

MR Review Essay

Searching for Heroes

Major Herman Reinhold, U.S. Air Force, Yokota Air Base, Japan

When the Russian submarine *Kursk* sank, could one man have saved the crew? According to Peter Maas, author of *The Terrible Hours: The Man Behind the Greatest Submarine Rescue in History*, the answer is “Yes!”¹ In August 2000, when the *Kursk* sank, Maas had a submarine book on the bestseller list about the 1939 rescue of the crew of the USS *Squalus*, and because he knew the details of the *Squalus* rescue, Maas spoke on television news shows and was quoted in *USA Today*, proclaiming that Charles “Swede” Momsen, the unsung hero of the *Squalus* rescue could have saved the Russian crew.²

Maas first wrote of Momsen and the *Squalus* rescue in his 1967 book *The Rescuer*, which was excerpted in the *The Saturday Evening Post*.³ An interest in World War II history caused Maas to rewrite *The Rescuer* to create *The Terrible Hours*.

Military professionals should read *The Terrible Hours* with a critical eye. The account is too subjective to give a fair picture of Momsen, who was an impressive man who did interesting, heroic things. Does Momsen’s reputation prove him to be a hero—someone who faces challenges without thought of earning admiration or reward? Maas is convinced that Momsen is a hero. The book is entertaining, informative, and provides many examples of heroism; however, it is limited in its portrayals of Momsen as a hero. The book might even harm Momsen’s reputation if readers mistakenly see him as a man eager to take credit for others’ work.

Momsen flunked out of the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, fought for a second appointment, returned, and graduated; he was a submarine captain and saved his ship and crew when it was trapped on the ocean floor; he bravely tested new ways to

save submarine crews; he fought for his ideas even when opposed by superior officers; he developed and tested new ways for men to dive; and he saved the crew of the *Squalus*, and then raised the sunken submarine to be studied and salvaged.⁴

After salvaging the *Squalus*, Momsen continued his distinguished Naval career. He was at Pearl Harbor and reacted quickly to reports that minisubmarines were in the area, ordering destroyers to conduct a search for them. During World War II, he found solutions for several serious problems, including methods for preventing the spontaneous ignition of torpedoes and explosive powder. Momsen also developed and tested new attack strategies for submarines. He was the captain of the battleship USS *South Dakota*, and after the war, he helped design the prototype submarine USS *Albatross*.⁵

In *The Terrible Hours*, Maas omits many other heroic events from Momsen’s 36-year Naval career, but he includes them in *The Rescuer*. For example, in *The Rescuer*, he reports that between 1945 and 1951, Momsen safely returned 5,700,000 Japanese colonizers to Japan, earning him praise from General Douglas MacArthur.⁶ Also, Maas does not mention that Momsen commanded the Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet; the First Naval District; and Joint Task Force Seven.⁷

Maas is best known for his non-fiction biographies, including *The Valachi Papers*, *Serpico*, and *King of the Gypsies*, which focus on individual heroes struggling alone against organized crime, police corruption, and deep family problems.⁸ *The Terrible Hours* similarly portrays Momsen as bravely standing alone against Navy bureaucracy and the forces of nature.⁹ Maas makes it his duty, or even his obsession, to give

Momsen proper recognition, exaggerating Momsen’s successes while discounting other peoples’ work and ignoring the historical context of Momsen’s own work. Interestingly, Momsen is often more willing to share the credit for his work than is Maas.

Momsen’s heroic efforts to save the *Squalus* crew are central to the tale. Maas uses Momsen’s development of rescue techniques as part of the background of the rescue, writing that “everything that could possibly save a trapped submariner—smoke bombs, telephone marker buoys, new deep-sea diving techniques, escape hatches and artificial lungs, a great pear-shaped diving bell, or rescue chamber—was either a direct result of his inventive, pioneering derring-do, or of value only because of it.”¹⁰ Maas ignores the fact that Momsen was a member of a team.

Maas also shows his bias in favor of Momsen when discussing rescue equipment; Momsen’s first great achievement in the development of rescue technology was the Momsen Lung, which allowed submariners to breathe normally while swimming from a sunken submarine to the surface.¹¹ Maas calls the lung “a completely fresh approach to saving submariners” and “a daring new concept,” and at the same time he describes other devices invented before the lung as being “too bulky or balky” and that there was no “serious effort” to train submarine crews in their use.¹² Also, Maas does not mention any other navy having adopted a device before the U.S. Navy adopted the Momsen Lung, but in fact, the German navy had adopted a similar device in 1912, and the British navy had done so in the 1920s.¹³ The only known use of the Momsen Lung was in October 1944, when eight men used it to escape

from the USS *Tang*.¹⁴ After World War II, new procedures allowed escape from 300 feet without needing breathing devices.

Maas ignores even more history when he discusses the McCann Rescue Chamber; a large, modern, diving bell designed to save trapped submariners. Diving bells have a long history that dates back to Aristotle. By 1792, diving bells possessed air pumps to deliver fresh air from the surface.¹⁵ Momsen's genius lay in his contributions to the design, development, and testing of a bell specially made to save submarine crews.¹⁶

The U.S. Navy named the McCann Rescue Chamber after Lieutenant Commander Allen McCann, who Maas says, "merely tested the bell."¹⁷ The bell was not named for Momsen, because in his desire to save submariners, he had "stepped on too many toes." Still, Momsen is more willing than Maas to give McCann credit. In an October 1939 lecture on the *Squalus* rescue and salvage, Momsen said, "My memory went back to . . . the first diving bell, the cranky open bell that would dump and fall and half drown us if we were not careful . . . , [and] of the final design produced by Commander Allen R. McCann and the comfort that it was to operate."¹⁸

