moving to the field for training. On the morning of the deployment, trainers inform all officers they will be moving to the field separately from the vehicles and soldiers. During most of the movement, the officers will be challenged with scenarios ranging from a simulated helicopter crash to a link-up operation with partisan forces. Meanwhile, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) move the unit to the field and, in a realistic environment, begin combat operations, having soldiers serve one or two levels above their grades. In this way, agile-leader training is the result of what could have been a routine event.

Another training scenario that would help develop agile soldiers is a concept the brigade’s human intelligence (HUMINT) personnel might develop. HUMINT training often involves complicated scenarios that require extensive preparations so actors can gain adequate training in the many required skills. Events can take months to plan but might result in only a few quality training events for an entire year. One solution is to develop a permanent scenario that would allow HUMINT personnel to continue to work the same scenario over an entire year yet provide valid feedback and quality critiques by trained personnel. In a garrison environment, HUMINT personnel could work through each challenging situation, with unlimited opportunities to improve skills.

The Stryker brigade applies this same concept within home-station training. The scenario they use enables trainers from all specialties, from squad through brigade, to obtain products on a brigadewide scenario used for all training events. Units can then practice—

- Common rules of engagement.
- Logistic operations in a realistic environment.
- Realistic OPFOR interaction (because trainers can script roles in advance).
- More realistic use of Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) products, such as terrain products, tactical unmanned aerial vehicle photographs, Prophet signals intercepts, digital information flow, and so on, which can be developed in advance of any training event.

Units could then train in a more realistic environment to develop soldiers who are agile, adaptive, and able to respond to the many challenges requiring creative solutions. The training’s quality and realism would provide more opportunities to develop soldiers and leaders who are more comfortable in ambiguous situations and can function outside of their comfort zones.



Attack aviation responds to the ambush of a 101st Airborne Division convoy, 2 April 2003.

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Stryker Force Training Changes

Interim Force training changes occur in all aspects of operations, including those in the following paragraphs.

Initiative. One of the most significant changes resulting from the Stryker Force's digital capability and improved situational understanding is the amount of information available to the soldier. Increased amounts of information are essential in developing and maintaining a thorough situational understanding of the area of conflict. Incorporating increased amounts of information requires an adjustment to the training of junior-leader initiative. Increased amounts of information can affect the entire unit's initiative, including its leaders'.

Exercising initiative is relatively simple when there are only a few pieces of information available and the probability of additional information reaching the unit is limited. Many at lower levels receive more information than they can adequately sort and analyze, which can significantly affect initiative. This informational shift requires trainers to teach initiative differently. Receiving copious amounts of information can overwhelm soldiers, so they must be trained to determine and select the most critical items and to then act on them in a timely manner. Soldiers will

learn to make critical decisions and will gain confidence from the fact that they will not be second-guessed by higher level leaders. Higher level organizations have an increased capability to micromanage their subordinates and stifle initiative by using digital or new tactical systems. Training must allow subordinates to work multiechelon operations and sort through significant amounts of information before using their initiative. Subordinates need to experience the trust of their higher headquarters, or their initiative will be stifled completely.

The full-spectrum conflict. The Stryker Force will be trained for the full-spectrum conflict in a train, alert, deploy mode to enable timely, rapid use of Army assets. Forces will not have a cushion of time, as they have had in the past, during the alert, train, deploy stage. There will just not be enough time to allow a delay in arriving in theater.

The requirement to train the full spectrum of operations mandates several critical training adjustments from past methods of training. Units must determine their most dangerous and difficult tasks and prioritize training to ensure those tasks receive the training emphasis they demand. The natural tendency will be to do many tasks to a lower standard, when in fact, units should train fewer

tasks to a higher standard.

Given the complexity of the organization, the training must be multiechelon. A platoon needs products from company, battalion, and brigade to train the way they will fight. If the platoon is making decisions with only limited information, they will not be adequately prepared for the significant information available

In the past, the Army relegated leader training, which was often not professionally challenging to all involved, to second place to other events. This will not work for the Stryker Force. Leader training must challenge individuals and develop the expertise they need to fight an agile, adaptive foe. Training should focus on training leaders to be able to function two levels up.

when higher headquarters uses a multitude of assets and digital systems. A focus on the discipline required to perform difficult tasks ensures that the unit can quickly scale down to a less-demanding situation. Attempting to train more events for the full spectrum of operations will only result in many poor quality events performed to a lower standard. Performing fewer events with more complexity and ensuring multiechelon training to maximize preparation time will increase the unit's chance of winning in future conflicts.