Maas also fails to give several others credit for the *Squalus* rescue and recovery, explaining why he feels Momsen deserves the bulk of the credit. Some people might disagree. Momsen was part of a large team that included Navy commanders, several ships and crews, and teams of divers.¹⁹

Admiral C.W. Cole, who commanded the rescue of the *Squalus*, called both Momsen and McCann to the scene. In his final report, Cole lists his crew and says that McCann was a "Technical Aide" and that Momsen was the "Diving Officer." Momsen supervised the divers, but he was too old to dive himself. In Cole's conclusion, he deems worthy of the highest praise "the efficient work of the divers [and] the exceptional coolness, judgment and initiative of Commander Allan R. McCann in handling what was probably the most trying and difficult situation of

the rescue period, viz: the fourth and last trip up of the rescue chamber with survivors."²⁰ Cole does not mention Momsen by name for any special praise. A 1942 book by David O. Woodbury also gives McCann the credit for developing the diving bell and for being the hero of the *Squalus* rescue effort.²¹ Although Woodbury reports that Momsen was at the rescue, he does not mention any specific acts by him.²²

Commander Edward Peary Stafford did not consider either Momsen or McCann the hero of the rescue. In his 1966 book, *The Far and the Deep*, Stafford gives the credit to Cole, saying his "instant, vigorous, and appropriate action resulted in the rescue of every live man in the sunken *Squalus*."²³ Selecting Cole as the hero makes sense, perhaps because he brought the other two "heroes" and "supporting players" to the scene. Other possible heroes include the *Squalus*'s captain and crew and the many divers who rescued the crew and salvaged the ship.

Focusing on selecting "a hero" misses the point. The rescue and salvage, built on the hard work of the men who went before them, were the successes of a Navy team. While Momsen's efforts were important, he was just one man; he could not, and did not, develop the equipment or procedures for the rescue alone. He could not save the *Squalus*'s crew or salvage the ship by himself, nor could he have saved the crew of the *Kursk* alone.

Readers of *The Terrible Hours* might wonder why Maas worked so hard to promote Momsen as a hero. The bias Maas shows toward Momsen and against others hurts Maas's credibility. Was Maas impressed with Momsen after meeting and interviewing him? Was Maas disappointed that McCann and Cole got more credit than Momsen? Momsen died of cancer in 1967, just before *The Rescuer* was published. Was Maas sympathetic to Momsen after Momsen's death? Was Maas writing an extended obituary?

Maas met Momsen late in Momsen's life. As a U.S. Navy journalist from 1952 to 1954, Maas was assigned to write about the USS *Alba-*

core and, in doing so, learned about Momsen and the *Squalus*. After leaving the Navy, Maas met and interviewed Momsen and was given access to Momsen's personal papers. He interviewed people who knew Momsen, and he interviewed many of the *Squalus* survivors.²⁴ Maas turned his initial research into *The Rescuer*, which includes footnotes, an index, a bibliography, and diagrams of the submarine, the rescue bell, and pontoons used to salvage the submarine, as well as photographs of the rescue operation and of Momsen.²⁵ *The Terrible Hours* has no pictures, diagrams, footnotes, index, or bibliography. When comparing the books, minor discrepancies appear in quoted dialogue and in reported events. Maas does not explain these differences, and without footnotes or a bibliography, it is difficult to know which book is more accurate or how to cross-reference his reporting of the events with other sources.

When Maas wrote *The Rescuer* and *The Terrible Hours*, he missed a great opportunity to write a biography. Momsen deserves a complete, objective biography that lets readers learn from his successes and mistakes. Even after reading both books, readers might want more information. Momsen did great things in war and in peace, even when superiors discounted his ideas. Unfortunately, Maas does not explore Momsen's long, consistent record of innovation, leadership, consistency, and dedication, which is his true legacy. The *Squalus* rescue was just one event in a long, successful career.

Hero worship is a limited field, and frankly, the military needs leaders more than it needs heroes. A hero might inspire some people around him to accomplish great feats. A great leader, through teamwork, will inspire followers to great accomplishments. The team is often greater than the sum of its parts. In today's world of technology and bureaucracy, we need accomplished leaders. The real message of the *Kursk* disaster and the rescue of the *Squalus* is that we usually succeed or fail, win or lose, live or die, as part of a team.

In the final analysis, readers will remember Momsen, and perhaps *The*

Terrible Hours will inspire a historian to write his biography focusing on his accomplishments and explaining how he was able to work with and lead so many successful teams to wonderful accomplishments. **MR**

NOTES

1. Peter Maas, *The Terrible Hours: The Man Behind the Greatest Submarine Rescue in History* (New York: HarperTorch, 2000) (1999).
2. Bestseller List, *USA Today*, 24 August 2000, 6D.
3. Maas, *The Rescuer* (New York: Harper, 1968), excerpted in *The Saturday Evening Post*, 23 September 1967, 36-69.
4. Maas, *The Terrible Hours*, 32-36, 63-77, 72-77, 116-32, 147-65, 177-309.
5. *Ibid.*, 291-309.

6. Maas, *The Rescuer*, 218-19.
7. *Biography of Vice Admiral Charles B. Momsen, USN (Retired) (1896-1967)*, Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, on-line at <www.history.navy.mil/photos/per-us/uspers-m/cb-momson.htm>, accessed on 15 September 2000.
8. Maas, *The Valacchi Papers* (New York: Putnam, 1969); Maas, *Serpico* (New York: Viking, 1973); Maas, *King of the Gypsies* (New York: Viking, 1975); *Biography of Peter Maas*, contemporary authors on CD-ROM, Gale Research, 1998, 1-2.
9. Maas, *The Terrible Hours*, 33.
10. *Ibid.*, 73-77, 116-32, 152-65.
11. *Biography of Vice Admiral Charles B. Momsen*.
12. Maas, *The Terrible Hours*, 117.
13. "Submarine," *The Encyclopedia Americana*, International Edition (New York: Grolier Incorporated, 1996), 820-21.
14. Clay Blair, Jr., *Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan* (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott & Company, 1975), 767-69.
15. John Smeaton, "Diving Bell," *The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. 10 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica,

- 1998), 889.
16. Maas, *The Terrible Hours*, 73-77, 122-28, 155-64.
17. *Ibid.*, 163-64.
18. Charles Momsen, "Rescue and Salvage of USS *Squalus*," lecture delivered to Harvard Engineering Society, 6 October, 1930, Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, on-line at <www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq99-6.htm>, accessed on 15 September 2000.
19. Edward P. Stafford, *The Far and the Deep* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1966), 124-34.
20. C.W. Cole, *Report of Commander Rescue Operations, USS Squalus, May 28, 1939*, Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, on-line at <www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq99-3.htm>, accessed on 15 September 2000.
21. David O. Woodbury, *What the Citizen Should Know About Submarine Warfare* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1942), 140-57.
22. *Ibid.*, 147-57.
23. Stafford, 162, photo caption between 192 and 193.
24. For Maas's communications with Momsen, see Maas, *The Terrible Hours*, 306-309.
25. Maas, *The Rescuer*.

MR Book Reviews

JUNGLE ACE: The Story of One of the USAAF's Great Fighter Leaders, COL Gerald R. Johnson, John R. Bruning, Brassey's Inc., Washington, DC, 2001, 320 pages, \$26.95.

The American public became fascinated with World War II aviation heroes—aces—who, through skill and a great deal of luck, destroyed five or more aircraft in aerial combat. Heralded in newspapers, magazines, and on the radio, aces were elite, modern knights who engaged in combat on an individual level while mastering the technical skills of the most advanced aircraft of the time. Their efforts and aerial achievements were substantive proof to the U.S. public that the war was being won. As a reward, the Nation showered the pilots with acclaim and fanfare.

Among the flying aces were the elite of the elite—the men who each had more than 20 aerial victories. Among these courageous and talented individuals was Gerald Johnson, a man whose life and story is today virtually unknown. In *Jungle Ace: The Story of One of the USAAF'S Great Fighter Leaders*, John R. Bruning details Johnson's life. Bruning begins the story by describing Johnson's youth in Eugene, Oregon. Johnson entered the U.S. Army Air Corps in 1940.

The naiveté of a relatively young nation could clearly be seen through the eyes and experience of America's youth at the time. Survivors of the Great Depression, they were simple

in their opinion about world affairs but resolved to do whatever was needed to preserve their way of life. America grew up, and so did they. Bruning captures this feeling and provides an excellent reminder of the time.

Bruning describes the finer points of air cadet training and the conditions found in a young, inexperienced air corps. Surprising, the trainers of the earliest combat pilots were civilians, as Johnson's experiences well illustrate. The realization that the United States was not ready for war, coupled with an attitude that it could accomplish what was required, helped produce the best combat force in the world.

Johnson's first taste of combat occurred in Alaska, where he shot down two enemy planes over the Aleutians Islands. Johnson's time in Alaska was a formative experience. He sharpened the combat skills that he later used to great advantage in the Pacific. Pilots were being lost at an incredible rate in the Pacific, and Johnson arrived just when his talents were most needed. He quickly became a group leader and an ace. His unit ended the war with more Japanese kills than any other Army Air Corps unit. When Johnson was only 24, he was already a colonel.

Johnson survived the war, but he died in a weather-related accident just 3 months after the war's end. Although Johnson has been largely

forgotten, *Jungle Ace* faithfully tells his story.

MAJ Ted J. Behncke, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

SUCCESSION IN SAUDI ARABIA, Joseph A. Kechichian, Palgrave Press, New York, 2001, 287 pages, \$59.95.

Joseph A. Kechichian, who has been an adviser for think-tanks and government agencies, is a prolific writer on the Middle East. His book, *Succession in Saudi Arabia*, is the first look at the dynamics of succession within the Al-Saud family since Alexander Bligh's book *From Prince to King* (New York University Press) was published in 1984. Kechichian's book is the first to address the succession issue beyond Regent Crown Prince Abdullah and the sons of King Abdul-Aziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia. Kechichian postulates several viable candidates from among the king's grandsons. The survival of the Saudi royal family, and who becomes king, directly bears on whether the United States can maintain peaceful relations with the desert kingdom.

The story of the Al-Saud family begins in 1901 and continues for three decades. King Abdul-Aziz used a complex system of alliances with several tribes, families, and his own extended family to secure loyalty. One of his more important allies was the Al-al-Shaykh family, who were descendants of Islamic revivalist

Abdul-Wahab, who preached during the 18th century. The Al-al-Shaykh family dominated religious and justice ministries, and Al-Saud's marriage gave the royal family its religious legitimacy.

The Al-Rashids, who were rivals to Al-Saud and who had forced them into exile from Central Arabia in the 19th century were also co-opted by war and marriage. The Sudayris is another old and aristocratic family in Arabia. Abdul-Aziz's mother was a Sudayri, and he also married into this family. His seven sons from the marriage now occupy major ministerial posts and governorships.

Knowing Abdul-Aziz's maternal lineage helps us understand the different branches of his line. Abdul-Aziz had an older brother who challenged Abdul-Aziz's authority to rule. Based on seniority, the descendants of this brother, known as the Saud-al-Kabir line, represent another aspect of the family, which requires recognition and analysis. Another branch, the Al-Faisal's, sons of the third Saudi King Faisal, who was assassinated in 1975, are quite competent and serve the Nation as the current foreign minister and former chief of intelligence. A sore point among royal family members is the concentration of high-level posts held by members of the Sudayri line.