The noncontiguous battlefield. The Stryker Force is designed to maximize its potential by being able to fight dispersed on a noncontiguous battlefield. This adjustment away from the traditional linear battlefield mandates significant training changes to effectively prepare soldiers for future operations. All soldiers must be trained to an increased level of proficiency because of the possible dispersed nature of future fights. Soldiers from all military occupational specialties might find themselves in harm's way.

Combat support and combat service support personnel will need to train to higher levels of proficiency in basic soldier skills and will benefit significantly from receiving advanced training in areas such as marksmanship skills. The challenge with the increased training requirements is a decrease in available training time. Digital equipment requires training and continuous use to maintain efficiency. Also, many support specialties are required to do more with fewer people to maximize the fighting units' tooth-to-tail ratio.

The training solution to such challenges has been to adopt a train-the-trainer concept, with the support of specialty NCOs. The unit can maintain the support required and train selected NCOs in critical

battle tasks for the noncontiguous battlefield, such as by focusing on increasing the skills of selected individuals, who can then inculcate the entire unit with an increased level of training proficiency. Developing a noninfantry advanced marksmanship course is one example of a training method that could be used to focus on support specialties. The course would train critical skills quickly without significantly affecting the entire unit. Many training methods will work to enhance soldiers' skills; the important point is for leaders to realize the need for these required changes and for them to place emphasis in this area.

Empowerment. Junior leaders must be empowered to plan and execute more training events on their own. The system of centralized planning and decentralized execution has been effective for many years. The Army has slowly gravitated to a system that supports centralized planning and execution for incorporating training efficiencies and for ensuring that junior leaders train for the proper tasks. The Army must encourage junior leaders to become more involved, readily accepting their mistakes along the way if they are ever to become agile, adaptive fighters. Rigidity in centralized control is effective when facing a much less adaptive enemy; however, the future will see adaptive foes looking to exploit U.S. weaknesses and to avoid U.S. strengths.

The Army requires junior leaders to accept significant increases in responsibility, with combined arms forces migrating to the lowest levels of the organization. Soldiers must fully train and prepare themselves for future complex battlefields. Training combined arms at the lowest levels requires additional training for junior leaders.

With combined arms down to platoon level, company commanders have significantly more responsibilities in the Stryker Force. Junior leaders must possess the skills they need to train effectively the many assets they have available. Eventually, the Army's educational systems will adjust and include these changes, but until this occurs, units must develop training programs for junior leaders concentrating on how to train the combined arms organization effectively. This could be through certification programs, leader development programs, a train-the-trainer program, or other method, to ensure leaders understand the requirements of these complex organizations.

Leader training. Leader training has always been an important component of well-trained units, but with the Stryker Force it takes on even more importance. Extensive leader training is essential to the effective development of junior leaders, and it must relate to essential cognitive skills that will be critical for the future battlefield and be challenging



A Civil Affairs soldier speaks with village leaders in Dawlatshah, Afghanistan, 13 March 2003.

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and unique. Trainers must devote the same effort to leader training as they would devote to preparing for a combined arms live-fire exercise.

In the past, the Army relegated leader training, which was often not professionally challenging to all involved, to second place to other events. This will not work for the Stryker Force. Leader training must challenge individuals and develop the expertise they need to fight an agile, adaptive foe. Training should focus on training leaders to be able to function two levels up, using practical exercises, simulations, tactical exercises without troops, staff rides, and other creative methods.

Digital skills. Training digital skills that will enable individual soldiers and units to effectively use the immense potential of digital systems requires extensive training at individual and collective levels. The “buttonology” of how to use individual digital systems is a critical individual task. Ensuring that leaders know the systems’ capabilities also is a critical leader task. Being effective at the individual level requires a creative use of systems throughout training, even when all systems have not been fielded. Reinforcing how digital systems are used and incorporating them into the most routine events

reinforces their use and importance in gaining situational understanding on the battlefield. Systems must be used to track individual digital proficiency, much as battle-rostered crews are tracked in an armored unit.