Kechichian looks at every Saudi ruler and assesses his impact and governance on Saudi Arabia, from the incompetent second king, Saud (1953-1964), to his successor, Faisal (1964-1975), who brought a hard-work ethic, coupled with shrewd diplomacy and modernization programs, to the royal family. Kechichian dedicates one chapter to describing Abdul-Aziz's grandsons' appointments to key positions in the government. As deputies, governors, and assistant governors, they represent the various royal lines that are jockeying for positions closer to the spheres of influence for the eventual appointment of the next generation of Al-Sauds, if not an outright assumption of kingship.

The royal family is aware that external and internal rivals closely watch royal dissent. They have learned valuable lessons from Egyptian President Gamal Nasser, who attempted to exploit the chaos caused

by King Saud's refusal to abdicate to Crown Prince Faisal and the events in 1981 with the forcible takeover of the holy mosque in Makkah.

Of note is the chapter on security concerns of Saudi Arabia, which includes a realistic analysis of the various forces required (religious, military, and secular) that in unison could topple the regime. Also, the appendix is rich with information, including the 1992 edict expanding the candidates for the monarchy to include grandsons of Abdul-Aziz, and the petitions from prominent citizens and religious clergy calling for increased participation in government. I highly recommend this book to Middle East analysts and foreign area officers.

LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,
USN, Gaithersburg, Maryland

STARS AND STRIPES ACROSS THE PACIFIC: The United States, Japan and the Asia/Pacific Region, 1895-1945, William F. Nimmo, Praeger, New York, 2001, 289 pages, \$65.95.

In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt said before Congress that December 7 is "a date that will live in infamy." Certainly all students of U.S. history, and in particular military history, are keenly aware of the events surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Most writings portray the Japanese as aggressors and lay the blame squarely at the feet of that nation's military leaders. Some revisionists, however, claim that the Japanese were actually victims. Revisionists claim that U.S. politicians wanted an excuse to go to war, and that political intransigence on the part of the United States left the Japanese Empire no choice but to attack. This latter characterization is what William F. Nimmo sets out to disprove by chronicling the activities of both nations with regard to the Asia-Pacific region over a 50-year period ending with the defeat of Japan.

At the beginning of the 20th century, neither Japan nor the United States was considered a formidable world power. Japan was for many years a closed society, completely isolated from the Western world. Events over the latter half of the 20th century thrust both nations to the

fore. To maintain sustained growth, the U.S. economy needed easy access to foreign markets. Japan's economy depended strongly on natural resources and needed space from external nations to sustain it.

After the 1898 Spanish-American war, the United States found itself a colonial power in the Asia-Pacific; a theater where former Spanish possessions were ceded to the United States—most notably the Philippines. Despite this, the United States endeavored to maintain its presence through treaty vice conquest. In fact, the United States was the first colonial power to voluntarily decide to grant independence to a possession.

Japan saw itself as a divine nation, with the emperor at its center. The nation had a long history of antagonistic acts toward its neighbors, and Japan's more militant leaders viewed territorial conquest as its right. During the first half of the 20th century Japan's dealings with its neighbors was brutal, harsh, and punishing. Even now Korea, China, and the Philippines harbor deep resentment and mistrust toward Japan. The Japanese also believed in their divine destiny and often obfuscated or outright lied in their treaty dealings with European powers, feeling no remorse in doing so.

Before 7 December 1941 Roosevelt told English Prime Minister Winston Churchill that the United States would eventually enter the war, but not until another nation had made the first strike. The common belief was that Germany or Italy would provide the excuse for the United States entering the war by attacking U.S. ships in the Atlantic.

The prevailing attitude in the United States was that Japan had neither the wherewithal nor the moxy to attack U.S. soil. The Japanese believed that a single, devastating attack on the United States would so demoralize its citizens that the United States would immediately sue for peace. That was why conflicting colonial methods and economic needs between the United States and Japan, combined with racism on both sides, made it inevitable that the two countries would become adversaries.

Nimmo presents an extremely well researched and documented account

of the activities of both Japan and the United States. Although his sympathies are clearly with the United States, he presents facts in such a way as to support his position vice bolstering his prejudices. *Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Asia/Pacific Region, 1895-1945*, reads much like a textbook, which makes it well suited for serious students of the subject.

The book covers a period in history when two world wars were being fought and when the entire socio-economic face of the earth was changing. Yet, Nimmo omits or merely highlights many important events of the Asian-Pacific conflict. Still, the book presents a valid chronology of events that will help put into perspective the relationship between the United States and Japan from 1895 to the present.

LTC David G. Rathgeber, USMC,
Retired, Fallbrook, California

WHO'S WHO IN WORLD WAR

ONE, J.M. Bourne, Routledge, New York, 2001, 316 pages, \$29.95.

Books like *Who's Who in World War One* usually reach only a "niche" audience. However, the narrow readership of such a book does not limit one's admiration of this fine reference. University of Birmingham History Professor J.M. Bourne provides over a thousand thumbnail biographies of the people who were involved in the war. On the other hand, Bourne is not satisfied with just reviewing the careers of "great men"—major political and military leaders. He also considers inventors, artists, writers, and scientists who achieved prominence as a result of the war. Each sketch highlights the person's role and acknowledges that the entries serve only as starting points for research.

Bourne's selection of which person gets coverage will sometimes surprise the reader. For instance, French Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces on the Western Front, gets one page; William H. Livens, the inventor of the "Liven projector" of gas munitions receives half a page; Nicholas II, the last Tsar of Russia receives one page; while Lloyd George, who was

the British Prime Minister during much of the war, receives two pages.