Collective digital training is much more time consuming and leader-intensive than one might initially anticipate. Small units must incorporate collective digital training into their busy schedules to effectively work out standing operations procedures and to gain valuable practice at making decisions with the proper amount of situational understanding. Getting the required feedback through a realistic scenario requires that a simulation center or higher echelon participate when units train with digital systems. Requirements for digital proficiency at all levels reinforces earlier suggestions to train fewer events to a higher standard and to conduct a combined arms, multiechelon training event to maximize training time and quality.

Physical training. Battle fitness remains an essential requirement for every soldier and unit. No advances in digital equipment can reduce the need for battle-ready soldiers who are physically fit and able to perform their tasks under harsh conditions.

Physical training can be adjusted to include the development of agile, adaptive soldiers. Physical events can challenge soldiers by including events that require them to adapt to changing situations and to develop creative solutions. Training can also focus on leading one to two levels above soldiers' comfort zones for certain physical events. Examples range from a modified leadership-reaction course to a complex unit-casualty exercise. Physical training's essential element is that it remain tough and challenging while building agile, adaptive soldiers.

Simulations. Across the Army, the reliance on simulations and virtual training continues to grow. The Stryker Force requires an even greater reliance on such technology. To properly train the digital systems, from the individual soldier through the collective operations center events, there must be extensive simulation support. Instructors can also use digital systems to develop agile, adaptive soldiers and leaders by incorporating the latest technology into training events and by aggressively seeking training opportunities. Trainers should challenge soldiers to operate outside their comfort zones, and trainers should use simulations to vary conditions. Of course, it is important that simulations be balanced with real events to provide the proper level between the two and to ensure that soldiers are well trained.

To implement many of the training changes that have been identified within the Stryker Force, the second Stryker brigade created the Stryker Brigade Advanced Skills Center (SBASC), at Fort Lewis, Washington, which teaches essential courses to the Stryker brigades. The most essential course taught is the Stryker leader's course, which teaches "what right looks like" for an agile, adaptive leader. This 7-day course, which focuses on critical tasks within a Stryker unit teaches the systems, training methods, and characteristics unique to a Stryker brigade and culminates in a 3-day field training exercise that requires agile, adaptive leadership throughout the event.

Other courses include an advanced marksmanship course for noninfantry specialties and an advanced weapons course for all specialties. Training also includes a sniper-employment course and a squad-designated marksman course, which is a new SBCT concept and the first course of its kind in the U.S. Army. Soldiers will also continue preparing for Ranger school and sniper school, as these are superb leader development courses. Where it is required, the SBASC will serve as a catalyst for change and for sustaining essential skills as needed. The SBASC is a critical part of the Stryker brigades' ability to attain the "next level—agile training mindset."

Leader and Soldier Development

It profits an army nothing to build the body of the soldier to a gladiatorial physique if he continues to think with the brain of a malingerer.
— S.L.A. Marshall³

As the Army continues the Transformation process, it must emphasize an area often ignored in the past. That area is training essential cognitive skills. On a battlefield, where units will be more widely dispersed over extended distances against a potentially more adaptive opponent than they have ever before faced, possessing cognitive skills takes on added significance. With minimal effort, trainers can teach essential cognitive skills, including the warrior ethos; concentration and focus skills; visualization; goal setting; stress management; and confidence. Yet, such skills significantly enhance soldiers' and leaders' ability to think confidently and act decisively. The second Stryker brigade included basic instruction on these skills in several leader development courses and has seen significant results.

The perfect training organization for cognitive skills is at the Center for Enhanced Performance (CEP) at the U.S. Military Academy. CEP's many training programs specifically target cognitive skills that significantly improve a soldier's performance. Although CEP conducted training for the Stryker brigade using instructors on the ground, it might be possible to develop a web-based training site that would give more units access to training methods.

The *Leader's Agility Book* is another tool trainers use to develop leaders within the second Stryker brigade.⁴ The book contains a series of examples, vignettes, and training scenarios with which to teach leaders how to develop agile, adaptive soldiers. Leaders can use the book to build on their own solid training knowledge and to incorporate additional skills to help their soldiers. Leaders can also use the agility checklist to ensure training events are developing the most agile leaders possible.