Bourne's choice of subjects illustrates his Anglo-centric focus. Clearly, he expects the British Commonwealth to provide the core readership for his book. He covers virtually every corps commander who served in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) while he rarely covers commanders below army level from other countries. Despite this bias, American readers will find Bourne's description of key U.S. figures to be even-handed, especially when compared with other British historians' harsh evaluations of the U.S. war effort.

Bourne's efforts do not keep him from making sharp judgments about a number of key participants. Of the Austrian politician Karl Stuergh he writes, "His conduct during the war was like that of an ostrich. He buried his head in the sand and hoped for the best." Of Erich Ludendorff, he said, "He was one of the most evil and disastrous figures in the most evil and disastrous century of German history." Yet Bourne is kinder to the most controversial British figure of the war, Douglas Haig, BEF Commander. Bourne writes that Haig has too long been a scapegoat for the ghastly casualties suffered by British forces on the Western Front, and that he has not been given proper credit for the enormous improvement in the fighting ability that the BEF demonstrated in the last campaigns of the war.

Who's Who in World War One is a laudable effort, and those who use this book as a reference will find it a superb resource that features both concise analysis and highly readable commentary.

LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

UNHOLY ALLIANCE: Greece and Milošević's Serbia. Takis Michas, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2002, 176 pages, \$29.95.

Anyone who has seen the news in the last decade knows there is trouble in the Balkans. The problems there are hard to unravel, and no clear solution is apparent. *Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milošević's Serbia* is a summary of the relations between

Greece and Serbia from the outset of the Balkans war until the present. Author Takis Michas is a Grecian journalist who has been in the right place at the right time, having interviewed important figures in both countries.

Michas questions Greece's position in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) vis-à-vis its relations with Serbia. Predicated on the fact that Greece is a member of NATO and the EU, it seems a conflict of interest to offer support to a troubled country whose last president was charged with war crimes. Michas explains this paradox by linking Serbia and Greece's Eastern Orthodox commonality, as both states have an Eastern Orthodox majority. This is the explanation for Greece's various public statements, anti-U.S. protests, and unilateral transfers of money to Serbia.

Unholy Alliance, based on primary source interviews, makes strong conclusions. Its value to the defense community is its illumination of an area that has not been in the news much recently but that is still relevant to international affairs. The book is well written and deserves a deeper look into the question it raises about Greece's pro-Serbian activities.

CPL David J. Schepp, USA,
Fort Benning, Georgia

ANOTHER CENTURY OF WAR?

Gabriel Kolko, The New Press, New York, 2002, 176 pages, \$15.95.

Another Century of War? If so, says Gabriel Kolko, it is almost assured that it will be another century of dashed hopes and unanticipated negative consequences, a century that is either the same as, or worse than, the 20th century. As Kolko notes in his earlier book, *Century of War: Politics, Conflict, and Society Since 1914* (New Press, New York, 1994), the United States won the Cold War but in so doing fell victim to unintended consequences. The century of war was a time of mutually assured destruction and a balance of terror. But despite its extreme violence, the 20th century was a time of balanced powers. Now the United States stands alone. In the absence

of countervailing forces, wrong-headed U.S. policies are destabilizing a world already rife with unsettled regions and easily obtained firepower.

Kolko's basic premise is that for 50 years the United States has fumbled around, being consistent only in its policies of being anticommunist and pro-oil. He feels that the United States holds a consistent over-optimism about the efficacy of its technology and firepower, and that it consistently fails to recognize that the world is a subtle, complex place that requires finesse, flexibility, and receptivity to the needs and wants of others. Inadvertently or perhaps knowingly, the United States has disrupted regions of the world by its support of anticommunist tyrannies. Because of its blunders, the U.S. weakened democratic movements throughout the world, generally making a world where the events of 11 September 2001 were the consequence.

Kolko thinks it is time to bring the troops home from the over 200 overseas bases, stop supplying half the world's arms, and accept that there are circumstances in the world that the United States cannot fix or should not be concerned with because they are peripheral to U.S. interests.

A prominent new-left historian, Kolko has made a career of being critical of U.S. foreign and domestic policies, and as he has aged, he has abandoned subtlety and nuance. In this small book on the follies of U.S. foreign policy, he uses words such as "inept," "immoral," and "dishonest." Most people will probably dismiss this book without a hearing, but it is familiar territory to his fans. Still, it will be alien—if not unpatriotic—to his critics, and in these times, it will be deemed unfashionable.

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Yukon, Oklahoma**

GERMS: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War, Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, William Broad, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2001, 382 pages, \$27.00.

Three investigative reporters from *The New York Times*, Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, initially began writing *Germs: Biological Weapons and America's*

Secret War to explore what had motivated the Pentagon to vaccinate its soldiers against anthrax.

Germs begins with an attention-grabbing account of an actual bioterrorism event that occurred in an Oregon town in the 1980s. The incident, the work of the Sannyasins cult, is said to have been the largest case of a bioterrorism attack occurring in the United States. The ease with which germs were obtained and spread among the population is most disturbing.

The authors give a historical account about the use and development of bioterrorism weapons. Beginning more than two millennia ago Scythian archers dipped their arrowheads into manure and rotting corpses to increase the deadliness of their weapons. In the 14th century, Tartars hurled plague-infected bodies at their enemies. However, the book focuses on the 1950s and 1960s when the United States began bioweapon research. The U.S. program ended in 1972 as was agreed on under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. A Soviet program, which started in the 1920s, also ceased its development but secretly continued to do research.