Institutional Changes

A unit cannot operate centralized in garrison and decentralized in the field. A commander is mistaken if he believes that such a conceptual shift is possible. Subordinates who, in garrison, are used to deferring decisions until consulting with, and receiving approval from, the battalion commander will not suddenly be able or willing to make the judgments required of them in training or in combat.

— Major General James M. Dubik⁵

Having institutional systems in place to support the new organization for the Stryker Force is absolutely essential to developing agile, adaptive leaders. Currently, institutional systems are why leaders must devote so much of their time to acquiring the re-

sources they need for training their units, which leaves them a minimal amount of time to devote to the quality of the training. Thus, junior leaders cannot become agile, adaptive soldiers because they must devote most of their time to fighting institutional battles. As a result, the quality of training can never reach the level required. Such systems have developed into a bureaucracy designed for efficiency of centralized operations and are not supportive of tough, demanding, realistic training. Many areas need adjustments. The following paragraphs discuss the most essential immediate requirements.

Ammunition. Ammunition procedures have failed to keep pace with the changing dynamics of Army organizations and essential training requirements. The most significant issue is with the Stryker units' ammunition requirements. Stryker brigades have significantly more weapons systems than did previous brigade combat teams and will require more training for all specialties because of the nature of the future battlefield. Developing appropriate Standards in Training Commission requirements for the SBCTs is critical and must be balanced with the use of simulations to attain the weapons proficiency units require. The SBCTs will require a commitment of significant ammunition resources to ensure they can maintain the proficiency to deploy rapidly worldwide and to complete their missions.

Procedures for drawing ammunition also create challenges. For example, Stryker brigades no longer have support platoon personnel assigned to their infantry battalions because the brigade support battalion is required to draw and deliver ammunition for all units within the brigade. Garrison systems have not adjusted to this concept, and they still require infantry units to draw ammunition without having qualified personnel. They then sign over the ammunition to the support unit for distribution. The unit will certainly not operate this way in the field, and this ad hoc arrangement causes severe problems. The Army must analyze all ammunition procedures to determine how they affect quality training. Where possible, procedures should be revised.

Funding requirements. Funding requirements need a similar adjustment to keep pace with the changing nature of warfare. Currently, it is extremely difficult to get training devices that are not already approved by a TRADOC-level organization and mass-produced for the entire Army. Stryker brigades require more flexibility than this and should be allowed to purchase items that can enhance training as new requirements are discovered and deemed essential. The Army should allow exceptions to the stringent funding requirements that negatively affect the development of creative training methods or of equipment required for the new organizations.

US Army



A soldier squeezes into his digital equipment-packed Bradley during an Advanced Warfighter Experiment at Fort Irwin, California, 25 June 2001.

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Centralized control in garrison. Commanders at all levels must understand the effects of overly centralized control of subordinate commanders while in a garrison environment. Expecting any commander who is overly supervised in garrison to suddenly become an agile, adaptive leader in a field environment is unrealistic. E-mail and digital systems make it easy for commanders to demand copious amounts of information from subordinates. The question is whether the unending amounts of information are really critical or whether they can be obtained by some other means than a commander's

Murderers' row: 2d Infantry Division's Stryker Brigade Combat Team awaiting orders to roll out, Fort Irwin, California, March 2003.



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direct involvement. Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, *Army Training and Education*, requirements for a company commander have increased exponentially during the past 10 years.⁶ In fact, company commanders must now track approximately 120 pieces of information from AR 350-1 alone. Such information does not include local regulations or requirements from several other layers of command. The Army needs to thoroughly review requirements, prioritize where possible, and reduce junior leaders' burdens so they can truly develop well-trained organizations that can excel in future conflicts. With limited training time and more complex organizations and missions, junior leaders cannot do it all. They might allow the mandatory requirements to slip, which will negatively affect training quality. The Army must help junior leaders prioritize requirements and focus on the most important tasks.