The accounts describing the Soviet program are incredible. At the program's peak the Soviet's employed thousands of scientists who annually developed bioengineered pathogens and produced hundreds of tons of plague, anthrax, and smallpox. The Soviets became extremely advanced in their development and capabilities, well beyond anything the United States had realized. The Soviet programs and facilities are now being dismantled in breakaway countries such as Kazakhstan.

The *Times* journalists present details about the possibility of biological warfare today, writing about Iraq's ability to deliver anthrax against forces engaged in Operation Desert Storm. (Iraq earlier purchased the anthrax agent from a U.S. company.) The journalists also report on the U.S. Government's attempts to prepare for and prevent an attack on the United States. The authors conclude that while a biological attack against the United States is not necessarily inevitable, the danger of

bioweaponry is too real to be ignored. They believe that the same efforts that will advance U.S. health and emergency systems will also help overcome the threat. Thus, to prevail, the United States should promote research, increase vaccine supplies, educate medical workers to recognize symptoms, and develop better interagency communication and coordination.

Germs is easy to read, although it contains a bit of journalistic sensationalism and many "revelations" that are not new or surprising. Still, the book is worth reading, if only to remind us of the bioterrorism threat and that the United States needs to take more action to prevent and prepare for the real possibility of an attack.

**MAJ S. Walker, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

KEEPING THE EDGE: Managing Defense for the Future, Ashton B. Carter and John P. White, eds., MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, 326 pages, \$24.95.

Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future is a collection of essays published by the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and Stanford Universities. Ashton B. Carter, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and John P. White, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, edit this book, which presents solutions to some of the most pressing problems within the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies involved with national security. Specifically, the articles address the changes or reforms necessary to bring contracting, personnel policies, and managerial practices within DOD up to modern-day standards that "taxpayers have the right to expect of their government."

Former U.S. Army General John Shalikashvili recommends redesignating the Unified Transformation Command into the U.S. Logistics Command (LOGCOM) and assigning the Military Traffic Management Command, the Military Sealift Command, the Air Mobility Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the National Distribution Command (an expansion of the former Defense

Distribution Center) within LOGCOM to provide warfighting commanders-in-chief with the focused, integrated global logistics they require. Robert J. Herman presents a second recommendation. Herman, a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, recommends consolidating the functions of the National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office, Central Measurement Organization, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency under a single agency, the NSA. Doing this would consolidate common technological capabilities as well as improve efficiency and analysis. Carter and White recommended many other examples of organizational, procedural, and functional changes for DOD and other national-security organizations within the executive branch of the U.S. Government.

Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future brings together over a dozen of the greatest national-security thinkers to address the challenges facing a national-security organization structured and designed to win the Cold War. The book identifies the need to understand and embrace ever-changing technological capabilities, and it identifies ways and means for defense institutions to stay in front of these changes. The book is valuable reading for the military professional concerned with activities that shape the way U.S. Government officials make national-security policy decisions.

LTC Richard A. Fisher, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

INDIA'S EMERGING NUCLEAR POSTURE: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal, Ashley J. Tellis, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, 885 pages, \$40.00.

India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal is the product of an extensive research project conducted by Project Air Force (PAF). PAF, the brainchild of General H.H. Arnold, is a RAND-Air Force partnership that has been in existence since 1946. PAF is the only Air Force federally funded research and development center not involved in building hardware. PAF's mission is to gather information for the purpose

of conducting studies and analyses on a collage of subjects that might affect the Air Force. PAF has an extensive list of published topics that are available for purchase (in book format) or that can be downloaded for free onto a computer. (See <www.rand.org/paf/about.html>.) The reader must be aware that RAND is a non-profit institution, and while it helps improve policy- and decisionmaking, it does not always reflect the opinions or policies of its sponsors.

Contributor Ashley J. Tellis is an Indian-born American currently serving as special adviser to the American Ambassador to India. His main objective in conducting his research is to determine India's nuclear posture; that is, if it is a "nuclear-capable state" or a "nuclear-weapon power," and how it got there.

Tellis logically organizes his work into six chapters that identify the factors affecting India's choices, analyzes five specific nuclear end states that India has debated for years, describes India's most likely course of action for the next 20 years, and examines the operational capabilities of India's desired nuclear posture. Tellis summarizes his exhaustive research with observations on the consequences of expected changes in India's nuclear posture in regard to Pakistan and China.

In the end, Tellis does not entirely agree with the U.S. Government's assessment that India is a nuclear-weapon state. He feels that India is undecided on where it wants to go with its nuclear strategy. India faces internal and external pressures to control and disarm its nuclear capabilities and expansion, yet it is constantly faced with regional stability challenges in regard to its nuclear-capable, armed neighbors (China and Pakistan). Tellis's end comment is that for a successful future in U.S.-India relations, the two countries must develop a realistic strategic vision in which the two states' competing interests can be reconciled—sound advice for today's strategymakers.

Strategymakers might find this book daunting because of its length; its extensive, detailed footnotes; and its enormous bibliography, but students looking for references will greatly appreciate this level of detail.

I highly recommend this book; it is an outstanding source of information about the future of India and the effect its decisions will have on the world.

MAJ Charles E. Newbegin, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CONTROLLING NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS: Obstacles and Opportunities, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberg, eds.,

The USAF Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2001, 356 pages. Out of print.

This compendium of 13 articles is an attempt to bring together a summary on nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) as discussed at the November 2000 Airlie Conference in Warrenton, Virginia. Because of its format and the varying views 75 experts expressed in regard to arms control, nuclear weapons, and national-security strategy, the book contains some healthy academic disagreement and does not attempt to provide an overarching theme. The foreword states quite clearly, that "the important point is that Russia at any time might choose to leave a dead-end of its own making. Foreseeing that time and being ready for it is the purpose of this unique book."

To organize material encompassing such a complicated subject, the editors assigned each article to one of four different sections: "Defining the NSNW Problem," "Contending Objectives," "Obstacles," and "Possible Solutions." This approach works to a limited extent. However, there is a significant amount of redundancy between articles, and the articles within the sections often do not fulfill the promise of section titles. Perhaps most illustrative of this is the section on Possible Solutions. If readers expect to find even a hint of a clear-cut strategy, they will be sorely disappointed. This is not the fault of the contributors, however; as one of them states, "One of the biggest myths in Washington is that the ability to identify a problem proves there must be a solution. This case is an example of that myth: the solution of a traditional arms control arrangement might seem attractive, but it is unlikely to solve the problem of

Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some things really are too hard."

If the subject is so complex as to preclude pat conclusions, and if readers feel unsatisfied after completing the book, why should they read it? One answer, found in the conclusion, is that readers will encounter a range and depth of thinking not found elsewhere in security-policy formulation literature. The foreword provides another answer: "For fifty years nonstrategic nuclear weapons have been the main source of the crises, accidents, and diplomatic contretemps associated with weapons of mass destruction. . . ." It behooves military professionals and civilian policymakers to delve more deeply into what could be the crucial focus of disarmament in the future.

The book serves as a valuable reference. Not only do the articles eloquently summarize the topic's salient points, the appendixes cover primary documents and initiatives from 1983 to the present that form the environment for NSNW negotiations.

MAJ Erick D. McCroskey,
USAF, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE AGE OF TERROR, Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda, eds., Basic Books, New York, 2001, 232 pages, \$22.00.

The Age of Terror is a series of essays that seek to explain how the events of 11 September 2001 occurred and to recommend potential actions for the future. What immediately draws attention to this book, over the other works that erupted from print shops following the events of 11 September, are the respectable contributors, which include four historians, a political scientist, a career diplomat, a professor of law, and a microbiologist.

John Lewis Gaddis, a Yale history professor and author of *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford University Press, England, 1998), leads off with "And Now This: Lessons From the Old Era For the New One." Gaddis asserts that two lessons immediately leap forth from the events of 11 September: that two oceans and U.S. military power are no longer sufficient to ensure homeland security, and that post-Cold War U.S.

foreign policy did not serve us well. Gaddis devotes most of his effort to this latter topic, concluding that U.S. policy shortcomings are due to a lack of strategic vision.

Paul Kennedy, Yale history professor and the university's Director of International Security Studies, is probably best known as the author of *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500-2000* (Random House, New York, 1987). His essay, "Maintaining American Power: from Injury to Recovery," emphasizes that at the heart of any strategy is the goal to maintain U.S. power. However, he notes, we cannot pursue a grand strategy aimed only at eliminating terrorists since we still have traditional strategic goals to pursue. One particularly interesting point he introduces is that the effect of continuing globalization could increase economic power across the globe but decrease the United States' relative economic power, an end state whose desirability needs to be determined.

The essays by Abbas Amanat, Chair of the Yale Council on Middle East Affairs, and Charles Hill, diplomat and Security Studies Fellow at Yale, address Middle East and Islamic regional issues. Amanat provides a concise, effective review of the root causes and perceptions behind what he terms "Islamic Extremism." He reviews the policies and events that generated the actions of Osama bin-Laden and his followers, concluding that the only viable defense is to promote Middle Eastern development. Hill adds to Amanat's work by pointing out that the United States fought a counterterrorism campaign in the 1990s and that the biggest obstacle to creating satisfied populations is that a "strongman, surrounded by a praetorian guard" holds power in each nation.

Essays by Oxford Professor Niall Ferguson; Yale political science and management professor Paul Bracken; Yale law professor Harold Koh; and Carnegie Institution President Maxine Singer complete the book. Ferguson addresses the role and relevance of neocolonialism in the current era, stating that the United States must be more assertive on the world stage

and wondering if "the leaders of the one state with the economic resources to make the world a better place have the guts to do it." Bracken addresses the organization and personnel policies of the intelligence community, specifically the CIA, which could have tertiary applicability to the Department of Defense and Army intelligence programs. Koh, a specialist in international law, covers legal and moral issues in preserving American values. Singer compares the mobilization of the scientific community to assist the war effort of the 1940s to the requirement for a similar effort today.

MAJ James Laughrey,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

STATE AND REVOLUTION IN CUBA: Mass Mobilization and Political Change, 1920-1940, Robert Whitney, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, 255 pages, \$49.95.

This study of Cuban state formation before the over-analyzed Castro experience in 1959 is worth a closer look. Canadian scholar Robert Whitney delves once again into Cuba's early history and examines it in detail, looking at the workers, trade unions, and state violence carried out by the Bautista regime in an effort to assert state control and gain influence. Whitney states that the purpose of his work is to show how the "transition from oligarchic rule to the modern state came about primarily because of the mass mobilization by the 'classes populares' against oligarchic capitalism." Whitney accomplishes his purpose with vivid examples and well-researched and supported opinion.

Whitney's argument for support of Latin American research follows the lead of other Latin American historians like Peter Winn in *Weavers of Revolution* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1986). Whitney uses examples at the grassroots level to examine this period in Cuban history from the bottom up as well as including elements from more traditional statist political history approaches. His treatment of the rise of Fulgencio Batista, an unlikely leader of a revolution, is well done. He argues that Batista realized that he had to bring the working and lower classes of

Cuban society into the political fold. Batista accomplished this by using a form of populism that resembled that of Lazaro Cardenas in Mexico, but Batista differed in that he maintained strict control of the revolutionary movement.