Resourcing training. The methods relied on in the past to resource training might not be the best for developing agile, adaptive leaders. When confronted with new organizations, installations should review procedures to ensure they are getting the best training value, not necessarily the most efficient

use of resources. For example, for units to actually own training land for a longer time period might be better than is currently allowed. Doing so would reduce the constant fight for land resources and the challenges to attaining training areas. Junior leaders could then concentrate on providing quality training instead of fighting for resources.

Other potential changes involve allowing junior leaders more control over developed live-fire ranges. While it would be impossible to conduct effective training without dedicated civilians who help in range scenarios, many installations have range-control civilians who severely hamper junior leaders' efforts to conduct tough, demanding, realistic training. A proper balance is needed.

Digital equipment use. A critical lesson for the fielding of digital systems is that to maximize their potential and to properly train soldiers they must be used frequently. That Stryker brigades be supported in using Army Battle Command Systems daily in a garrison environment is essential. This change might require shifts in normal contact procedures with higher headquarters, such as E-mail, and would require a commitment of funds to support the changes.

However, it is critical that using digital systems becomes second nature. Daily use is the best method to attain the required skills.

Using technology effectively. Technology is a powerful tool that can save time and enhance training if the Army invests in systems that can take advantage of technology. For example, the many AR 350-1 requirements that exist for company commanders require extensive man-hours to track and the use of prime-time training to teach. Tracking all AR 350-1 requirements would require a simple database that could be connected to the Army Knowledge Online system to enable soldiers and leaders to track qualifications easier on-line. Using simple links on a website, soldiers could complete portions of individual mandatory training, then allow leaders to confirm completion on-line. This would leverage technology to reduce the burdens on prime-time training and greatly simplify the collection of statistics vital to a unit's readiness.

Personnel. Adequately supporting the development of agile, adaptive soldiers and leaders requires some adjustments of the personnel system. The Army needs to review essential institutional changes and act on them to ensure a complete Transformation to the Interim and Objective Force. Some essential changes require stability for soldiers and leaders to ensure training can move to the level required.

Without a firm commitment for the stability of soldiers who have essential skills, a unit will never be able to function beyond a basic level of operation. Individuals who possess essential digital skills should be identified with additional skill identifiers so they can be closely tracked and sent to the correct units. This also comes into effect for follow-on assignments for SBCT personnel. They should be carefully screened for where they are best able to apply their skills to help other units or organizations in the Transformation process.

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Transformation is Difficult

As the Army transforms to do its duty in a new operational environment, we must retain and, in fact, strengthen the key imperatives of leader development and training.

— General Eric K. Shinseki⁷

Transforming any organization is difficult, challenging, and requires a complete commitment from its leaders. Army Transformation efforts come at the perfect time in the Nation's history. The world has changed, and the Nation needs an army of agile, adaptive soldiers who can deploy rapidly to any potential conflict to deter or defeat the Nation's foes. The Army has made incredible strides in its materiel Transformation and must continue to work toward providing soldiers the best technology and equipment available.

The Army is at a phase in Transformation where nonmateriel changes are essential to a lasting Transformation. The lessons of the Stryker Force are growing every day, and unless the Army acts now to make the proper changes to the human dimensions of Transformation, it will never truly transform. The time is now to critically analyze the training methodologies, leader and soldier development, and institutional adaptation that must occur for a true Transformation that will lead the Army into the future with an effective Stryker Force and that will adequately prepare the Objective Force for success.

NOTES

1. GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, quoted in GEN James M. Dubik, "The Army's Twofold: The Dual Role of the Interim Force," *The Land Warfare Papers*, 39 (Arlington, VA: The Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), October 2001), iv, on-line at <www.AUSA.org/PDFdocs/lwp39_dubik.pdf>.
 2. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 14 June 2001).
 3. S.L.A. Marshall, Center for Enhanced Performance briefing, West Point, New York, date unknown.
 4. U.S. Army, 1-25 SBCT, "Take Charge," *Leader's Agility Book*, version 4, publish-

ing information unknown.
 5. GEN James M. Dubik, in "Transformation" white paper, AUSA, publishing information unknown.
 6. U.S. Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Education* (U.S. Department of the Army, Washington, DC: 9 April 2003), on-line at <www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r350_1.pdf2>.
 7. GEN Eric K. Shinseki, in "Transformation" white paper, AUSA, publishing information unknown.

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