In this book, Whitney adds to the existing body of political history literature on Cuba from 1920 to 1940. His book aids those who want to understand the troubled past of Cuba's history before the successful 1959 revolution and Castro's rise.

MAJ Edward M. Bonfoey III, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

SECRECY WARS: National Security, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know, Philip H. Melanson, Brassey's Inc., Herndon, VA, 2001, 320 pages, \$27.50.

In *Secrecy Wars: National Security, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know*, Philip H. Melanson explains how citizens can access executive-branch information by understanding the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act. He feels that every citizen should understand and use these methods of obtaining information as a check and balance to government authority.

Because of the conflict between government security and the public's right-to-know, citizens must understand government issues so they can advise their legislators how to vote. Melanson, arguing that the executive branch might operate outside the law if not given some type of oversight, provides evidence of the government's inappropriate behavior by citing former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's targeting of Martin Luther King; former President Lyndon B. Johnson's lying to the American public during the Vietnam crisis; the lack of a thorough investigation into Robert Kennedy's assassination in 1968; and the use of intelligence assets to track domestic groups protesting the Vietnam war during the early 1970s.

Melanson acknowledges the need for government secrecy to protect national security and shows that across the executive branch, specifically the FBI and CIA, many agencies used the national-security stamp to hide mistakes and inappropriate

behavior. When these agencies release information, complete pages are often blackened out. Also, the same request might result in receiving 20 pages of information one time and 3 pages the next, suggesting that there is no consistency in handling requests. And often, agencies will not respond to requests in accordance with FOIA and Privacy Act requirements, forcing the requestor to use legal means or congressional contacts to force the agency into compliance. Finally, these agencies allow access to requestors only if they are departmental persons. For example, when former CIA director Robert M. Gates wrote *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1997), he had access to information that the public could not have obtained.

To remedy the problem of obtaining information, Melanson outlines 10 changes lawmakers must make to ensure that citizens have the information they need. Two notable changes would be that after 20 years all classified information automatically would be declassified and that the standard for withholding information be changed from data that "could" cause harm to data that "would significantly" cause harm to national security. The problem with the second recommendation is determining what information would fall into which category.

Secrecy Wars is a useful book for military professionals, especially those in the law enforcement and intelligence communities. Although the laws to increase public access to records are unlikely to change anytime soon, this book opens the issue for debate.

MAJ Timothy Edward Murphy,
USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE CIVIL WAR BOOK OF LISTS, Donald Cartmell, New Page Books, Franklin Lakes, NJ, 2001, 263 pages, \$17.99.

The Civil War Book of Lists by Donald Cartmell is a fresh look at the Civil War era. Clear, comprehensive, and concise, this compendium addresses myriad topics related to the Civil War inclusive of antebellum,

wartime, and postbellum facts. While the book lives up to its title, it is not just another book of lists. It provides context and boundaries for a plethora of lists, addressing almost every conceivable topic relevant to the Civil War.

Cartmell's intent is to infuse new life into one's view of the Civil War. Doing justice to the participants and the battles, the book is about more than leaders and warfare. Cartmell clearly shows that the war affected a wide range of social, political, economic, and diplomatic topics and issues, and he has handily interwoven into his prose dozens of lists. Each chapter provides ways of looking at one of the most well-documented and studied wars of the Nation's history.

Full of photographs, time lines, background, and other pertinent information, this little book enables anyone to see the Civil War more clearly and how the war fits into the greater scheme of history. This book is bound to leave a reader saying, "I never knew that before," or "I never saw that piece of information in that light." The book is enjoyable, fast-moving, and well worth reading for anyone who has a deep interest in the Civil War.

MAJ Christopher McPadden, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

MONEY AND SECURITY: Troops, Monetary Policy and West Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971, Hubert Zimmerman, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002, 275 pages, \$45.00.

Normally, monetary policy is not discussed in the same breath as military force structuring, but as Hubert Zimmerman, an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Ruhr-University argues in *Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy and West Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971*, they not only can be discussed together, but they might be at times inextricably intertwined.

Zimmerman's thesis is quite simple. During the period from 1950 to 1971, the United States and Great Britain faced competing pressures as they determined what troop levels Germany should maintain. It was to

be expected that the two Western powers had to address traditional military and foreign policy questions arising out of the creation of the NATO, as well as the expected budget concerns related to the direct out-of-pocket cost of maintaining a presence in Europe.

What was novel for both the United States and Great Britain was how such an extended foreign military presence during peacetime affected the two countries' balance of payments during this period and what alternatives both would use to address the imbalances. To put it succinctly, they were "confronted with the dilemma of having to assign more relative value either to their central economic goal of strengthening the balance of payments or to vital security considerations." Be-

cause they could not ignore security considerations, the question was who would pay for their continued presence in Germany and how would it be paid.

Many of the military and political decisions the United States, Britain, and West Germany made during the 1950s and 1960s had a large "balance of payment and monetary policy" component. For example, Britain's reevaluation of the size of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) in 1957 has traditionally been attributed to geopolitical factors related to the Suez Crisis. Zimmerman argues that the failure of British arms exports to West Germany exacerbated the balance of payments problem caused by maintaining the BAOR, which became a crucial factor in the reevaluation. Similarly, Zimmerman shows

how the U.S. Department of Defense used arms sales to West Germany to offset the effect the Vietnam war had on the balance of payment, thereby postponing the necessity to decide between the Great Society and the war. Moreover, the constant pressure on West Germany to increase its contribution to NATO was directly related to payment issues.

This book presents an entirely different perspective on familiar events and is well worth reading. The subject matter is not necessarily easy to understand, as one would expect when dealing with monetary policy, but Zimmerman makes the subject far more readable than might be expected. I highly recommend the book.

John C. Binkley, Ph.D., *University of Maryland, College Park*

